AdventAI

SUNDAY-KEEPING; WILL IT ANSWER THE PURPOSE?

By W. H. Littlejohn

From Review and Herald, Vol. 57, No. 13., March 29, 1881

BY ELD. W. H. LITTLEJOHN.

TEXT: “Who can understand his errors? Cleanse thou me from secret faults. Keep back thy servant also from presumptuous sins; let them not have dominion over me. Then shall I be upright, and I shall be innocent from the great transgression.” Ps. 19:12, 13.

In the controversy now going on in reference to the Sabbath question, various reasons are assigned for the want of harmony between the requirements of the fourth commandment and the practice of the religious world. The commandment says, in so many words, that “the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God,” and that in it no work shall be done. Strange as it may appear, however, Christians are now found almost universally resting upon the first, and laboring upon the seventh, day of the week. When interrogated as to the reason for this course, many of them acknowledge that they are violating the letter of the Sabbath law; but they insist that God will justify them in so doing, since, though not keeping the day which he requires, they are celebrating another of equal length, in strict compliance with the manner in which he has directed that the seventh day should be hallowed.

It is the purpose of this article to test the soundness of this logic.

To begin with, we ask for the authority for supposing that God would be any more lenient toward those who are disobedient in one particular, than he would be toward those who are disobedient in another particular; i. e., if—as conceded by the persons under consideration—it be true that God has made a law to enforce the observance of a particular, definite day of the week, why does it not constitute as great an indignity to his authority to change the day thus commanded, as it would to keep the right day in an imperfect manner.

The essence of the law, it seems to us, relates to both time and method. He, therefore, who would fail to meet its demands, either in the one or the other of these particulars, would thereby make himself a law-breaker instead of a law-keeper.

Take, for example, a human statute. Let it be one which relates, if you please, to the militia of the State. Suppose that the governor, acting in harmony with the law, should issue a proclamation requiring the military organizations of the various counties to assemble for general training on the 19th day of November of each year, on penalty of fine and imprisonment on failure so to do. Now let it be granted that the militia of some one of these counties should deliberately decide that they would not train on the 19th of November, as required, but that they would substitute therefor the 29th of December following. This having been determined upon and carried out, suppose that the prosecuting attorney of that county should feel it to be his duty to prosecute the members of the militia of said county, for their disregard of the statute law in question. Suppose, also, that they should appear before the bar of the circuit court, and put in the plea that they had kept the law in the spirit of it; since on the 29th of December they could devote as much time to this exercise as on the 19th of November, and that they had spent its hours in precisely the manner in which the State law required that they should spend those of the latter day.

Now, does any intelligent man have any doubt as to the manner in which such a plea would be received? Do we not all see that it would not be considered for a moment, and that the unmitigated penalty would be visited upon the offenders? Most assuredly we do. Who does not perceive that any other course on the part of the court would be utterly subversive of all legal restraint? It might be that, so far as the purposes of military discipline were concerned, they would, in the case in question, have been as fully met by those who trained on the 29th of December, as by those who did so on the 19th of November. But behind the mere question of the results in that particular, there would lie a principle vital to the sovereignty of the State. Should it be acknowledged that men had the right in one case to deviate from the demands of the statute, a precedent would be established thereby which would be fatal in its consequences; for thenceforth, every man would feel at liberty to disregard the element of time in any law whenever he saw fit thus to do, provided that he should make a substantial compliance therewith in other respects.

The result of such a course would be disastrous in two particulars: First, it would produce confusion; secondly, it would weaken the authority of law and bring contempt upon the law-makers, by subjecting them to the whims and caprices of those whose duty it is to obey without questioning every enactment which proceeds from competent sources.

Having seen, now, that human legislators are inexorable in their demands for obedience to all the requirements of the statutes of the State, in point of time as well as in other respects, and having discovered that the reasons for so doing are both numerous and weighty, we proceed to inquire whether they will not apply equally well to a divine law as to a human one. In other words, if it is the duty of the citizen to render full and implicit obedience to the requirements of the State in every particular, is it not equally true—nay, is it not infinitely more imperative—that he should fulfill, to the minutest detail, all the commands of the God of Heaven?

To our mind, there is no room for doubt in the premises. Human law-makers are liable to pass enactments, which, either as a whole or in part, are unjust. Not so, however, with the God of Heaven. All of his requirements are both wise and equitable. If, therefore, he has given us a law requiring us to fulfill the same at a given time and in a given manner, then—as he never does a work of supererogation,—he meant that it should be observed in the exact manner, and at the exact time, prescribed.

This being true, should any one take upon himself the responsibility of deliberately deciding that it would answer the purpose of Heaven just as well, should he act as though it were a matter of indifference as to whether he should obey in both the time and the manner required, he thereby impeaches the wisdom of the Almighty in having made the law as he has made it; or else he insults his majesty by deliberately setting at naught one of the precepts which he has given, in one of its particulars.

Take, for example, the Sabbath law in question. The mighty God, who never errs and never acts from caprice, must have had a definite object, both in giving a Sabbath day and in prescribing that the seventh day of the week should be employed for that purpose. To say otherwise, would be to question his wisdom.

This being the case, he who in the matter of time would depart from the demands of the law, thereby proves, either that he regards God as having blundered in so constructing the commandment as to enforce a definite day, or that he has so little reverence for his authority that he does not hesitate to disobey him so far as he may think it more convenient or advantageous so to do.

Should it be replied that circumstances alter cases, and that a deviation from an explicit statute is sometimes pardonable, we answer, True;p. 194 but only when such a deviation can be defended on the ground of necessity. But is there really any necessity for the substitution of the first day of the week in the place of the seventh as a Sabbath? The answer is clearly in the negative. It is not meant by this that, in the existing state of things, it may not be more convenient, under some circumstances, to keep the first, than it is to observe the seventh, day of the week. Undoubtedly, with many, this may be the case. But convenience is one thing, and necessity another and entirely different thing. Necessity implies something which is unavoidable; convenience, something which is simply more easy, or desirable.

The only reason why any man at the present time prefers to keep the Sunday, is simply because it would bring him more fully in harmony with others who have put themselves at variance with the law of God by a deliberate act of disobedience.

But by the very desire on the part of such individuals to have harmony in the community in the observance of the same day, they prove the wisdom of God in originally providing a Sabbath law so worded as to secure the desired uniformity by designating a particular definite day as the Sabbath, and obligating all men to keep the same.

But, says the objector, they will not do so, and therefore, as they have already made the change, I propose to conform to their usage, and thereby secure the desired unanimity. But does he not see that such a course would defeat the very end which he wishes to attain? If, for minor considerations, he claims the right to change the day of his worship, he thereby virtually indorses the action of others who have done so before him; for, in so doing, he shows that he demands for himself the right to depart from the letter of the law when it is more convenient for him thus to do, and must, therefore, acknowledge the same right in others, since the law gives him no more liberties than it does them.

Such being the case, he helps to establish a precedent which serves to render the Sabbath fluctuating in its character, by giving to every man the power to observe it at such times as his caprice, or fancied interest may dictate. If the parties in question are really solicitous to make a permanent reform in the direction of bringing men to the observance of the same period of time, then they should take the opposite course from the one which they are now pursuing. They should insist that the Sabbath law is specific in setting apart one and the same day for observance on the part of all, and that the very reason why God made it thus specific, was because he saw that it was in the highest degree important that all men, everywhere, should observe the same day in common.

By this means, in process of time, they might induce the erring to retrace their steps. By the other course, they indorse this departure from the requirements of the law; and, having admitted that they had a right to substitute the first day of the week for the seventh, they have thereby acknowledged a principle which may with equal propriety be pleaded in favor of a change from the first day to that of any other day of the week, to which it may hereafter be desirable to transfer the rest of the Sabbath.

Having seen that from the reasonable standpoint, it is illogical to argue that any person has a right to deviate from an explicit command of God, either in the time or the manner of its observance, as men are unanimous in acknowledging that he who treats a mere human statute in that manner cannot defend his course of action or escape punishment, and since such a deviation would defeat the very end desired, by preventing the adoption of a uniform day of rest, it will be well to turn to revelation itself for further light upon the subject.

How is it, then, in the revealed word? Does God represent himself as being indifferent as to whether the obedience rendered to him shall be partial or complete? or does he insist upon an exact compliance with all of his righteous demands?

Upon this point there can be but little question. Everywhere we are enjoined to tremble at his word. While the sin of ignorance was winked at so long as it continued to be such, whenever knowledge entered, and the minds of his ancient people were enlightened, confession was to be made and an offering to be brought, in order that the offender might receive pardon. (Lev. 5:15.) A strict and unquestioning conformity to the letter of every requirement, so far as that is possible, is everywhere enforced.

A few illustrations of this fact will suffice.

  • (To be continued.)*