THE SOUL.—NO. 1.
REPLY TO DR. KELLOGG’S REJOINDER.
BY REV. N. WARDNER, D. D.
The Doctor begins his criticism of my first discourse on the soul, by affirming that “character is not an attribute of mind. Character, in its broadest sense, pertains not to the brain alone, but to the individual as a whole, and depends not upon the material structure of the individual, but upon his organization. During life, the character is preserved by the material representation of this organization; after death, and between death and the resurrection, by the record representation in Heaven. The record of a man’s life in Heaven, including as it does a complete account of his every thought and act, may be said to be a character representative of the individual. It appears, then, that character does not perish with the body, but survives so long as a record of the man’s life is preserved in Heaven, in the same way, though in a much more complete sense, as a man may be said to live in the memory of his friends after he is dead.”
Where does the Doctor find scripture that teaches all this? Here he claims, first, that “character is not an attribute of mind.” Does he mean to say that thoughts, affections, passions, will, etc., which prompt to corresponding actions and courses of life, do not pertain to character? If not, then what did Christ mean when he said, “Those things which proceed out of the mouth come forth from the heart, and they defile the man; for out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, thefts, false witness, blasphemies,” etc.? Matt. 15:18, 19. Does the heart that he speaks of mean the physical organ that propels the blood, or the affections of the mind? Again, second, the Doctor says character does not depend upon the quality or action of the mind, but upon the individual as a whole; and third, not upon his material structure, but upon his organization. Hence, it does not depend upon mind nor upon matter, but upon an immaterial concept or abstraction. What kind of a character must that be? In his work, page 50, he says, “The brain originates new ideas and perceptions.” If so, then character and responsibility could not, of course, be attributed to the mind, because the mind would be simply an effect produced by the brain. Hence, moral responsibility must at least fall back upon the brain. But he goes further, and throws it back upon the whole person, even to the fingers and toes; and then goes still further back and throws it upon an immaterial organization, a concept, a product of mind, after all; for there can be no concept without a mind to conceive it. But in no sense can organization be moral character. Moral character results from choice and action of an intelligent sane person. An insane person or an idiot, although he has an organization, has no moral character. Moral character involves moral capacity, which a hand or foot does not possess, and therefore could not incur guilt. You may cut off all the limbs of a man’s body, and thus take away half of him, but would that take away half of his moral character, and leave him only half as much of a saint or a sinner as he was before?
The Doctor says that “during life the character is preserved by the material representation of this organization, and after death, and between death and the resurrection, by the record representation in Heaven.” But character and organization are two distinct things, and preserving one does not preserve the other. Decomposition destroys both “organization” and “form,” and all that a record can do is to preserve the knowledge of them. Webster says, “Form is the suitable disposition of the parts of a compound thing.” Then, when this disposition of the parts is destroyed, the form no longer exists; and so of organization, for they are inseparable. Where is the scripture or science that says man’s soul is simply “form,” or “organization”? The Doctor has only cited one author, and he a heathen. If the Scriptures teach such doctrine, is it not strange that the Christian world has never conceived the thought before?
Again, is this “record,” like character, the real righteousness or sinfulness of the man, or is it simply a history of it? The representation of a thing is not the thing itself. Unless this record is in itself sinful, or righteous, how can the real character of the person be preserved by it? According to the Doctor’s theory, a bad character can only exist in God’s memorandum, after death. Hence, if it ever really exists again, he must reproduce it. But will God reproduce sin?
The Doctor says the organization is the soul, and the “soul is not the individual, but a representation of him,” and yet a man’s character depends upon his organization, or soul. That is, a man’s character depends upon something besides himself; that which is merely a representation of him, “a mere abstraction”! He then goes on to say, “Men, women, persons, are rewarded and punished, not souls.” Then those to whom moral character does not pertain, are rewarded or punished, and that to which character does pertain goes clear. What kind of doctrine is this?
Again, he says, “The Bible gives no hint of either rewards or punishments until after the resurrection of the dead.” But commenting upon my sermon on Life, he said, “It appears to us that his [Adam’s] exclusion from the tree of life, was simply the means adopted by God to carry out the penalty of death pronounced upon him.” Do these two statements agree? What were the sentences pronounced and executed upon Adam, Eve, the serpent, the antediluvian world, and Sodom? And what for? Were all these after the resurrection? The 26th chapter of Leviticus is filled with promises and threatenings of rewards and punishments pertaining to this world. In another place God said, “I will punish them that dwell in the land of Egypt, as I have punished Jerusalem.” “I will punish the king of Babylon in his land, as I have punished the king of Assyria.” “And it shall come to pass, when seventy years are accomplished, that I will punish the king of Babylon, and that nation, saith the Lord, for their iniquity.” Our Saviour said, “There is no man that hath left house, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my sake and the gospel’s, but he shall receive an hundred-fold, now, in this time, . . . and in the world to come eternal life.” Here he promises a hundred-fold reward in this world. Thus, the Doctor seems to be in conflict with his own statements and with the Bible.
Again, he says, “The human soul is the sum of the relations existing between the material components of a human body.” If so, then he who kills the body destroys the soul,—the sum of the relations between the components of the body. But Christ says, Man cannot kill the soul. Was it the “sum of the relations existing between the material components of a human body,” “the plan of his make up,” his “organization,” that “came into the child again” in answer to the prophet’s prayer? When Rachel died, was it the “sum of the relations existing between the material components of a human body,” her “organization,” that departed? When Christ said, “My soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death,” was it his “form,” this “sum of relations,” this “plan,” this “mere abstraction,” that was so sorrowful?
Again, how does the soul exist between death and the resurrection, if it is “the sum of the relations existing between the material components of a human body”? When decomposition takes place, are not the relations of the material components of the body destroyed? If so, then such a soul does not, and cannot, exist between death and the resurrection.
Again, he says, “We believe, with Aristotle, that the soul is form, pure and simple, considered apart from matter or any other possible means of representation.” And then he says, “We never stated that a plan or a concept may exist without matter.” Here, it seems, is a “concept” of a “form,” “apart from matter or any other possible means of representation,” an “immaterial abstraction,” existing “in Heaven,” and yet cannot “exist without matter”! What can be made out of such a jumble of contradictions?
Character, he says, depends upon organization; i. e., “form, pure and simple, considered apart from matter or other possible means of representation.” If so, then this “form,” “concept,” “abstraction,” which is “immaterial,” and has, in itself, no intelligence or life, is, according to the Doctor, the seat of human character and responsibility! Yet it is not rewardable or punishable! Again, if his position be correct, then this “form,” “concept,” “abstraction,” etc., is the subject of regeneration! What kind of a regeneration must “a mere abstraction” experience? Again, making another man after the same form does not make him the same man, any more than casting two kettles in the same mold makes them but one kettle. The man to be punished, according to the Doctor, is not in existence from death to the resurrection, and the one then to be created will be composed of different materials, and only resemble the one annihilated in “form,” like two stoves cast in the same mold. He attempts to explain the mystery involved, by the figure of a river, which may dry up, and then again be filled with water. He claims that this second is the same river, because its bed, its banks, its source, its mouth, all its relations to other objects, in short its organization, is the same. “If these had materially changed, the river would have been annihilated. But as they were preserved, the river was reproduced, literally resurrected, as man will be in the resurrection.” But let us imagine this river to be, like man, an accountable being, and see how his comparison holds. A child falls into that river, and is drowned. The water that choked him to death did the murder; but that passed away out of the river and never returned. At the day of reckoning, on what shall the guilt and punishment fall? Not on the water that came after it; for that had no part in the murder. Not on the banks, the bed, the source, nor the mouth. Neither one nor all of these together had any part in the foul deed. Now, the Doctor says, man is composed of two parts, matter and organization. But the matter all passes away and never returns again; and the organization, or soul, is only a “concept,” a “form,” “apart from matter or other possible means of representation,” like the concept of a river bed, apart from matter or other means of representation. Now, in the resurrection, where is the guilty party? Not the matter of the resurrected man; for none of it had any connection with the deeds committed. Not the soul; for the one associated with the matter that did the deeds ceased all actual existence at death, and only a memorandum of it has existed since. Besides, it was never anything but a mere “concept,” “form,” or “abstraction,” unconscious, unintelligent, and without life. Hence, according to the Doctor’s theory, there is nothing pertaining to the resurrected man that ever had any connection with the crimes under consideration, and for which he is made to suffer. Does this look like divine goodness, justice, and wisdom? Where is there any scripture that teaches such doctrine? He makes this record to be a representation of the man, and not of the soul, and says, “Man is made wholly of dust, of matter.” All this dust passes away, and other dust takes its place, so that the man is wholly another man, and not the same. Again, how would the Doctor’s idea of soul read in Scripture? “What shall a man give in exchange for his ‘form’ or ‘abstraction’?” “The law of the Lord is perfect, converting the form.” “The form, or abstraction, that sinneth, it shall die.” “His form came into him again,” etc., etc.
The Doctor thinks I will have to agree with the eccentric English divine, who says that “horses, dogs, cats, and other lower animals, have souls and a hereafter, as well as men. An argument that proves too much, proves nothing; it appears to us that our reviewer’s arguments involve him in this dilemma.” But how does the Doctor know that the Englishman’s theory is not correct? Then where would be the dilemma? Besides, the question at issue is not about the souls of cats and dogs, but of men. Does not a disposition thus to switch off away from the issue, indicate that there is a dilemma that he wishes to escape from?
The Doctor says a soul exists as a “concept,” and “is not material.” Then because I represented him as teaching that a concept may exist without matter, he accuses me of resorting to an “ingenious sophistry,” and “committing a serious philosophical blunder.” I leave the reader to judge at whose door the “sophistry” and “blunder” lie.
He says, I am guilty of equally as grave a philosophical error in drawing the deduction from his statement that, if thought cannot exist independent of matter, it must be a quality of matter. He attempts to set me right by saying, “Animals cannot exist independent of air. Does it follow from this that air is a quality of animals?” But his figure does not meet the point. Do animals originate air? In his book he says, “Brain cells originate new ideas; this is thought.” Was I not, therefore, warranted in my deduction, that if the brain originates ideas, these ideas are qualities of matter? He denies that the brain is a medium of thought, but claims that it originates thought, and yet denies that “matter ever produced anything”! Is it not a physiological law, that what a substance produces represents properties of that substance? Does not fruit represent properties of the tree that produces it?
Again, he complains that I misrepresented him by stating as his teaching, that a soul is a “concept of an organization,” and denies that he ever taught it. Nothing has been further from my intention than to misrepresent him in the least, or in any manner; and have I done it in this instance? If I can understand him, he teaches that a soul is an organization; not a material one, but a conceived one. And what is that but a concept of an organization? His complaint looks to me like a play upon words to escape an embarrassing conclusion.
REPLY.
Says Eld. W., “In no sense can organization be moral character.” It puzzles us to see the relevancy of this remark. Like many others in the same connection it has no bearing on this discussion whatever, since we have never claimed that organization is moral character, as intimated by Eld. W. It is a very easy matter for any one to make objections to suit his purpose for the pleasure of answering them, but we can see no way in which the interests of truth are to be advanced by such methods. When Eld. W. says, “Moral character involves moral capacity,” he only repeats a principle which the reader will quickly recognize as stated several times in our previous articles. Eld. W. quotes us as saying, “Character, in its broadest sense, pertains not to the brain alone,” etc., and then most unfairly represents us as holding that moral character pertains to the fingers and toes, and offers as a sober argument the suggestion that a man may lose half his weight by amputation of his limbs (a physical impossibility, asp. 115 the trunk weighs more than the limbs) without being deprived of half his moral character! In our little work, “Harmony of Science and the Bible on the Nature of the Soul and the Doctrine of the Resurrection,” which Eld. W. has taken the pains to review, we have distinctly maintained that moral character and responsibility depend upon the moral faculties. Eld. W. wholly ignores this fact, though he must certainly be aware of it, and misrepresents us as holding a view which would not make man different from a beast.
Says Eld. W., “An insane person or an idiot, although he has an organization, has no moral character.” According to Eld. W., moral character depends upon the soul or spirit. We would ask, Has an insane person no soul? If not, what became of it when he became insane? He has a will, can reason and act. If these are products of soul-action as well as moral character, as Eld. W. holds, will not our reviewer be obliged to take the position that an insane man has lost the moral half of his soul? A man who is partially insane, has but partially lost the moral portion of his soul, and may perhaps be said to possess three-fourths of a soul! How much more harmony and beauty is there in such a theory as this than in ours? We hold that moral responsibility depends upon the moral faculties. If the moral faculties are perverted by inheritance or disease, just to the extent of the perversion is the moral responsibility lessened.
Says Eld. W., “The Doctor says the organization is the soul, and the ‘soul is not the individual, but a representation of him;’ and yet a man’s character depends upon his organization, or soul. That is, a man’s character depends upon something besides himself. . . . What sort of doctrine is this?” In the use of such arguments as this, our reviewer enjoys the evident advantage of knowing that few of his readers have had an opportunity of examining for themselves the book reviewed, and hence are not prepared to appreciate the difference in meaning conveyed by the language quoted in the connection in which we used it and the fragmentary and disconnected manner in which it is here presented. We are compelled to ask, “What does it indicate when a reverend gentleman of power and intelligence feels driven to make” capital for argument in such a questionable manner as this? In our book we have repeatedly stated it to be our view that the soul is the essential part of an individual; and it is only after death that it is a representative of the individual. We are unwilling to lay upon our reverend reviewer the charge of willful unfairness; but we are utterly at a loss to know how he could have given our little work so critical a reading as he seems to have done, without becoming sufficiently acquainted with our views to know that the above argument was a gross misrepresentation. A religious discussion is worse than useless unless characterized by candor; and common fairness demands that an opponent’s positions should be fairly and clearly stated.
Quoting us, Eld. W. remarks, “Again he says, ‘The Bible gives no hint of either rewards or punishments until after the resurrection of the dead.’” Then he proceeds to attempt to involve us in a contradiction, by quoting our view respecting the results of Adam’s sin. All we need to say in answer is, that we had reference in the remarks wholly to final rewards and punishments, as any candid reader of the book can easily see.
Again, Eld. W. quotes, “The human soul is the sum of the relations existing between the material components of a human body,” and adds, “Then he who kills the body destroys the soul.” Not so, since the soul may survive the death of the body by virtue of the record representation of it in Heaven.
Eld. W. asks if it was the organization that “came into the child again,” in answer to the prophet’s prayer. According to his view, soul means simply animal life. If this be true, then we are ready to grant that the child’s life was restored to him, which was accomplished by means of a miracle, which restored the material representation of his organization, and thus restored him to life. If Eld. W. insists that the word “soul” is here used figuratively, and means the immortal spirit, then we may also claim the privilege of making the language figurative, as we believe it to be in fact. The account is that the child’s “sickness was so sore that there was no breath left in him.” In answer to the prayer of Elijah his life was restored; and it is most reasonable to suppose that the restoration to life took place in consequence of a restoration of the very thing that he had lost, namely, his breath. This view is certainly in harmony with the Bible account of the case, and seems to us to be much more reasonable than the theory that the little boy’s invisible, immortal, immaterial soul or spirit departed from his body and went off to paradise, or some other place, where it was “happier than while in the flesh” (Eld. W.), and then, in answer to Elijah’s prayer, was by Almighty power sent back to earth again, and made to take up its abode in its deserted tenement, in the cast-off mortal coil which it had but a short time previous triumphantly deserted. Let us imagine the feelings of a soul once liberated, thus re-incarnated in a house of clay. After having suffered the ills and inconveniences of life for years, and finally a sore sickness, which severed the mystic chain which is supposed to hold imprisoned the waiting, suffering, impatient soul, and allowed it “to soar away to realms of bliss” and “taste the joys of paradise,” this delivered soul, in answer to the importunities of another soul still in bondage in a prison-house of clay, is snatched away from the blissful realm when it has just begun to taste the joys of its new life, and thrust back into its old diseased, depraved, sinful, suffering, sorrowing body. If there is any particular beauty or other attractive feature in such a theory, we are quite unable to see it; and we find it impossible to reconcile such a proceeding with our ideas of divine wisdom and mercy.
Says Eld. W. again, “When Christ said, ‘My soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death,’ was it his ‘form’ that was sorrowful?” Our reviewer has acknowledged that the word “soul” is often used in a figurative sense in the Scriptures, and could not have found a better illustration of such use than this. When Christ said, “My soul is sorrowful,” he meant exactly the same as a person means who says, My heart is sad. The only part of man’s nature capable of being sorrowful is the mind, and this must be what he referred to. The difficulty with our theory here is wholly imaginary.
“Again,” says Eld. W., “how does the soul exist between death and the resurrection? When decomposition takes place, are not the relations of the material components of the body destroyed?” Not necessarily, as we have elsewhere shown. So long as the representation of those relations is preserved in the heavenly record, they continue to exist, even though the material body representative is destroyed.
The “jumble of contradictions,” which our reviewer discovers, is a medley of his own imagination. If the reader will please observe that a thing and its representative are not identical, the asserted contradictions cannot be discovered, even in appearance. In answer to the question, “What can be made out of such a jumble of contradictions?” we say, A consistent and harmonious theory, when not misrepresented.
Eld. W. is too hasty in his conclusion that the organization is the seat of human responsibility. It is undoubtedly true that the character must depend upon the organization, for it cannot be dependent upon changing matter; nevertheless, responsibility must rest upon the individual, not upon a single part of him. Eld. W.’s difficulty about responsibility, regeneration, etc., grows wholly out of the fact that he has always been accustomed to think of the soul as the real man, the thinking, conscious, responsible part, and the body as of little account. Our view reverses the order of importance, or nearly so. Man, as we see him, an active, thinking, rational creature, is the responsible being.
Our reviewer attempts to destroy the force of our illustration of the river, by supposing the “river to be, like man, an accountable being,” but makes a sad “jumble” of it; for he immediately forgets that the river is the responsible party, and lays the responsibility of drowning the child upon the particular mouthful of water which obstructed his breathing, or the few pailfuls by which he was submerged. This is a fair sample of the kind of logic necessary to sustain a doctrine which originated in the darkness of heathen mythology, and has held its place among other theological myths for centuries, in opposition to the dictates of sound reason, and a fair interpretation of the Scriptures. It must be clear to the simplest mind that if the river was responsible, it was guilty of murder when it drowned a child; and the guilt rested not on the particular water that entered the child’s mouth, but upon the river as a whole; and the guilt thus fastened upon the river would remain with it, notwithstanding the constant change of its waters, so long as its identity as a river remained. Another illustration may make this point still clearer. The United States government is a responsible being or existence. Suppose now that a portion of the national army commits a depredation upon the territory of the British government in Canada. In a court of nations held to settle the matter by arbitration, who would be held responsible for the depredation, the U. S. government, or the soldiers who committed the trespass? And suppose the matter remained unsettled a hundred years, would not the responsibility still rest upon the United States government, notwithstanding the fact that the people of the government, the material part, all but the organization, had wholly changed? In the words of our reviewer, “What does it indicate when a gentleman of power and intelligence feels driven” to employ such illogical arguments as the one just considered?
Our reviewer attempts to cast ridicule upon our position by reading in the word “form” for “soul” in several texts. But suppose we test his own theory in the same way with the very same texts. For instance, “What shall a man give in exchange for his ‘immaterial substance different from matter,’ or ‘his immaterial entity’?” Or, as Eld. W. believes that the soul, and not the material person, is the real man, we may read, “What shall ‘an immaterial entity’ give in exchange for ‘itself’?” Again, “The law of the Lord is perfect, converting the ‘immaterial substance different from matter.’” “The ‘immortal, immaterial entity’ that sinneth, it shall die.” “His ‘immaterial substance different from matter’ came into him again,” etc. No further comment is necessary.
Seeing no escape from the conclusion which we in a former article showed to be a legitimate one from our reviewer’s premises, he has been compelled to admit that “horses, dogs, cats, and other lower animals, have souls and a hereafter, as well as men.” Having admitted this, he asks, “Then where would be the dilemma?” He releases himself from one horn of the dilemma, it is true, but is straightway impaled upon the other. Our reviewer virtually admits that the arguments which prove man to have an immortal soul prove the same for beasts. According to the Bible, Ps. 49:12, 20, the beasts perish. Where, then, is there a chance for the possession of an immortal, immaterial entity, composed of a “substance different from matter,” in either man or beast? If our calling attention to the bearing of this question upon the nature of beasts as well as of men is switching “off away from the issue,” why does Eld. W. feel compelled to make such an astonishing admission as that the theory of a “cat-and-dog heaven” may be correct?
Our reviewer still seems to be unable to see the difference between non-material existence and existence independent of matter. We hope, however, that the point is sufficiently clear to the majority of our readers to make it unnecessary for us to dwell long upon it. Perhaps we may be pardoned for offering another word, however, by way of illustration. Suppose a globe, instead of a man, is the object under consideration. We remark that the roundness of the globe is a quality, and is not material. A friend standing near says that we have represented that the quality of roundness may exist independent of matter. Eld. W. is exactly in the position of the bystander. Roundness cannot exist without something to represent it, neither can the soul, although it be abstract in character. We also are willing to “leave the reader to judge at whose door the ‘sophistry’ and ‘blunder’ lie.”
In the next paragraph Eld. W. attempts to relieve himself of the difficulty in which his position has involved him, by quoting a portion only of a remark from our book. He quotes us as saying that “brain cells originate new ideas.” The statement of which he takes a part is this: “The brain . . . not only has the power to associate sensations, but to compare them, and to originate new ideas from the comparison.” The reader will readily see the difference between the two statements. We do not wish to be ungenerous, but it certainly does appear to us that a little more care in making quotations would present our position in a fairer light. To draw from our remark the conclusion that ideas are qualities of the brain is just as reasonable as to assert that a house is a quality of the man who built it, and no more so. Eld. W. says that we teach “that a soul is an organization; not a material one, but a conceived one,” and then asks, “And what is that but a concept of an organization?” and concludes the paragraph by accusing us of making “a play upon words to escape an embarrassing conclusion.” We protest that the last remark is uncalled for, and will submit to the smallest boy or girl capable of reading this article if a nice, ripe apple is not quite a different thing from the thought of one. Our reviewer may have sufficient faith in immaterial entities and the potency of substances “different from matter” to enable him to believe a conception of a good dinner to be the dinner itself or equivalent to it; but although not particularly “given to appetite,” we are sufficiently materialistic in our views to be decidedly prejudiced in favor of the dinner.
J. H. KELLOGG.