AdventAI

RESURRECTION

By N. Wardner

From Review and Herald, Vol. 56, No. 22., November 25, 1880

REPLY TO DR. KELLOGG’S REJOINDER.

BY REV. N. WARDNER, D. D.

Most of the points in the Doctor’s reply to my first paragraph have been so fully answered in my last and preceding articles that I will not repeat them here. I wish, however, to call attention to what Paul says in Eph. 1:13, 14: “In whom, also, after ye believed, ye were sealed with the Holy Spirit of promise, which is the earnest of our inheritance until the redemption of the purchased possession.” The Greek word arrabone, rendered “earnest,” means earnest-money, deposited in case of purchase, part payment, etc. (Liddell and Scott). Here Paul teaches that the Christian, in thus being sealed, receives an advance payment of his inheritance to enjoy “until the redemption of the purchased possession.” In chap. 4:30, he says, “Ye are sealed unto the day of redemption.” Hence this part-payment is to be held in possession and enjoyed “until the day of redemption,” when the Christian will come into full possession of his inheritance. This corresponds with Christ’s statement, that his disciples should “have a hundred-fold now, in this time, and in the world to come, eternal life.” How does this compare with the Doctor’s theory, that man receives no part of his reward or punishment till after the resurrection? Who can fail to see a contradiction between the Doctor, and Paul and Christ?

Again, there is no more necessity to conclude that the great final Judgment occurs at death, because the soul is thereby made more happy or miserable, or is made sure of its reward, than that it takes place at this sealing by the Spirit (regeneration), because a man is made happier thereby, or is made certain of his heavenly inheritance by this part-payment, as Paul was before he died. Against the testimony of Paul, Peter, and Christ, the Doctor quotes the opinions of Canon Barry and Mr. Hutton. I could quote hundreds of as learned authors against their opinions, but what would they all be worth, if they conflict with the testimony of our Lord and his inspired apostles?

The second point I made was, If, as the Doctor says, “man is made wholly of dust,” and the resurrection body is composed of entirely new material, this new man would not be the same man who died; hence for his identity to be preserved after death, it must consist in an entity which does not cease to exist with the body, as Christ says is the case with the soul. The Doctor admits my theory to be correct here, and substitutes “organization” in place of an intelligent entity as identifying the person. But he claims that this organization is “a mere abstraction,” or “concept,” and no part of the individual himself, “but a representation of him;” and between death and the resurrection it only exists in a record or the memory of another being. Now, anybody can see that a representation of a person is not the person any more than a shadow is himself. Also, that the record or photograph of such a soul is only the representationp. 339 of a “representation” of the person, which makes death result in perfect annihilation of the whole man—soul, body, and spirit; so that the identity of the person is wholly gone forever. If God thus annihilates a man, such an act is a clear expression of his will that he should not exist, and then to turn round and bring him back into existence as he was before, involves self-contradiction, as Paul taught in Gal. 2:18. If a man’s identity is lost, no punishment could be justly inflicted upon another man for his sins.

The third point I made was, If mind and character are products of a material organization, a radical change in said organization would, according to physical law, cause a corresponding change in the mind and character of the person. Hence, to create a new person and compel him to recognize himself to be another, and punish him for what that other one had done, would be monstrous injustice. In reply, the Doctor says, “We have labored at some length to show, from scientific evidence, that personal identity may be maintained otherwise than by a separate, conscious entity.” This is an equivocal answer. For even if he could prove that personal identity may be maintained otherwise than by a separate conscious entity, it would not prove that such separate conscious entity will not be preserved; and hence would be of no force, unless he proves that personal identity could be preserved in no other way. But I have failed to see such scientific proof as he claims to have presented, unless he calls his own assertions proof, in opposition to which I have quoted some of the profoundest scientists of the world; and who shall decide when doctors disagree? “To the law and to the testimony. If they speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in them.”

The Doctor quotes Canon Barry and Mr. Hutton as saying that the soul is “what lies at the bottom of the sense of personal identity,” and the Doctor says, “This is our view exactly.” Here is his fourth distinct definition of the soul, or the fourth soul in his theory. If the soul, as he now says, is what lies at the bottom of the sense of personal identity, then it is the seat of consciousness; something altogether more than “a mere abstraction,” “form,” or “concept.” For the Doctor now to adopt this as his definition of soul, seems to me to be fatal to the theory taught in his book.

Again, I said, “If mind and character are products of a material organization, a change in said organization would cause a corresponding change in the character.” In reply he says, “If a slight change of character causes a loss of identity, then human identity is a very changeable element.” Is this any reply to my argument? His theory is, that no mind or character can exist except as produced by a material organization, which ceases to exist at death; hence for a machine that has always produced one kind of result to turn and produce something radically different, it must first undergo a radical change, and when so changed, there must result a corresponding change in the product. I understand that the spirit is the seat of the character, and that the spirit does not perish with the body. But if, as the Doctor teaches, character is produced by the body, then a body radically different must produce a radically different character. But if, on the contrary, there is an intelligent, responsible entity in which character inheres, which death cannot destroy, as Christ teaches, then changes in the body do not necessarily affect it, and moral development and changes of moral action have no effect to destroy its essential identity.

Again he says, “His view involves the same difficulty, if difficulty there be,—we do not see any,—since he holds with us that the soul is the means of identity, and also holds that the character is the product of the soul.” But the Doctor’s soul is not a part of man, but “a mere abstraction,” without matter, intelligence, life, or sensation. He says, “The soul is not the individual, but a representation of him.” He claims, also, that the soul is not what is to be rewarded or punished, but the individual whom it represents. But if, as he now says, “character is a product of the soul,” then neither the soul nor the character is any part of a man, but a mere “representation of him.” Hence, though the individual has no character, good or bad, yet he is to be punished for the bad character belonging to an unconscious, unintelligent “abstraction,” or “form,” which is not the man, but a mere representation of him, and is not rewardable or punishable. Where is justice here?

Again: “Eld. Wardner says, ‘A different cause cannot produce the same effect; and vice versa a different effect cannot come from the same cause.’” Answer: Does this prove that the same cause may not produce varied forms of manifestation, as does electricity? The Doctor goes on and draws a conclusion. He says, “It clearly follows, then, from Eld. W.’s own reasoning, that the perfected soul, in the future state, will not be the soul which it purports to be, which existed in this present state.” Answer: The Doctor might as logically say that a dirty child is not the same child after the dirt is washed off as before. The soul, or spirit, is the real individual, whose identity is independent of all stunting, or cleansing, or developing; while the Doctor’s soul is like the relation of the shadow to the child’s body, which is no part of the child, but “a representation of him,” and vanishes out of existence when the body is gone, unless it be in somebody’s memory. Another body is not the same child, nor does it produce the same shadow.

Again he says, “Eld. W. will admit that the body is changed, and he must admit that the soul is also changed, since the character, evidently, is more or less modified, at least in those who are saved. Hence he is involved in the same difficulty. . . . The characters of the redeemed are not to be made worse, but better, by leaving out defects; and surely there would be no injustice in this, any more than there would be in making a sound man out of a cripple, or an enlightened, civilized American out of a benighted, degraded, half-starved Hottentot.” Here he attempts to make it appear, 1. That a living, conscious, moral agent, who ceases to desire sin or act it out, and, on the contrary, loves and does good, loses his personal identity thereby, as much as though everything pertaining to his being ceased to exist, except a history or photograph of him! 2. That for a living, conscious, moral agent to recognize himself as still existing, who has not ceased thus to exist, is as unreasonable as it would be to compel a newly created being, no part of whom ever existed before, to recognize himself to be some murderer or thief of a past age! Then, 3. Tries to make it appear that because the redeemed are not to be made worse, but better, by leaving out defects, there is no injustice in it; when, in fact, according to his theory, there are no redeemed ones there, but entire new beings; and whatever favors may be bestowed upon them will not change the monstrous injustice of compelling a newly created, innocent being to recognize himself to be a vile malefactor of a past age, and be punished for his deeds! This is what the Doctor’s theory indorses, sugar it over as he may.

My fourth point was that Christ, in asserting his Messiahship and divinity, said that he had power to lay down his life, and that he had power to take it again. The Doctor denies that he did this, or that he had any power to do it. Thus he impeaches Christ. Jesus said, “Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up.” “He spoke of the temple of his body.” “I lay down my life that I may take it again. No man taketh it from me, but I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again.” John 10:17, 18. But the Doctor says it was not so; he had no such power! He quotes 1 Cor. 15:18, “Then they also which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished.” Answer: In the preceding verse, Paul said, “If Christ be not raised, your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins;” then they also which had fallen asleep in Christ are perished. Why? Because they, and those who had fallen asleep in Christ, trusted in him alone for salvation; and if Christ had not risen, as he said he should, he had proved himself to be an impostor, and therefore they had trusted in a false hope, and perished for lack of a Saviour. This being so, the Doctor’s use of the text above quoted was wholly irrelevant in regard to my position. For if Christ failed to establish his claim to be the Messiah, there was no reason why Paul or anybody else should desire to give up this life for the sake of being with him, or to expect happiness from him.

Again: “Eld. W. builds an argument for the immortality of the soul upon the fact that Christ said, ‘Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up.’ This argument has no force, unless it is contended that the real Christ did not die. If this be true, then the atonement was only a human sacrifice after all, and the death of Christ was no more efficacious than would have been the death of Adam, or any other representative man of the race. Again, in what did the sacrifice consist, if, as according to Eld. W.’s view, Christ did not really die, but simply rested three days in a condition in which he was happier than while in the flesh? This would be no sacrifice at all.” Answer: 1. I have proved by the testimony of Christ (Matt. 10:28), that man has a living entity in him, not dependent upon the body for existence or life, so that the body may be burned to ashes and the soul will not be harmed by it; which shows that the life of the spirit is derived from another source than the body, and its death can only result by its separation from that source. 2. The Doctor asks, “In what did the sacrifice consist, if, as according to Eld. W.’s view, Christ did not really die?” Here he takes the ground that unless Christ’s spirit ceased to exist, his atonement was only a human sacrifice. I shall show, presently, that, according to the Doctor’s theory, it was nothing more than a sacrifice of human flesh; while I, on the contrary, believe that the bitterest pang in his suffering for sinners’ redemption, was spiritual agony; so much so that his bodily suffering was an “unnoticeable trifle compared with it.” Without this, the atonement would have been unavailing. But if, as the Doctor teaches, all the divinity there was in Christ was what had been transmuted into flesh, it was transmuted into human flesh, nourished by the products of the earth, decomposed and passed away, and was replaced by other dust, several times during his stay on earth. And since the Doctor claims that all life and mind, hence all moral character, originate from flesh, if correct, the same must be true of Christ, since in all respects he was made like unto his brethren, and took their natures; therefore it was only human flesh that died on the cross. His soul, according to the Doctor, was nothing but a “concept,” “a mere abstraction,” was not himself, but a mere representation of him. Now, since the Doctor claims that a physical body and a conceived organization is all that makes up a human being, and that the divinity of Christ was transmitted into mere human flesh, it follows that his death on the cross was only the death of a fleshy human body, like any other human body. If such a theory does not un-deify Christ, I can conceive of none that would. What a belittling, degrading, and gross view of the divine Saviour does this hold up for our acceptance! Webster says divinity means “Deity; the God-head; the essence of God; the Supreme Being.” Hence the Doctor’s theory claims that the essence of God, the Supreme Being, who created and upholds all things from the beginning, was made into corruptible flesh, was killed by men, and for three days and nights was only a mass of dead flesh! Then, who raised him to life? The Doctor says, God did. But, according to the Doctor, God was, at that time, a mere mass of dead human flesh. I don’t wonder he tries so hard to ignore these points, and to draw attention away from them, and to slip other issues into their place, any way, any thing but to meet this issue fairly and fully. “His trinitarianism” seems to shackle him very much. His theory culminates right here, and must stand or fall here, and there is no use trying to evade it. I therefore repeat my questions again: 1. What was that pre-existing divinity that could be killed by men? 2. Was the universe without a Divine Being for three days and nights, but a dead one? or is there a plurality of such beings? 3. When did Christ possess immortality, before his advent, or at his resurrection? 4. Was his immortality an element of his divinity, which (the Doctor says) was made flesh and was killed? or did he obtain it from some other source?

Again, the Doctor quotes from my closing paragraph the question, “How can a pure spiritual body produce the same character as a gross, diseased body?” and instead of answering it asks, “Does our reviewer wish us to infer that he believes that there will be gross characters in Heaven?” What sort of a reply is this? He would have known better than to have put such a question, had he given even respectful attention to what I said in connection with the sentence he quoted, viz., “The Scriptures teach that the characters by which men will be recognized, after the resurrection, and for which they will be judged and rewarded or punished, will be the characters which they form here in their corrupt bodies.” And then asked, “How can a pure, spiritual body produce the same character as a gross, diseased body?” But instead of answering it he said, “Does our reviewer wish us to infer that he believes that there will be gross characters in Heaven?” I therefore repeat the question, “If spirit and character are the products of material bodies, how can bodies so suddenly changed and radically different (after the resurrection), still produce the same spirits and characters, so as to preserve the same moral and intellectual identity? Can a sweet, pure fountain send forth the same quality of water that a bitter and corrupt fountain does? and vice versa. If not, then how can a pure, spiritual body produce the same character as a gross, diseased body?”