Human Probation

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Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association · Battle Creek, Mich. · Sep 5, 1882

FromReview and Herald, Vol. 59, No. 36.

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Human Probation.

BY ELD. G. W. COLCORD.
TEXT: “I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing.” Deut. 30:19.
In studying this subject, let us, first, briefly consider the text; secondly, read a few definitions; thirdly, study a tenet which is counter to human probation; and, lastly, carefully investigate our principal theme.
1. The words of the text were uttered by Moses to Israel, when, very near the time of his decease, he was inspired to proclaim the terms of the covenant made “with the children of Israel in the land of Moab.”
The terms “life” and “death,” as used in this passage, evidently embrace more than temporal existence and man’s sleep in the grave. With “life” the Lord offered a “blessing,” even an inheritance with Abraham. During the eternal age, this priceless estate will be enjoyed by Israel’s noble patriarch and his family. The royalty of Christ will be universal. Deut. 30:20; Rom. 4:13; Gal. 3:29; Luke 1:33. This glorious promise is confirmed by the oath of God. Heb. 6:17, 18.
To lose the “blessing” will be to receive the “cursing;” for all who neglect to secure life through Christ, will feel God’s wrath in the Judgment. Matt. 25:41; John 3:36; Rom. 2:8, 9, 12, 16.
2. The following definitions, carefully studied, will aid in elucidating our topic. As they refer to two lines of thought, which are essentially opposites, we would better place them, as couplets, side by side:—
Probation.—“Any proceeding designed to ascertain truth, to determine character, qualification, or the like; examination, trial; hence, specifically, . . . (c.) The state of man in the present life, in which he has opportunity of proving his character,” etc.
Fatalism.—“The doctrine that all things are subject to fate, or that they take place by inevitable necessity.”
Libertarian.—“One who holds to free will.”
Necessitarian.—“One who maintains the doctrine of philosophical necessity.”
Will.—“The faculty of choosing; choice; . . . v. t. To determine by an act of choice.”
Fatality.—“The state of being . . . independent of free and rational control.”
Accountability.—“The state of being accountable, or liable to give account. ‘The awful idea of accountability.’”—R. Hall.
Irresponsible.—“Not liable or able to answer for consequences.”
3. Fatalism, the counter tenet referred to in the first paragraph, is thus stated by Diderot: “Examine it narrowly, and you will see that the word ‘liberty’ is a word devoid of meaning; that there are not, and that there cannot be free beings; that we are only what accords with the general order, with our organization, our education, and the chain of events. These dispose of us invincibly.”—Haven on the Will, pp. 543, 544.
Recently the writer received a communication on this subject from which the following extracts are copied: “We are under certain circumstances, ever; and with this particular organism, under these certain or particular circumstances, we must act in a certain way. It is inevitable.” “Ultimately, as far as we are concerned, it is chance, all chance.” “The stronger force is sure to rule.”
These quotations betray a superficial study of the great theme of human probation. The conclusions, though legitimate from the premises, are erroneous, because the premises are false.
Whenever we “examine” the subject “narrowly,” we plainly see a constant need of the word “liberty.” It indicates an inestimable blessing bestowed upon us by our Heavenly Father. The following considerations show that the human race exercise “freedom of the will”:
(1.) It would be unjust to require man to do right, if it were impossible for him so to do. But it would be thus, were it impossible for him to will to do right. The fatalist has no hesitation in saying that man has no power to go against his inclinations; neither has he the power to change this current of inclination; but this is not in accordance with the facts in the case. True philosophy says, Man can control his inclinations, and he can also act contrary to them. These are facts, and it is vain to deny them. Light will shine on this point more clearly as we pass on. God is reasonable. He requires man to govern his will in favor of righteousness. Therefore man is free to do right.
“Let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts.” “If sinners entice thee, consent thou not.” “Keep thyself pure.” Isa. 55:7; Prov. 1:10; 1 Tim. 5:22.
(2.) Freedom of the will is further argued from man’s moral nature. That man has a moral nature, should be doubted by none; for without such a nature he could not be a subject of moral government; and life without moral government would be void of virtue and vice, praise and blame, rewards and punishments. But, unwise as it is, this position is accepted by avowed necessitarians. Diderot says: “The doer of good is lucky, not virtuous. . . . Reproach others for nothing, and repent of nothing; this is the first step to wisdom.”—Haven, p. 544. “Whatever is, is right, in its fullest and broadest sense.”—A. P. McComb, in Modern Spiritualism, p. 74.
Nevertheless, truth remains unharmed; for error is inconsistent, even with its principal propositions. The correspondent referred to above, in concluding his missive, used these words: “I love truth and morality.” Then my friend would dislike error and immorality. And here is commenced a line of reasoning which, when followed to its termination, always presents the terms, law, probation, right, wrong, reward, and punishment.
But if fatalism be true, man is simply a machine, hence should never be praised nor censured by any one. Here, again, we behold an inconsistency of the worst kind,—a self-contradiction; the necessitarian as quickly lauds or blames his fellows as does his theoretical opponent. Here is one of his absurdities, shown in a couplet:—
“Man’s actions are inevitable.”
“You could have done better than that.”
(3.) Feelings of remorse prove, beyond successful contradiction, the liberty of the will. This state of mind is entirely distinct from that of disapproval. We approve or disapprove the conduct of others; but remorse relates only to ourselves. We experience compunction when we censure ourselves. Thus the fatalist, by making known his sense of guilt, tacitly acknowledges that he has possessed this freedom.
“There are some truths which are so deeply based in the human constitution that all men of all classes receive them and act upon them. They are planted deeply and immutably in the soul, and no reasoning, however plausible, can shake them. . . . The doctrine of the freedom of the will, as a condition of even the possibility of a moral nature, is one of these first truths. It seems to be regarded by all persons, without exception, as a dictate of common sense and as a first principle of our nature, that men are morally accountable, and are the subjects of a moral responsibility in any respect whatever, only so far as they possess freedom, both of the outward action and the will. They hold to this position as an elementary truth, and would no sooner think of letting it go, than of abandoning the conviction of their personal existence and identity.”—Upham’s Mental Philosophy, pp. 516, 517.
4. In studying the subject of man’s probation, we may not only see the fallacies of the advocates of human irresponsibility, but we may have clearer conceptions of the Creator’s primary designs concerning celestial, as well as terrestrial beings. Here is opened before our mental vision a vast field of investigation; but of the many points of thrilling interest, we can now consider only a few of the most important.
(1.) That our race is now in a state of probation,—moral trial,—is evidenced by our consciousness of the liberty we enjoy of choosing the good, and hence of rejecting the evil, if we but will. Can the reader either wink or refrain from winking, just as he chooses? Can he thus raise or lower his hand? This is no more axiomatic than that man can swear or pray, and that, too, as he decides to do.
Let not the objector say, Whether man’s act be good or bad depends on influences foreign to himself; for our reply is ready,—The most potent of all laws of influence brought to bear upon the mind of man, is not extraneous, but innate; and this is the law of probation, by which he is allowed to do as pleases him, right or wrong. Should we, at any time while fully enjoying probation on the point, decide to do right, no devil, even, could force us to transgress; on the other hand, should we consent to serve Satan, the Lord would not, yea, according to the economy of grace, could not, interfere, so as to compel us to do right.
This, at first hearing, may sound like strong language; but consider: Can the Lord commit an absurdity? No! He “cannot lie.” Titus 1:2. He cannot change a past act. Instance: He cannot change his Edenic rest from the last to the first day of the week. And it would be as reasonable to say that God could change the anniversary of our birth from the day in which we were born to another in which we were not born, as it would be for us, first to acknowledge, tacitly or otherwise, that he created us probationers, and then contend that we are subject to fate! During our mundane life, we may do as we choose, to the limit of our probation, in reference to our Master’s service. We may obey or disobey him. But in “the world to come,”—after our probation will have been closed,—it will be wholly as God will decide, and we shall be as passive as the most ultra believer in “the inevitable” can suppose.
“There is a manhood that can walk before the open doors of hell unscathed by the fires that roar within. There is a sobriety that can walk before the gilded openings of saloons, and feel [entertain] no temptation to enter the portals. . . . The first step in that way is the feeling that drunkenness is a crime for which home, society, nature, and nature’s God, will hold the drunkard responsible.”—Pacific Christian Advocate, Oct. 20, 1881.
“Our own free will we know by consciousness; and we can have no evidence of any truth so irresistible as this.”—Stewart, in Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers.
(2.) Valid reasons may be adduced why God placed both men and angels on trial. That the entire family of cherubim were once on probation, and that a part sinned while the remainder continued to obey God, is a proposition which admits of abundant philosophical and Scriptural proof. But we cannot be allowed space in this treatise to argue the point. See “Ministration of Angels and History of Satan,” REVIEW Office, Battle Creek, Mich.; and 2 Pet. 2:4; Jude 6; Isa. 14:12–20; Eze. 28:11–19; Matt. 8:28, 29; Rev. 20:10.
“Why did the Lord place Adam in a state where it was possible for him to sin?” tauntingly propounds the skeptic. Ingenious minds also query on the same point, and the replies rendered are various.
One answers: “Though the Creator is omniscient, he has power to suspend the use of prescience; and, doubtless, he did this when he left our first parents to choose for themselves. His virtual decision was, ‘I shall be equal to any emergency.’”
A second interpretation is: “It was the Son who said, ‘Let us make man,’ etc. The Father simply consented to his Son’s plan, and was therefore only indirectly related to the same. Christ was not absolutely prescient; hence, when the newly-made pair transgressed, he offered to die for the race, that mankind might have a second trial for life.”
Another expositor says: “Admitting that the Lord foresaw man’s fall, he was nevertheless defensible in placing Adam on trial; for he also foresaw that redemption’s broad plan would augment his glory and greatly enhance the joys of the saved.”
(Concluded next week.)