ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT DECISION

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Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association · Battle Creek, Mich. · Nov 23, 1886

FromReview and Herald, Vol. 63, No. 46.

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ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT DECISION.

OUR readers will be interested to read the decision of the Supreme Court of Arkansas, in the case of Bro. Scoles, a copy of which he has kindly furnished us:—
Decision of the Supreme Court, J. W. Scoles vs. State—appealed from Washington county.
The indictment charges that the defendant “on the 3rd day of May, 1885, the said day being Sunday, unlawfully was found laboring and performing other services, the same not then and there being customary household duty of daily necessity, comfort, or charity.”
The particular act that constitutes the alleged offense is not set out, and appellant urges that the indictment is not sufficient.
Held: The language of the statute which creates the offense is employed in the indictment, and nothing more is required in a statutory misdemeanor, where the general language of the statute is sufficient to apprise the defendant of the nature of the accusation against him. We cannot say that the indictment is insufficient under this rule, but think that the defendant would be enabled to prepare his defense and plead the judgment in bar of a second prosecution for the same offense.
The proof shows that defendant was found painting a church on a Sunday. He offered to prove that he was a member of a religious society known as the Seventh-day Adventists, one of the tenets of which is the observance of Saturday as the Sabbath instead of Sunday, and that he had regularly refrained from all secular work and labor on Saturday, agreeably to his religious faith and that of his church. But the court rejected this testimony, and the defendant was convicted and has appealed.
The offense was committed after the repeal of section 1886 of Mansfield’s Digest by the legislature of 1885. The appellant contends, however, that the effort to repeal section 1886 was ineffectual; and if it was not, the law without the exception made by that section, gives a preference to other religious denominations over that of the appellant, thereby violating section 24, art. 2 of the Constitution; and moreover, denies to him the equal protection of the law within the meaning of the Federal Constitution.
Held: The argument against the repeal of section 1886 is based upon the idea that if the law is read without that provision the penalty of the statute is “extended” to the appellant without a re-enactment of the law, thereby violating section 23, art. 5, Constitution. But it will be observed that that provision of the Constitution does not in terms prohibit the repeal of a law by reference to its title, and the prohibition can be extended by implication only. The power of the legislature is not to be cut off by inference, save where the inference is too strong to be resisted. We look to the Constitution, not to see whether power is granted, but to ascertain if it is withheld, and when there is a doubt as to the existence of a power it must be resolved in favor of the legislative action.
It is well settled that this provision does not make it necessary, when a new statute is passed, that all prior laws modified, affected, or repealed by implication by it should be re-enacted. This would be an absurd and impracticable construction. If the legislature had undertaken to amend the section, the provision under consideration would have required the section as amended to be set forth in extenso, and the old section upon the passage of the new one would have been repealed, if not expressly then by implication. In that event there would have been no necessity for re-enacting the other parts of the chapter, in which the section is found. When there is an express repeal of a section without a substitute or an amendment to it, what greater necessity for re-enacting the other sections that are affected only incidentally by the repeal? The section has been repealed, and the chapter is intact without it.
The constitutionality of our Sunday laws is not affected by the repeal of section 1886. (For the reason commonly given for sustaining these acts, see Commonwealth vs. Has, 122 Mass. 40.) It is said that every day in the week is observed by some one of the religious sects of the world as a day of rest; and if the power is denied to fix by law Sunday as such a day, the same reason would prevent the selection of any day; but the power of the legislature to select a day as a holiday is everywhere conceded. The State from the beginning has appropriated Sunday as such. On that day the business of our courts and public offices has always been suspended; the issuance and service of legal process prohibited; presentment and notice of dishonor of commercial paper not allowed; and the performance of an act in execution of a contract which matures on Sunday postponed to the next day. This observance of Sunday as a day of refrainment from secular business has always been required of the people generally without reference to creed, and they continue to observe it, without complaint that as a municipal institution it violates any of their constitutional or religious rights. The principle which upholds these regulations underlies the right of the State to prescribe a penalty for the violation of the Sunday law. The law which imposes the penalty operates upon all alike, and interferes with no man’s religious belief; for in limiting the prohibition to secular pursuits, it leaves religious profession and worship free.
The appellant’s argument, then, is reduced to this: that because he conscientiously believes that he is permitted by the law of God to labor on Sunday, he may violate with impunity a statute declaring it illegal to do so. But a man’s religion cannot be accepted as a justification for committing an overt act made criminal by the law of the land. If the law operates harshly, as laws sometimes do, the remedy is in the hands of the legislature. It is not in the province of the judiciary to pass upon the wisdom and policy of legislation; that is for the members of the legislative department; and the only appeal from their determination is to the constituency.
The assertion that all days are kept by different classes, and therefore the State could not fix upon any day as a holiday without taking somebody’s Sabbath, is not true. Only three days are regarded as sacred days. These are the Sabbath of the Lord, and the two thieves between which it is crucified—the Friday of Mohammed, and the Sunday of the pope.
The specious plea that the Sunday law interferes with no man’s religion, is unworthy any candid mind. And the doctrine that the law of the land can make acts criminal which are permitted by the law of God, is monstrous.