(Continued.)
With the foregoing presentation of the question, we are prepared to state the proposition which it is our purpose to maintain. It is, that the Bible recognizes two laws as distinct from each other as black and white, daylight and darkness; that these two laws existed contemporaneously from the time of the introduction of the plan of salvation to the death of Christ, when one of them was nailed to the cross; while the other still continues.
This view will be defended as alone consistent with reason and revelation; as one which alone harmonizes the Scriptures, and puts into agreement with itself their testimony concerning the work of Christ and the plan of salvation. While the other view, that there was only one law previous to the death of Christ, which was at that time all abolished, making necessary a new enactment for whatever law we have since that time, is contrary to the plainest principles of God’s government, arrays Bible against Bible, and is utterly execrable in the conclusions to which it leads.
1. Two facts appear at the very threshold of this subject, which will be readily acknowledged by all. First, some laws which were binding in the old dispensation are binding in this dispensation. The laws, for instance, against murder, adultery, theft, blasphemy, and idolatry, are still in force. There are, therefore, some obligations common to both dispensations from which the world could not, consistently with God’s government, for a single moment be released. Secondly, that which was abolished at the cross was an entire system. God did not single out and abolish portions and pieces of some arrangement or system, and leave other parts remaining. If there was but one law, it all expired at the cross. Now a question arises; namely, Was there ever even a human government guilty of such folly as to abolish a law which the State could not for a moment spare, and then re-enact it at the same instant, knowing before their action that when they had abolished it, they must instantaneously re-enact it? What kind of a farce would this be? And shall we charge God with folly as much greater than this as his laws are more sacred than human laws, and all the world is greater than a single State? This is what he did do, if he abolished all law at the cross; and he did there abolish all law, if there was but one law. But if there were some principles not abolished then, there was some law which did not belong to the system which then came to an end. But further, if there were laws in the old dispensation which could not be spared in this, and all must admit that there were, why should God abolish them? Can any one answer? If you say that they chanced to be in an imperfect system, which had to be taken out of the way, and which, of course, carried everything with it, then another question arises, Did not God know this? Could he not foresee the dilemma in which he would at length find the eternal principles of his government involved? Ought we not to be careful how we charge God with folly? And this is the first count in the indictment of the one-law theory: it charges an infinite God with infinite folly.
2. The laws against murder, adultery, theft, blasphemy, and idolatry, have been referred to, as necessary in, and common to, both dispensations. Let us inquire into the origin of these principles. God, as our Creator, has a right to rule us. We, as his creatures, are under obligation to obey. There must be some law regulating this relation, and defining our duties. But man was not to be alone in the world. The earth was to be filled with inhabitants. All men would be under obligation to their fellow-men; and there must be some law regulating this relation also, and the duties growing out of it. Thus in two directions man was placed under obligation in the beginning; and these duties to God and to his fellow-men existed in the very nature of things; they began with man’s being,—a necessary concomitant of creation itself. And these laws must endure as long as these relations continue; and until the relations change, the laws governing them can never change.
All this, remember, before ever man had sinned. And if he had never sinned, those laws would have existed just the same. They would have gone with him, not only till he was confirmed in holiness and happiness, but through all eternity. And they would have been the only laws to which he was subject. Now, when man fell into sin, how did it affect his amenability to these laws? It did not affect it in the least, as it did not release him from any obligation to God or to his fellow-men.
Here, then, we have well-defined laws, occupying a specific field of their own, and regulating a distinct class of duties; laws which existed prior to the fall, independently of the fall, and which were not affected by the fall. These may justly be termed original or primary laws, which were in the very nature of the case immutable and eternal.
But just as soon as man had sinned, making redemption necessary to his salvation, and a plan had been devised for the accomplishment of a work of atonement in the hands of a Mediator, another law sprung into existence as the immediate result of this work. For after this, if man would have the favor of God, it became necessary for him not only to obey the primary laws, which were in no wise relaxed, but also to conform to certain other requirements by which he was to express faith in a coming Redeemer. This was the law of types and shadows, and was to be obeyed in the performance of certain typical ceremonies, rites, and offerings. Here was a law that owed its origin to the fall of man, and which could not have existed before; for a type pointing out a coming Redeemer would have been an impossibility before such a Redeemer was necessary to man’s future welfare. The object of this law was not to change or interfere with any of man’s primary duties to God or to his fellow-men, but only to show him the way back to God’s forfeited favor.
We now have before us two laws, distinct in their origin, distinct in their nature, and distinct in their design. The next inquiry will be whether they are equally distinct in the matter of their duration.
(To be continued.)