THE SOUL by N. Wardner; John Harvey Kellogg

Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association · Battle Creek, Mich. · April 22, 1880

FromThe Advent Review and Sabbath Herald, Vol. 55, No. 17

THE SOUL.

By N. Wardner; John Harvey Kellogg

The Second of the Series of Discourses on Life, Soul, Death, and the Resurrection.

BY REV. N. WARDNER, D. D.

“And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life [margin, ‘breath of lives,’], and man became a living soul.” “Lives,” plural,—physical life and spiritual life. Gen. 2:7.

Dr. Kellogg, in his work, page 75, says: “When the body dies, the brain undergoes dissolution with the rest of the body, and thought, with consciousness, perception, and all the other attributes of mind, must perish with it.” If so, then all character perishes at death. And if perish means annihilation, that character can never exist again without a new creation.

Again the Doctor says, “It should be borne in mind that immateriality does not mean non-existence. Qualities exist, but are not material.” “Ideas have existed, but not materiality.” “A plan exists, abstractly, as a concept, but not as matter.” “The question is not, then, between a material soul and no soul at all, as some put it.” p. 86. “The soul is not material.” p. 96. “We cannot conceive of mind as independent of matter.” p. 51. Then the soul cannot exist independent of matter, unless it is independent of the mind, and it has no moral character, and is not subject to rewards or punishments. “A plan,” a “concept,” says the Doctor, may exist without matter; but a plan or concept is a thought; yet he says, “Thought cannot exist independent of matter.” How can both these statements be true? If thought cannot exist independently of matter, it must be a quality of matter.

On page 104, he says: “A record of the acts of both the righteous and the wicked is preserved in Heaven. . . . In this record is embodied a detailed plan of each person’s organization, whether he be good or bad. The record forms a perfect photograph of the individual, being, indeed, a representation of the abstract organization which was once represented in matter.” On page 95, he says: “The organization, like the plan of a house, is only an idea, a concept.” If a soul is merely a concept of a human organization, whose concept is it? Man’s or God’s? If man’s, then here is a human thought without matter, which “cannot exist” without matter; for a concept is a thought. If God’s, then it may have existed eternally, and he also rewards and punishes his own thoughts, because of what human beings had done who were annihilated ages before. How can an organization exist without organs, or organs exist without matter? “The soul is immaterial.” p. 96. “Matter is incompetent to constitute the soul.” p. 86. A soul, then, is not an organization.

The Doctor asks, “How is the soul, or organization, which loses its association with matter, at death, to be preserved for becoming again associated with matter in the reproduction or re-organization of the individual at the resurrection?” He answers thus: “If it is preserved, then, and re-associated with matter at some time subsequent to death, it must be because God has made some special arrangement for the purpose. This arrangement we discover in the perfect record of men’s lives, which is preserved in Heaven according to the Scriptures.” “This record . . . is, in the most thorough sense, a photograph; a perfect pattern of the organization of each individual. The character of an individual as pictured by his acts, including, of course, words and thoughts, bears the perfect impress of his organization.” pp. 94, 95.

How can an organization “lose its association with matter,” when it cannot exist without matter? According to the Doctor’s theory, even a thought, or conception of such organization, cannot exist without matter. “Thought is inseparable from matter.” If “thought is inseparable from matter,” it must be a property of matter; and hence character, and all that makes man responsible, are only properties of matter. Yet he says, “The soul is not material,” still it exists between death and the resurrection. Here we have that existing without matter which cannot exist without matter! He claims that an immaterial spirit cannot exist. “Such a thing as an immaterial substance is a nonentity, an impossibility,” p. 36.

Again he says, “The soul or organization, like the plan of a house, is only an idea, a concept.” Is a conception and the thing conceived one and the same? The conception of every existence was in the mind of God ages before it existed in fact. Was his concept of a human soul that soul itself? If so, then it existed from eternity.

The Doctor says the Bible and science “recognize no human existence, but a material existence.” p. 76. Then he says, “The soul is not material.” p. 96. Hence the soul is no part of human existence.

Again: “Since human identity consists in identity of organization, if we have reproduced in the resurrection the same organization as that which an individual possessed at death, the personal identity of that individual will be restored. He will have the memory of the person who died, with his individual peculiarities—leaving out defects—and will recognize himself as the same person.” p. 93. If so, then he will recognize as true what is untrue; for if “man is made wholly of matter,” and absolutely goes out of existence (“death is non-existence.” U. S.), he can no more be reproduced out of other matter and be identically the same, than the identical flames produced by the burning of London, A. D. 1666, were reproduced in the burning of Chicago, A. D. 1871. The idea that a newly created being should be made to believe himself to be another being who went out of existence ages before, and be held responsible and punished for what that other being did, is not only absurd, but monstrous injustice.

The Doctor claims that a human body, constructed after the same plan, though of different materials, and even with “defects left out,” is absolutely the same being who had long been out of existence! If a house burns down, and another is built, of different materials, after the same plan, leaving out defects; is it the same house? If my coat wears out, and I have another made after the same pattern, out of different material, is it the same coat? If one house or coat may succeed another and be identical, because constructed after the same pattern, then they may exist side by side, and still be identical; and so may thousands of them!

The fact that spirit manifests itself through organized matter no more proves that it is produced by that matter than the fact that electricity manifests itself through a machine proves that it is produced by that machine, and cannot exist independently of it. If thought is entirely the product of the brain, it can no more change till the brain changes than sweet water can flow from a bitter fountain. It is a universal law of nature that a cause, acting under the same circumstances and in the same manner, always produces the same effects; and if said effects ever change, a change must first take place in the cause that produces them. We all know that mind has a controlling power over the body to make it act at will, thus proving its superiority and independence of action. But if the mind is simply an effect of the brain, or body, then the effect is superior to its cause, and controls its cause, and so we may expect soon to see a stream control and change its fountain, instead of being controlled by its fountain!

Again says Dr. K., “Matt. 10:28 shows that the soul is of greater importance than the body.” p. 70. Then, according to his theory, the thing produced is of greater importance than the cause which produced it; hence, superior. Can even God himself produce anything superior to or of greater importance than himself? If he cannot, how can matter? If God, a spirit, did or can exist independently of matter, then such is the law of his existence, and it is therefore conceivable that he may have created other things capable of existing in like manner. But the Doctor says, “Mind is the result of the force of matter.” p. 51. If so, then spirit is a product of matter, and cannot be renewed or regenerated till that corrupt matter which produces it is first regenerated and purified. “Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? Not one.” Job. 14:4. Christ says a bad tree cannot produce good fruit; hence, every tree is known by its fruit.

What does the Doctor mean when he says, “The perfected character will be represented in a perfect body, which will no longer be a trammel to the soul in its aspirations after good, but will accord with it in perfect harmony”? p. 150. Here he talks like an orthodox minister, that the body is the instrument of the soul instead of being the producer of it, making the soul superior, which in its aspirations might be helped or crippled by its medium, the body. Character results from choice, will, habit, etc., all exercises of the mind, and when developed by one class of circumstances cannot possibly be the same as a character developed by different circumstances and influences; and how can a newly created being possess the exact character of another, formed by different influences, and had ceased to exist ages before, or be justly held responsible for his deeds?

Finally, was Christ’s character and divinity simply the product of his physical organization and the influences around him? We are told that in all respects he was “made like unto his brethren.” Heb. 2:17. Did his divine spirit, wisdom, and power cease to exist when his body died? Or were they merely preserved in a record or photograph? Since only one true divinity can exist, and Christ was that divinity, did it pass out of existence so that there was only the photograph of divinity for three days and nights? How was this?

REPLY.

The first point made by Eld. W. in the foregoing article is that if, as we claim, the mind is dependent upon the brain, and the brain undergoes dissolution at death, so that thought and consciousness perish at death, then “all character perishes at death,” and “can never exist again without a new creation.” Our reviewer’s conclusion is too hasty. A little more thought upon the subject would have shown him very clearly what we think no one can fail to see, that character is not “an attribute of mind.” Character, in its broadest sense, pertains not to the brain alone, but to the individual as a whole, and depends not upon the material structure of the individual, but upon his organization. During life the character is preserved by the material representation of this organization; after death, and between death and the resurrection, by the record representation in Heaven. The record of a man’s life in Heaven, including as it does a complete account of his every thought and act, may be said to be a character, representative of the individual. It appears, then, that the character does not perish with the body, but survives so long as a record of the man’s life is preserved in Heaven, in the same way, though in a much more complete sense, as a man may be said to live in the memory of his friends after he is dead. It is not the man, but his character, which lives, even though everything material that went to compose his body has returned to dust in obedience to the command, “Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return.”

After making several quotations from our work, showing that we believe the soul to be immaterial, Eld. W. says, “Then the soul cannot exist independent of matter, unless it is independent of the mind, and it has no moral character, and is not subject to rewards or punishments.” Certainly; we accept the conclusion. In the work criticised by Eld. W., we have endeavored to show that the mind and the soul must be entirely distinct in character. Eld. W. leaves us to infer that he believes the mind and the soul to be identical. He must admit that lower animals have minds as well as man. There is no way to escape the unequivocal declaration of science that the same evidence that proves that man has a mind establishes the same for lower animals. Eld. W., then, will have to agree with the eccentric English divine who asserts that horses, dogs, cats, and other lower animals, have souls and a hereafter as well as man. An argument that proves too much proves nothing; and it appears to us that our reviewer’s argument involves him in this dilemma.

In the sense in which we use the word soul in the quotations made by Eld. W., we grant that it cannot be subject to rewards and punishments. The soul is not the individual, but a representative of him. Men, women, persons, are rewarded and punished, not souls. The Bible gives no hint of either reward or punishment until after the resurrection of the dead. The soul, independent of the body, cannot be punished. The idea of punishing an immateriality is in the highest degree absurd. In the instances in which the Bible speaks of the soul as being punished, as “The soul that sinneth, it shall die,” the term soul is used in a figurative sense to mean the whole person. The evident meaning of the text is, the person who sins will be punished with death.

Again Eld. W. says, professedly quoting us, “‘A plan,’ a ‘concept,’ says the Doctor, may exist without matter,” [Italics ours]. He then continues, “‘But a plan or concept is a thought; yet he says, ‘Thought cannot exist independent of matter.’ How can both these statements be true? If thought cannot exist independently of matter, it must be a quality of matter.’”

Again we agree with Eld. W.; both the statements to which he refers cannot be true. Does the reader inquire further, Which is not true? We answer, The first. We never stated that a plan or a concept may exist without matter. At least, we do not believe such a statement, and if it occurs in our book it is an accidental error; but after having several persons read the book through for the express purpose of finding the statement, we are confirmed in the belief that it does not occur in the work reviewed, even as an error. We did say, “A plan exists, abstractly, as a concept, but not as matter.” This is quite a different thing, as will appear to the most casual reader by the aid of a simple illustration. Suppose we had said, Hearing exists as a sensation, not as sound, and Eld. W. had quoted us as saying, Hearing may exist without sound, he would have misstated our position in the same way that he has now done. Fire is not heat, and yet fire cannot exist without heat. So a plan, a concept, is not itself matter, and yet it cannot exist without matter. It thus appears either that our reviewer has resorted to very ingenious sophistry to make us appear to be in error, or else has committed a very serious philosophical blunder. We are unwilling to entertain the first hypothesis, and will leave the reader to decide as to the second. An equally grave philosophical error is involved in his next sentence. He says, “If thought cannot exist independently of matter, it must be a quality of matter.” This is certainly incorrect reasoning. The relation of dependence does not imply that of quality, as another illustration will show. An animal cannot exist independent of air. Does it follow from this that air is a quality of animals?

Thus far, all the arguments of our reviewer have been based upon illogical deductions.

Let us now notice his further strictures. After quoting from pages 104 and 95 of our work, he says: “If a soul is merely a concept of a human organization, whose concept is it? Man’s, or God’s? If man’s, then here is a human thought without matter, which cannot exist without matter.” This argument needs no attention, as it is based on an error of our reviewer, which we have just pointed out. We never claimed that thought could exist without matter; but, as our reviewer himself pointed out in a preceding article, have contended that thought could not exist without matter. But Eld. W. continues, “If God’s, then it may have existed eternally, and he also rewards and punishes his own thoughts, because of what human beings had done who were annihilated ages before.” Here is a most glaring absurdity, surely. We must

protest, however, against being made responsible for it. The reader will find nothing like it in the book under consideration. It is a structure of error builded by our reviewer out of an illogical deduction from our premises, and preconceived views of his own which to us appear to be incorrect. We have not claimed that the soul is “a concept of an organization,” but that the human soul is the sum of the relations existing between the material components of a human body. It may be said to be the plan of a man’s make-up, and it represents an individual just as the plan of a house represents the house. The drawing which is termed the plan, is not the real plan any more than is the house itself; it is one way of representing the plan, just as the house is another and the most perfect mode of representing it. The thought, idea, or conception of the organization is only another mode of representation in which it is presented to the mind by the imagination. We believe, with Aristotle, that the soul is “form, pure and simple,” considered apart from matter or any other possible means of representation. Our reviewer will grant that there is a difference between a relation and the things related. The things related are material; the relation is not material, but is dependent, in a certain sense, upon matter for its existence. The soul seems to us to be simply the sum total of the relations existing between the various parts of a human being. We may not have expressed our idea the most happily in the sentence under consideration, but hope we have now made our meaning clear. We can see no more difficulty in the fact that God may have had in his mind a conception of each human soul from all eternity than in the equally certain fact that, knowing the end from the beginning, he knew what would be the acts of each individual long before man was created. As the latter fact does not affect the question of human responsibility, the former does not affect the question of the nature of the soul.

Our reviewer asks, “How can an organization exist without organs, or organs exist without matter?” He then quotes us, “The soul is immaterial,” and concludes, “A soul, then, is not an organization.” This seeming incongruity is wholly the result of a play upon words. Our use of the word organization must make it evident that our meaning is, “The relations included in such a state [of organization] or condition.”—Webster. With this meaning the inconsistency disappears. The meaning attached to the word by Eld. W. is wholly foreign to our use of it.

Eld. W. next quotes us as representing that the soul loses its association with matter at death, and asks, “How can an organization lose its association with matter, when it cannot exist without matter?” The expression may not have been sufficiently guarded to make a misunderstanding or misconstruction impossible, but we think it must be evident to the reader that reference was made not to matter in general, but to the matter composing the body. The record representation of the organization in Heaven, if it has any existence at all, must have some sort of a material existence. Hence we are justified in claiming that the criticism does not hold.

Eld. W. further says, “If ‘thought is inseparable from matter,’ it must be a property of matter, and hence character and all that makes man responsible are only properties of matter.” We have not said that “thought is inseparably connected with matter;” hence we are not responsible for the conclusion drawn by Eld. W., that “character and all that makes man responsible are only properties of matter.” The attributes of mind are properties of organization, not of matter, just as the beauty of a portrait is not a property of the paints with which it is colored, but of the arrangement of the various colors.

Eld. W. evidently fails to understand our position or he would be unable to say as he does, quoting from our work, “The soul is not material,” still it exists between death and the resurrection. Here we have that existing without matter which cannot exist without matter! Our reviewer is evidently astonished at the absurdity of our position, and, as represented, it certainly is absurd; but he omits to notice that we have in our work called attention to the fact that the soul is represented by the heavenly record of an individual’s life when his body goes back to dust, existing thus until the resurrection. All that is necessary to dispel the absurdity of the position is a fair presentation of it.

Eld. W. says again, “He claims that an immaterial spirit cannot exist.” Such a thing as an immaterial substance cannot exist. Will Eld. W. claim the contrary, viz., that an immaterial substance can exist? This would be equivalent to believing that there may exist a substance which is not substance, for immaterial means not substance, or not matter! Will Eld. W. give us evidence of the existence of an immaterial spirit or substance?

The next paragraph we have already answered in substance, and hence do not need to notice again. Our reviewer quotes us as saying that the Bible and science recognize no human existence but a material existence, and that “the soul is not material,” and adds, “Hence the soul is no part of human existence.” If we did not know our reviewer to be an honest and honorable man, we should say that such reasoning was inexcusable. The least that can be said is that it is very bad logic, since it violates one of the plainest rules of logical reasoning, as an illustration will show. A house is recognized by science only as a material existence. The plan of a house is not material. Hence the plan of a house is no part of it. The absurdity of the conclusion must be patent to all. If our reviewer will refer to any text-book on logic he will see that one of the fundamental rules laid down is that no conclusion can be drawn from negative premises. This is what he has done, and hence we have just grounds for complaint that the reasoning is illogical and incorrect.

The next argument is based upon a statement supposed to be quoted from our work; viz., “Man is made wholly of matter.” We never believed such a statement, and cannot find it in the work under consideration. As Eld. W. does not give the page on which he finds it, we conclude that he quoted from memory and thus fell into error. The statement seriously misrepresents our position, as will be seen by reference to page 64 of our work, where in referring to this very subject we say, “Man is made up of two parts, matter and organization.” Now we would humbly submit to the candid reader whether or not Eld. W.’s statement properly represents our views. If not, then all the arguments which he proceeds to build upon it are as erroneous as the quotation which he makes.

With reference to the quotation made from Eld. Smith, that “death is non-existence,” we have to say, as we remarked at the outset, that we shall not hold ourselves responsible for any but our own views. To attempt to disprove our views by showing an inconsistency between them and a statement made by Eld. S. several years ago in accordance with a view quite different from ours, does not seem to us to be strictly fair. But as the argument fails from having been based on a misquotation, we need not notice it further.

We agree with Eld. W. that if man and all there is of him goes out of existence at death, he could never be reproduced. But we do not believe such a theory, and have not taught it; on the contrary, our book was written for the purpose of showing that man has a soul which does not perish with the body, and which represents an individual during death and secures his identity in the resurrection, even without identity of matter.

We also agree with Eld. W. that “the idea that a newly created being should be made to believe himself to be another being,” etc., “is not only absurd, but monstrous injustice.” But we cannot help feeling that we are subjected to the same sort of injustice, since we have never expressed any such idea, either in the work under review or anywhere else. On the contrary, we have labored at length to show that a person resurrected without any of the original matter composing his body, but with the same organization, is not a newly created individual, but the same person that died. On pages 217 to 219 of the work reviewed by Eld. W., we argue as follows:—“The resurrection must concern especially the same elements of man’s nature that were involved in creation. The thing that was created, goes into the grave; a human body dies, is disorganized. At the resurrection we have a restoration of the same person by re-organization of matter in the same order, manner, or arrangement. The matter of which Adam’s body was composed was not created at his creation. The only new thing made in the creation of man was an organization. God formed man from the dust of the ground; that is, he gave to inorganic matter an arrangement which invested it with life. The organization was created, not the matter. Through the creation of an organization and its representation in matter, Adam was created. In death, the material representation of the organization is destroyed. The person is dead. In the resurrection, the same organization is again represented in matter, the re-organization being effected by the same omnipotent power which created the first organization. Thus the resurrection concerns chiefly the very same thing which was created; viz., the organization. It appears, then, that a resurrection which excludes or ignores the original atoms of the body is not in any proper sense a new creation, since the same individual is reproduced. The creation of man was making a living being out of dead matter without reference to any previously existing man. The resurrection is making a living man out of dead matter, with direct reference to a previ- ously existing man, who is reproduced by the preservation and reproduction of the identical organization. There is no new creation involved, but a resurrection in every sense of the word.”

Eld. W. continues to argue on the supposition that we believe in annihilation at death, which doctrine we do not believe, and have taken particular pains to controvert. After expressing astonishment at our view of human identity, by means of an exclamation point, he continues thus: “If a house burns down, and another is built, of different materials, after the same plan, leaving out defects, is it the same house?” If a house were a fit analogue of a human being, the argument against us would be conclusive; but as it is not, the quotation has only the value of an illustration, and is without logical force. Eld. W. does not mention to his readers that we have established the fact that the nature of identity differs with different classes of objects. Objects which naturally undergo change of substance do not require identity of substance for their identification, but do require identity of organization, at least in a certain degree. Objects which do not naturally undergo a change of substance require identity of matter, for their identification. For instance, a river, the material element of which, the water, continually changes, retains its identity notwithstanding; while a house or a rock, which does not by nature undergo such changes, requires the same material elements for identification. In one or the other of these two classes all natural objects may be placed, man with the rest. If the human body is characterized by permanency of matter, then it may be classed with such things as houses, coats, and similar objects, as is done by Eld. W.; if, on the other hand, it is known to be naturally subject to change of material elements, it must be conceded that man belongs in the other class,—that in which identity consists in organization, not in matter,—and must be compared with such objects as a river, a cloud, a rainbow, a society. Let us take one of these objects as an illustration, and see if there is a just analogy; for example, a river. In many tropical countries, and in some parts of this country, rivers disappear in the hot season, their beds becoming dry. Two years ago, in passing through Western Kansas on the cars, we observed a dry river-bed of this sort. There was no river there; but when the fall rains came, water appeared, and the river flowed again. Now will Eld. W. tell us that this was not the same river that had been flowing there before? Surely not. The river is the same, because its bed, its banks, its source, its mouth, all its relations to other objects, in short its organization, is the same. If these had been materially changed, the river would have been annihilated; but as they were preserved, the river was reproduced, literally resurrected as man will be in the resurrection of the dead. Where is the “monstrous absurdity” in this; if we are mistaken, we shall be glad to have the error pointed out.

Eld. W. next says, “The fact that spirit manifests itself through organized matter no more proves that it is produced by that matter, than the fact that electricity manifests itself through a machine proves that it is produced by that machine and cannot exist independently of it.” In answer we will say, 1. We have never claimed that spirit is a product of matter. None of the attributes of mind are products of matter, but of organization, of which God is the author. We submit, however, that the evidence that mind is inseparably connected with matter is of exactly the same character as that which proves electricity to be inseparably connected, not with any particular machine, but with matter.

Eld. W. says again, “We all know that mind has a controlling power upon the body, . . . thus proving its superiority.” Let us see. Suppose the skull be crushed in upon the brain; the mind has no further power; indeed, it disappears altogether! What would be the natural conclusion? Evidently it must be that the brain is the controlling organ after all, and that the mind is merely the manifestation of its action. Thus the argument that we have made an effect “superior to its cause,” falls to the ground.

Eld. W. continues, still combating a position which we do not hold, and which cannot be legitimately drawn from our premises, quoting us: “Matt. 10:28 shows that the soul is of greater importance than the body.” From which he argues that we have represented the thing produced as being “of greater importance than the cause which produced it.” This is incorrect, for we have never claimed that the soul was a product of the body. It is, according to our view, and as we have stated again and again in the work under consideration, the most essential part of the body.

Eld. W. says, and we agree with him, that “if God, a spirit, did or can exist independently of matter,” it is “conceivable that he may have created other things

[beings] capable of existing in like manner.” But there is an insurmountable “if” in the way. In order for this argument to be of any value, the supposition must be established as a positive proposition.

Eld. W. next argues that if “mind is the result of the forces of matter,” then spirit is a product of matter. Here our reviewer begs the question altogether. He first assumes, without offering more than suppository proof, the existence of spirit, and then assumes further, without offering any evidence at all, that spirit and mind are identical. Such argument is inconclusive.

With reference to the quotation in which Eld. W. thinks we talk “like an orthodox minister,” we have to confess that we indulged in a rhetorical flourish that may be construed contrary to our real views as elsewhere expressed; but we intended to advance no different theory. We used the word soul in a figurative sense, for one of the dependencies of the soul, the mind,—a common figure of speech. However, this is wholly irrelevant to the subject, as we based no argument upon the expressions employed.

Eld. W. has maintained that mind, thought, character, etc., are independent of matter. Now we are astonished to find him saying that character is developed from circumstances. Circumstances are material, or at least are the product of material agencies. If, then, character depends entirely upon circumstances, it must depend upon matter; and if, as Eld. W. claims, character is an attribute of the mind and the responsible part of man, he does not come very far from agreeing with us that man possesses no such thing as a conscious, thinking, immaterial entity independent of the body.

Eld. W. asks, “Finally, was Christ’s character and divinity simply the product of his physical organization and the influences around him?” Let Eld. W. himself answer. “Character results from choice, will, habit, etc., all exercises of the mind, and when developed by one class of circumstances,” etc. He makes no exception, and even goes on to say that a character “developed by one class of circumstances cannot possibly be the same as a character developed by different circumstances and influences.” He even questions the power of God to make a being whose character should be the same as that of another which had been developed by special circumstances. His reasoning would seem to establish beyond question, then, not only that the character of Christ was a product of the circumstances under which he was placed, but, as his divinity is included in his character, his divinity also. Apparently to strengthen this view, our reviewer quotes Paul in Heb. 2:17, to show that “in all respects He was ‘made like unto his brethren.’” If our view of the nature of the soul is unorthodox, it is certainly not more so than such a doctrine as this.

Eld. W. further asks, “Did his divine spirit, wisdom, and power cease to exist when his body died?” We will let Paul answer. In Rom. 5:6 he says, “Christ died for the ungodly.” He does not say that Christ’s body died, as does Eld. W., neither do the Scriptures anywhere intimate that Christ himself did not die upon the cross as really as died the lamb of which he was the great antitype, at the hands of the high priest in the Jewish atonement service. Eld. W. concludes, “Since only one true divinity can exist, and Christ was that divinity, did it pass out of existence so that there was only the photograph of divinity for three days and nights? How was this?”

Does Eld. W. really wish us to explain “the mystery of godliness,” how “God was manifested in the flesh?” We make no pretense to such wisdom. Will his philosophy make clear this wonderful mystery? We must confess, however, that we can much more easily reconcile the supposed difficulty with our views than we can reconcile with the teachings of the Scriptures and logical reasoning the doctrine of the trinity, to which our reviewer holds.

In conclusion we would remark that it seems to us that Eld. W. has devoted most of his criticisms to points of comparatively small consequence. He has not attacked at all the fundamental ideas upon which our views are based. We call his attention to this fact, so that he may not fail to point out, if he can do so, the fundamental errors in our views, if such there be, and thereby lead us to the truth.

J. H. KELLOGG.