FIRST REPLY TO DR. KELLOGG’S REJOINDER.
By N. Wardner
BY REV. N. WARDNER, D. D. Before entering upon my reply, I wish to state that the discrepancy in the printed form of my discourse on “Life,” the printer made me quote the Doctor wrong, which I corrected in the next number of the Recorder, as he did in his rejoinder. In the Doctor’s review of my sermon on “Life,” he says, “We have never claimed that anything was ever produced by matter, much less that God was an emanation from matter.” In his book, page 36, he says, “All existing things are the attributes or characteristics of some material things. Such a thing as an immaterial substance is a nonentity, an impossibility.” Then God must either be matter or an attribute of matter, or he is a nonentity! Is not such an inference inevitable from such a premise? It implies, also, that if anything was ever produced, it must have been produced by matter, for nothing could exist without matter. Do not these statements necessarily imply that all things and beings, and even God himself, if they exist at all, exist by virtue of some attribute of matter? If, as the Doctor says, “the origin of God is a mystery too inscrutable from all standpoints of observation, and inexplicable by all human theories,” why does he make such sweeping and unqualified statements as will not allow of his existence in any other way than as matter or an attribute of matter? His statement seems to be as positive and unqualified as though he knew that no being could exist except in one particular way. He says, “We are willing to leave the question of the origin of God where Inspiration leaves it.” But his theory does not leave it there. Does Inspiration teach that all divine and human spirits and intelligence are simply attributes of matter? Is not the origin of the human mind and spirit, also, “too inscrutable from all standpoints of observation, and inexplicable by all human theories,” to warrant the making such “inscrutable” and “inexplicable” questions the basis of a separate religious organization, and make their discussion a prominent part of their work? Again, says the Doctor, “We can say about the origin of matter, as about the origin of God, We know nothing about it.” How much more does the Doctor know about the origin of spirit and mind, and their connection with matter? If he knows nothing about the origin of matter, then how does he know that it was eternal, or that no intelligent designer existed before it? If, as he says, mind is “inseparably connected with matter,” then this rule must apply to the divine mind as well as to the human; and even if “we cannot conceive of” them as existing without matter, does that fact warrant the assertion that no intelligence ever did or can thus exist? It seems to be a fact that, so far as scientific tests can show, the minutest particle of matter contains evidence of intelligent design, as clearly as any organized body, and is, in its nature, adapted to the end it serves. And if any substance lay back of such particle, and gave rise to its existence, it doubtless contained the same evidence of intelligent design, and so on, ad infinitum. Can there be design without a designer who existed first? and how can it be assumed, with propriety, that no mind could exist before or independent of that which contains such proofs of intelligent design? Can an intelligent effect result from an unintelligent cause, or no cause at all? and can there be an infinite succession of such causes and effects? Science can no more settle the question of the origin of mind than it can the origin of God. To settle one is to settle the other. The Doctor says again, “We must utterly disavow advocating any theory, according to which all moral character is the product of matter. . . . We believe human life and thought, in all their phases and with all their modifications, to be the result of organization, which is the product, not of matter, but of Almighty power. . . . We are still in want of evidence to show that man . . . is more than what he seems to be, an organization of matter.” If man is nothing but organized matter, how can he have any characteristics except properties or attributes of matter, if so be that “all existing things are the attributes or characteristics of some material things”? An apple is the result of organized matter, and derives its qualities from the tree, and thus shows what are the characteristic properties of the tree. “A tree is known by its fruit,” because it cannot develop properties that are not in it. Can men develop what is not in them? If man is “made wholly of matter,” how can he develop any but material properties? If he does, must it not proceed from some thing or some being besides matter? Is God, who organized man, the author of his character, and responsible for it? Some intelligent being or entity, superior to organized matter, must be, or else the matter itself must be responsible. Which is it? Speaking of man’s creation, the Doctor says, “He was like a delicately constructed mechanism, awaiting the touch of a master to unloose the mainspring, and set the machine in motion.” If man is a material machine, then all thought, character, etc., are the result of the workings of this machine; what a machine turns out depends upon its construction, and its products are invariably what its organism is adapted and designed to produce. Different effects cannot be produced till some change takes place in the construction or arrangement of the machine. A sewing machine is not adapted to grind corn, because its inventor had no such end in view. It must do what it was made to do. If man is simply a material piece of mechanism, he must act according to the law of its construction; and how could he, and not the maker, be justly held responsible for his acts? But if there is a power vested in man, as universal consciousness teaches, which enables him to control the operations of this mechanism, it must be, in some sense, distinct from and superior to the mechanism itself. Unless there is such power in him, how can he justly be held responsible for his acts? Is universal consciousness no evidence of a truth? Does it lie? The Doctor says, “Bad thoughts and habits leave their impress upon the brain, which can only be affected by a change in its organization.” But what produces these bad thoughts and habits? What produces bad fruit? Is the cause in the fruit, or in the tree which produced it? Is a tree so injured by bearing bad fruit that it must be re-organized to repair the injury? It would need to be re-organized before it could bear good fruit. Is it not the bad qualities of the tree that produce the bad fruit? If man is simply a vitalized machine, and it works out “bad thoughts and habits,” who is responsible? Either the machine is, or else its Maker, unless there is some element connected with it, and superior to it, which has power to control its action at will, as universal consciousness teaches is the case with man. Again, the Doctor says, “The Scriptures clearly teach that rewards and punishments wholly depend upon the resurrection, upon the restoration of a material body, . . . though, in a certain sense, the character may survive so long as the memory of the individual’s life is preserved.” According to the Doctor’s theory, men’s characters cease to exist at death, except in God’s memory, and will never exist again unless he reproduces them. Do the Scriptures teach that God will reproduce bad actions and thoughts, i. e., immoral characters? The Doctor says, “We believe that in every case where the word life is used in a so-called spiritual sense, its use is figurative.” This seems equivalent to saying that regeneration, by which spiritual life is obtained, is only a figure of speech and no reality. How is it in the following passages? “In him was life, and the life was the light of men.” Is this a figure of speech and not a fact? “As the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself.” Have neither the Father nor the Son any other than physical life except in a figurative sense? With reference to my last statement, that final rewards and punishments must affect a higher element of man’s nature than merely his physical body, the Doctor says, “As it has not been shown that man has a so-called higher element in his nature, we can see no logical foundation for such statement.” He here seems to take the position that simply the preservation or destruction of this physical mechanism is all that constitutes the final rewards and punishments of men, and that any other position is illogical. What did the Doctor mean when he said that Matt. 10:28 “shows that the soul is of greater importance than the body”? Is not that superior which is of “superior importance”? What else could make a thing superior? In speaking of the resurrection, he says the body “will no longer be a trammel to the soul in its aspirations after good.” What is this but representing the soul as superior to the body in importance, and as the seat of intelligence and character, since the resurrected body is made to conform to its aspirations after good, so as not to be a trammel to it? The Doctor claims to base his theory of mind, etc., on science, and yet rejects Dr. Allman’s statements as of no account. What does he know of science on this question except from the results of the investigations of scientific men? and to reject the statements of the highest scientific authorities, or claim that they contradict each other in this matter, does not speak well for the reliability of his theory. In our article to which the above is intended to be a reply, we called especial attention to the fact that we did not attempt to make our theory of the nature of man account for the existence of God. We also invited Eld. W. to try his own theory by the same test which he would apply to ours. As was very aptly remarked by Eld. Cottrell, when referring to the article under consideration, “Man is the subject of investigation,” and we were struck with the peculiar appropriateness, as bearing on this point in the discussion, of an anecdote related by Eld. C. A young man whom he was seeking to impress with the importance of religious subjects, thought he had pre- sented an unanswerable argument when he retorted, “Who made God, anyway?” He supposed that religion must be a myth if it did not account for the origin of God. He never stopped to reflect as to whether his infidelity presented any better solution of the problem. So Eld. Wardner continues to urge that our theory of the nature of man is erroneous simply because it will not account for the origin of God, and this in the face of our protest that we have never made any attempt to solve that inscrutable mystery. Furthermore, Eld. W. does not attempt to relieve himself of the difficulty in which he is clearly involved; for when he objects to our view because it does not account for the origin of God, he is certainly under obligations to show that his own theory will solve this great problem. We particularly pointed out his duty to show how his theory is, in this respect, superior to ours, but he has utterly failed to do so; indeed, he most sedulously avoids any such attempt. Eld. W. asks, if, as we say, “the origin of God is a mystery inscrutable from all standpoints of observation,” why we “make such sweeping and unqualified statements as will not allow of his existence in any other way than as matter, or an attribute of matter?” We have made no statements which oblige us to account for the origin of God, and invite our readers to examine the book under criticism, and decide for themselves. The quotation made by Eld. W. is not quite correct, and hence we may be pardoned for giving it entire, and as it is in our work, with the context. Under the heading, “The Nature of Matter,”—we make no reference whatever to the nature or origin of God, as might be supposed from Eld. W.’s article,—we remark as follows: “The conclusions which have been drawn respecting the nature or constitution of matter (not of God), by the ablest minds of the age, from the observations of scientific men (we make no claim to original discoveries on this point) from the earliest dawn of science down to the present day, are chiefly the following: . . . ‘All existing things are either material in character, or are the attributes or characteristics of some material thing.’” The words of the last sentence in italics are omitted by Eld. W. in his quotation. As will be seen, all we have asserted is that so far as the observations of scientific men have led to any conclusion on this subject, the results have been as stated. We would respectfully inquire if Eld. W.’s observations warrant him in taking the opposite position, which he seems to assume. If so, we would next inquire, by means of which one of the seven senses—our only means of making observations—has our reviewer been able to see, hear, feel, taste, smell, or otherwise appreciate an immaterial entity? For our reviewer to pronounce our view erroneous because it does not explain or account for the origin of God, is as unreasonable as it would be for him to repudiate the science of astronomy because it does not explain the source of solar heat, or to pronounce the science of mechanics a mass of useless vagaries because it will not enable a man to construct a perpetual motion. Inspiration does not teach anything definite about the nature of mind or intelligence. It certainly does not teach that mind or intelligence are capable of existing separate from the body, as we have before shown, and the contrary of which our reviewer has utterly failed to show, even by a most ingenious use of the original Greek and Hebrew terms. Eld. W. remarks, with more than a slight tinge of sarcasm in his tone, “Is not the origin of the human mind and spirit, also, ‘too inscrutable,’ etc., to warrant the making such ‘inscrutable’ and ‘inexplicable’ questions the basis of a separate religious organization, and make their discussion a prominent part of their work?” From Eld. W.’s standpoint, the question is certainly pertinent. We can well understand how he should consider the origin of an immaterial, invisible, intangible, intelligent something, as in the highest degree “inscrutable” and “inexplicable”; but from our point of view, the mystery and inexplicability of the question disappears. Eld. W.’s difficulty arises from attempting to account for the possibility of an impossibility; to conceive of something inconceivable. We accept the teaching of science, the evidence of our senses, and the dictum of common sense; and the mystery and “inscrutability” of the question, as it relates to the nature of man, disappears like a mist before a sunbeam. Eld. W. seems to deprecate the discussion of this question, as though it were unworthy of serious notice; yet the reader will remember that this discussion was wholly uninvited on our part and on the part of the people to whom Eld. W. refers. We ought, also, to call attention to the fact that serious injustice is done in the representation that the question of the nature of man, or of the human soul, is made “the basis of a separate religious organization,”99 We acknowledge our ignorance concerning the origin of matter, as well as of God, since neither the Bible nor science gives us any light on the subject; and Eld. W. triumphantly asks, How much more do we know “about the origin of spirit and mind?” It would seem from this remark and those which follow in the same paragraph, as well as from the whole tenor of his arguments on this subject, that our reviewer is utterly unwilling to investigate the subject of the human mind or the human soul, on its merits. From the outset he has insisted upon doing violence to the subject by departing from the real question at issue. We have offered a consistent theory of the nature of man and of the human mind, supporting our position by both science and the Bible; Eld. W., instead of offering logical arguments to show the incorrectness of our positions, has lost sight of the real issue, or at least presented arguments well calculated to divert the reader’s mind from the subject of discussion. Again we protest against being required to account for or explain the nature of God, or of the divine mind. Our arguments are all drawn from the standpoint of human observation, and wholly relate to man. The nature of Omnipotence is left out of the question, as a problem too vast for the human mind to attempt to grapple with. But notwithstanding his constant complaint against our position because it does not satisfactorily explain the nature and origin of God, Eld. W. makes no attempt whatever to offer any solution to this great problem, or to show how his view is, in this respect, in any way superior to ours. Indeed, he finally acknowledges that science cannot settle the question of “the origin of God.” As we have shown, this is equally true respecting the question of the origin of matter; and the question is not in the least degree relieved by appealing to the old and much-abused argument of design. Mind—and the divine mind as well as the human mind—shows evidence of design as well as matter, and if the evidence of design of necessity implies a Creator, or a designer, our reviewer is left to suppose that the great First Cause was not the first cause, but an effect, the result of some still more remote cause, or in other words, that God himself could not exist without a Creator. We do not propose to carry our reasoning into such doubtful regions as this, and can see nothing to be gained by so doing. Eld. W. asks, “Is God, who organized man, the author of his character, and responsible for it?” We readily answer, Certainly, God is responsible for man,—the human race,—just to that extent that his character is the result of his original organization. Man individually is responsible just to that extent that his character is the result of his own acts or his own will. Says Eld. W., further, “Some intelligent being or entity, superior to organized matter, must be, or else the matter itself must be responsible. Which is it?” Eld. W. would answer, “Some intelligent entity superior to matter.” We have asked for proof of the existence of such an entity in connection with man, but it has not been offered; and in the absence of evidence of a reliable character, we are compelled to look for something besides an hypothetical entity to bear the weight of human responsibility. Eld. W. next attempts to show that our view makes man an automaton, and makes him irresponsible for his acts. We are unwilling to grant the conclusion. Man is not morally responsible because he has a will, but because he has moral faculties. Eld. W. will not deny that lower animals possess will-power as well as man. A horse or a dog has as good voluntary control of his body as a man, or nearly so; and he is responsible for his actions, just so far as his capabilities extend. If a dog violates the laws of digestion by eating too much, he suffers the consequences, showing his responsibility to the laws of digestion. The same may be said respecting the violation of any other organ possessed by a dog. The dog, like other lower animals, has no moral faculties, and hence is not morally responsible. He cannot commit sin; for, having no moral organs, he is subject to no moral law, and where there is no law, there is no transgression. Man has moral faculties, and hence may transgress moral law, and to this fact is due his moral responsibility. The action of will is as inexplicable as manifested in lower animals, in the humblest insect or minutest speck of life, as when seen in man. The old theory that animals are governed wholly by instinct was long ago abandoned by all scientists of eminence. It is now universally conceded that lower animals, as well as man, possess will and intelligence. This point in our argument Eld. W. very carefully evades. We had hoped he would express his views on the subject. His persistent silence is ample evidence of his inability to meet this argument. It is very evident either that he must withdraw from his present position or else he must grant to lower animals, and not only to the higher orders but to the lowest insect, and perhaps even the microscopic animalcule, to every form of animal life, he must grant the possession of an intelligent, presiding, controlling entity; in other words, an immortal soul. We do not wish to reflect upon the candor of our reviewer, but it does seem to us that a real, earnest, sincere desire to discover truth would scarcely allow so plain an argument as this to go unnoticed. Perhaps, however, from Eld. W.’s standpoint, silence is better than any argument which can be adduced. The fact that he has said nothing on this point, while much has been said on minor, and, indeed, wholly irrelevant points, leads irresistibly to the conclusion that he has nothing to say. We do not profess to be able to explain the nature of the will and its relation to the brain, but we are anxious that those interested in this subject should see that this is a question which relates not to man alone, but to the whole animal kingdom; and if the possession of a will proves the possession of an immortal soul, it proves the same for every bird, beast, insect, reptile, and every animate object. The Rev. J. G. Wood, an English divine, and a renowned naturalist, is much more consistent in his theological views than is our reviewer; for he boldly asserts that brutes have souls and a future life, as well as man, and bases his belief upon the fact that the same arguments which prove the possession of an immortal soul by man, prove the same for the lower orders of the animal creation. Mr. Wood believes in a cat-and-dog heaven. Does our reviewer indorse his theory? The law of logical consistency demands that he should. We respectfully request him to say something on this point. Let him define his position. We think we have just grounds for complaint that our reviewer has been over cautious about defining his own views, devoting his whole time, or nearly so, to questioning ours. In the article we are now considering, we count not less than thirty-seven interrogations, in the space of less than two columns. The problem of “will” is not the only inexplicable problem in science or philosophy. If Eld. W. will solve for us so simple a problem as to explain how a bat acts upon a ball to cause it to fly through the air in opposition to the law of gravitation, we will offer an explanation of the will which will be equally satisfactory. More: if our reviewer will be so kind as to explain how an immaterial entity can operate upon a material one, we will undertake to solve all the rest of the mysteries. It is just as difficult to explain the force of gravitation as it is to explain the force called will. The same is true of magnetism. A magnet brought near to a small piece of iron causes it to move. As much difficulty will be met in attempting to explain this simple phenomenon as in explaining the will. The primary difficulty is not in our inability to explain the will, but in our inability to explain primary force. It would be just as logical to say that a magnet has a presiding entity, a soul or spirit, because it presents inexplicable phenomena, as to say the same of man for the same reason. This style of reasoning is well illustrated by the story about “Noah’s baby.” Many years ago, a curious creature was found in dredging the Mediterranean Sea, which exhibited a remarkable resemblance to a baby. There was much speculation as to its nature. An erratic genius said, “It is Noah’s baby that fell from the ark.” It was objected that the Bible said nothing of Noah’s having so young a member in his family at the time of the flood, and that no mention was made of such a catastrophe; and substantial proof was called for. The reply made, and thought conclusive by the propounder of the theory, was, “If it is not Noah’s baby, what is it?” So the ancient Greeks, when they saw the vivid lightning, and heard the thunder, said, with superstitious awe, “It is the voice of the Great Spirit.” If asked for proof, they would have said, “If the thunder is not the voice of the Great Spirit, what is it?” The inability to answer the question would have been taken as conclusive proof that the thunder was the voice of God. Our reviewer continually resorts to the same style of argument. He says, “The human will is a manifestation of spirit or soul.” We ask for proof. He says, in effect, If the will is not spirit or soul, then what is it? We candidly admit that we do not know. He exultingly replies, “If you cannot explain it, it must be spirit.” Is not this the Noah’s baby argument in a different form? It seems to us that the two arguments are identical. This kind of logic proves too much. For example, we cannot explain gravitation. Shall we conclude that there is a spirit of weight? We cannot explain magnetic or electrical force. Must we say that there is an electrical or magnetic spirit? Is there also a heat spirit and a light spirit? We cannot satisfactorily explain plant growth. Will Eld. W. say that there is a plant soul? An hypothesis is by no means a logical explanation. If plausible, it may be accepted as such by those who are not trained to logical habits of thought; but surely, Eld. W. does not wish to make capital out of the general lack of appreciation of what is necessary to constitute logical evidence. Says Eld. W., “According to the Doctor’s theory, men’s characters cease to exist at death, except in God’s memory, and will never exist again unless he reproduces them. Do the Scriptures teach that God will reproduce bad actions and thoughts, i. e., immoral characters?” Our respect for the learning and culture of our eminent reviewer forbids us to believe that he could have presented the above as a really logical argument against our position. The absurdities involved in it are almost too glaring to need pointing out. In the first place, it is no part of our theory that “men’s characters cease to exist at death except in God’s memory.” We have nowhere enunciated such a theory. The Bible represents that there are books of record in Heaven containing an account of men’s lives. This is an undoubted representation of human characters. Eld. W. asks, “Do the Scriptures teach that God will reproduce bad actions and thoughts, i. e., immoral characters?” No; nor do we claim that they do. But we are astonished at the intimation that actions and thoughts constitute character. Action pertains to physical organs. Eld. W. has heretofore protested against our view that character pertains to the whole body, claiming it to be a property of the soul exclusively; yet now he asserts that bad actions constitute immoral character. This is, indeed, strangely inconsistent. It appears to us that there is as much difference between action and character as there is between a printing press and printing; or between a ship and sailing. Our reviewer has confounded a cause with its result. Eld. W. will not deny that the Bible teaches the doctrine of a literal resurrection. He must admit, then, that God reproduces bad men. Suppose, then, that he did reproduce bad actions—which he does not do—would it be any more derogatory to his character than to reproduce the bad actors? God only reproduces the men; their bad actions are not reproduced, only themselves, embodying the results of their evil deeds. Eld. W. replies to our remark that “where the word ‘life’ is used in the so-called spiritual sense, its use is figurative”: “This seems equivalent to saying that regeneration, by which spiritual life is obtained, is only a figure of speech and no reality.” Why did Eld. W. say, “This seems,” etc.? The candid reader must see clearly that however the remark may “seem” to our reviewer, it means no such thing as is intimated. A simple example will make the point clear. The narrator of the Polaris Expedition to the polar regions says that Capt. Hall, the commander, was the “life of the expedition.” We say of the word “life” here, as in the texts referred to, that its use is figurative; will Eld. W. deny it? Now, would it be reasonable to say that our statement that the word life is used above in a figurative sense, “seems equivalent to saying” that the expedition was “only a figure of speech”? This is a fair representation of Eld. W.’s argument. He concludes the paragraph with the query, “Have neither the Father nor the Son any other than physical life except in a figurative sense?” As before remarked, we make no pretensions to ability to explain the nature of God. The subject is too high for us; and with all respect for our reviewer, we question whether he can present any solution of the mystery of divinity which will greatly relieve the obscurity of the subject. We would ask, Can Eld. W. give us logical and conclusive evidence of the existence of “any other than physical life, except in a figurative sense?” The primary meaning of the word “life,” according to Webster, is, “to possess capacity for the vital functions.” The etymology of the word clearly indicates its connection with a physical body. All other uses of the word grow out of this primary signification, and it seems to us that any one at all familiar with the genius of language will not deny that these derived meanings are, in a rhetorical sense, figurative. Eld. W. makes a point upon our remark, “As it has not been shown that man has a so-called higher element in his nature,” etc. We think it must be clear to the reader that we used the term “higher element” in this case, just as we supposed the writer intended it, as meaning a conscious entity independent of the body. In our remark respecting Matt. 10:28, we referred not to the same thing designated by Eld. W. as the “higher element” of man’s nature, but to what we believe to be the soul, the organization. This fact our reviewer is undoubtedly aware of, and hence it is hardly fair for him to present this as an inconsistency or contradiction. The last remark applies equally well to his remarks concerning the expression100 “will no longer be a trammel to the soul,” etc. This point we fully explained before, stating our true meaning; but the same thing is brought forward again, as though no such explanation had been made. Is this the best way to seek for truth? Eld. W. says, in conclusion, that we reject “Dr. Allman’s statements as of no account.” We must ask the reader to correct this statement by referring to our reply. We are willing, as there stated, to give Dr. Allman’s statements all the weight they can have, though they differ widely from the views of the majority of the leading scientists of the world. Dr. Allman admits that the essential element of his theory is something which “the mind is incapable of conceiving.” What sort of a basis is this upon which to found a theological dogma? Eld. W. seems to think we have not shown proper respect to Dr. Allman’s views. We ask, Is he himself willing to pin his faith to Dr. Allman’s “inconceivable” hypothesis? Will any man of sound judgment exchange that which is tangible for what is intangible? that which is comprehensible and reasonable, for that which is confessedly without logical support and absolutely “inconceivable”? Dr. Allman says, “As yet,” “inconceivable,” etc. What evidence has he that such an hypothesis will ever become conceivable? But as before remarked, should we grant Dr. Allman and our reviewer this “inconceivable substance different from matter,”—in the forms in which we usually meet it,—our position still remains untouched, since even an “inconceivable substance,” if really substance, must still be matter.