AMERICA'S INDUSTRIAL SUPREMACY ASSURED.
“Every war, even a victorious war, is a national calamity.” So writes the Count von Moltke, Germany’s most successful warrior. And he might have added, To be constantly preparing for war is a national calamity but little inferior to actual warfare. Last year Europe expended for military and naval purposes something near $800,000,000, and did no fighting. This great burden was borne chiefly by eight powers, as follows: Russia, $173,740,000; Great Britain, $153,510,000; France, $128,520,000; Germany, $101,626,000; Austro-Hungary, $53,074,000; Italy, $44,030,000; Spain, $28,560,000; Turkey, $23,800,000. This profitless squandering of money which the overtaxed producers have to furnish is unfortunately not the whole of the blood tax upon Europe in times of peace. The national debts of Europe, due almost entirely to past wars and preparations for future conflicts, amount to more than twenty billion dollars, the interest of which the producers have to meet. About eighteen billions of debt stand against the eight powers above named. This is the tax paid in money. That which comes from withdrawing able-bodied men from productive labor is an item of scarcely less magnitude, for the standing armies of Europe foot up something over eight millions. In a late report by the Hungarian ministry, designed to show the relative weakness of the Austro-Hungarian forces, the armies of the five chief States of Europe were enumerated as follows:— The military strength of Russia consists of 3,046,800 men, of whom 600,000 belong to the reserve, and 2,446,800 to the standing army. The regular army of France comprises 1,689,000 soldiers of all arms; the territorial army, 1,208,000; total, 2,289,000; to be increased in 1892 by the addition of 300,000 reserve men to 2,723,000. The German power of all classes is represented by 2,004,300 men, of whom 1,076,200 belong to the standing army, 307,200 to the landwehr, and 620,900 to the reserve. Italy has an army of 698,000 and a militia of 310,000. In 1892, when the reserve will number 1,016,200, her total strength will reach 2,024,200. Austro-Hungary possesses a standing army of 800,000, a landwehr of 299,318, and a reserve of 95,000 men; total, 1,194,318. The grand total of all these forces amounts to 16,471,918, the standing armies alone numbering 7,925,000. To these figures there should be added for the armies of Great Britain, Spain, and Turkey, about 700,000 regular soldiers and twice as many reserves. Allowing that half of the men nominally in the European armies are at home on furlough, and able to take part in productive labor, there cannot be less than 4,000,000 men, in the prime of life, permanently withdrawn from productive industry in the great States named. Counting the labor of these men as worth no more than a hundred dollars each a year, the burden of their idleness can be measured only by hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Adding the value of the time lost by the millions of reserves in drilling, and the losses incident to the spoiling of men for peaceful industry by enforced soldiering during the years of early manhood, a rough idea can be formed of the aggregate burden which governmental ambition and mutual fear combine to lay upon the shoulders of Europe’s working population. Not the least disheartening feature of this state of things is its tendency to grow steadily worse. As a leading English journal pertinently remarks, it is the special aggravation of this waste of human energies that it is interminable, that it settles nothing finally, that the consequence of war is not peace, but a condition of further preparation, in which victory and defeat alike are used as arguments for further preparations. Germany is victor, and becomes a camp; France is vanquished, and becomes a parade ground. Germany is united, and must therefore be drilled; Italy is united, and must therefore be drilled; the Balkan peninsula is disunited, and must therefore be drilled. Whatever the circumstances, or the sacrifices, or the hopes, there must be more and ever more men drilled, more expenditure on preparations for war, more devotion by rulers to military work, more surrender of citizens to disciplinary training. To this frightful extent Europe is handicapped in the race for industrial supremacy. It is the penalty which the people have to pay for the accidents of their geographical position, the forms of government they have inherited, and their worse inheritance of military history, national hatreds, and political entanglements. At the same time the ability of the European workers to meet these heavy obligations is being steadily lessened, not only by the drafting of their best brawn and bone into the armies, but by the voluntary expatriation every year of thousands of their more energetic sons and daughters. The United States comprise about the same area as the great States of Europe combined, and already have nearly one-fifth as many inhabitants. From our continental position, any great aggressive war in America by American men is altogether impossible, and the prospect of great civil wars is, we are happy to believe, not less remote. Our strength is rapidly becoming so great—if it is not already so—that no foreign nations are likely to assail us; and the aversion of our people to foreign entanglements is likely to keep us from offensive foreign wars. The natural advantages of America for diversified and prosperous industries are certainly not less than those enjoyed by Europe; and our people are quite as capable as those of Europe of making the most of their industrial opportunities. The problem of industrial supremacy is, therefore, not hard to solve. The single advantage we enjoy in being free from the terrible war-burdens of Europe even in times of peace, and our practical exemption from risk of foreign wars, cannot fail to maintain us in our position as the most prosperous people in the world. The annual tale of labor prevented, labor misapplied, and labor driven away by the enormous armies and armaments of Europe, finds no counterpart here. All our labor is productive,—all tends to swell our national wealth, and increase our power to do and to enjoy. This alone would insure our industrial supremacy, other things being equal, in a very few years; and fortunately our freedom from Europe’s military burdens is but one of the great blessings we have to be thankful for,—but one of the conditions which go to make sure our superiority in productive power,—our supremacy in the arts of peace. And the advantage of all this must and does accrue mainly to the American producer, showing itself in lighter taxes, higher wages, a greater diffusion of wealth, and a more generous style of living, all of which are everywhere recognizable by European tourists here as characteristic of the lives of American workers.—Scientific American.