AdventAI

THE WAR IN THE EAST.

By Interior

From Review and Herald, Vol. 59, No. 32., August 8, 1882

The Egyptian situation is still complicated by the undetermined attitude of the Porte and the dog-in-the-manger spirit of the powers. The former has signified its willingness to dispatch troops to Egypt immediately, under the conditions of the identical note, that is, for six months, but has shrewdly accompanied its consent with stipulations that make acceptance impracticable. It demands that England withdraw her troops, refuses the request of England to first proclaim Arabi a rebel, and desires to consult the Mohammedan priests and magnates at Cairo as to the manner of occupation. These conditions serve only to embarrass the situation. The Sultan, while desirous of retaining his hold upon Egypt, dare not aid Europe, fearing a sacrifice of his spiritual interests.

As to the powers, each one claims to have interests in Egypt, but each shrinks from interference, while unwilling that any other power should reap the rewards of so doing. Germany is the only one openly to sanction English intervention, but even she intimates that when Egypt is pacified the powers will demand a collective settlement. Austria follows Germany. Russia demands assurance that the war is not one of annexation, and Italy refuses to have aught to do with the matter save to share in the final division of spoils. Still, the work of the conference has practically ended with the withdrawal of Russia from its sessions, and the powers will tacitly acquiesce in English action without formally sanctioning it. The attitude of England is explicit and satisfactory. The objects for which she will conduct the war are the security of the Suez canal, the independence of Egypt after the restoration of peace and order, the sanctity of international engagements, and the protection of British subjects. She does not withdraw her invitation to Turkey to send troops, but will not consent, at this late hour, to place her own in any secondary position. France is still asked to join the intervention, but has virtually decided to allow England to act alone in suppressing the revolt, confining herself to defensive operations on the line of the Suez canal. A British army corps of twenty-five thousand men is being dispatched for active operations, the reserve has been called out, and a vote of credit granted. The issue has been joined, and upon England falls the responsibility of restoring order in Egypt.

Meanwhile, the rising promises to be more formidable than was at first anticipated. The military element of Egypt is undoubtedly with Arabi, and armaments continue on an extended scale. Volunteers are rapidly arising from Upper and Lower Egypt, and the Bedouins have promised fidelity. Each day's delay adds to Arabi's power of resisting the British occupation of the delta. Commissariat and climatic difficulties add to his numbers, and he has in his power the destruction of the Suez canal, the ruin of Cairo, the cutting off of fresh water supplies from an invading force, and the flooding of the country by cutting the canals. Such a position is not to be accounted lightly, and it is probable that England will have to fight for any advantage she gains.

There is another element which must be considered in the estimate of probabilities, and that is the religious aspect that the war is fast assuming. It has been hinted more than once that in the event of Turkish intervention, Arabi would depose the Sultan and proclaim an Arab caliph. It is no doubt the fear of an Arabian rival that has prompted the hesitation of the Porte, and that now makes the dispatch of troops hinge upon the attitude of the Moslem magnates at Cairo. To understand this phase of the situation, it is necessary to remember that while the Mohammedanism of the Turk is the same as that of the Arab, the latter has never fully accepted the claims of the Sultan to the caliphate. Nominally, the head of the Moslem world is the grand Sherief of Mecca, and the tradition that sovereignty should revert to the Koreish at Mecca has always been tenaciously cherished by the Arabs. The Sultan claims by purchase the full dignity of the caliphate, and has sought by long series of intrigues to make Constantinople the capital of a grand pan-Islamic confederation. These pretensions are resisted by the priesthood and the Arabian people, who claim to retain the faith of Mahomet in purer form than the Ottomans. The Sultan they regard as compromised by his European surroundings, while the Khedive, as the creature of Western intrigue and a traitor to the faith, is looked upon with fanatical hatred.

The suspicion with which the Ottoman power is regarded is evinced by the fact that for months a secretly-organized pan-Islamic propaganda has been rapidly spreading throughout the Mussulman world of Asia and Africa, not a trace of which is to be found among the Moslem populations of Europe. This propaganda has a two-fold object,—the regeneration of the Mussulman religion, and the emancipation of Islam from the Christian yoke.

The Mohammedanism of Asia sympathizes with that of Africa, but not with that of the Ottoman; and therein is the danger both to England and the Sultan. Much of this Mohammedanism sees in Arabi Pasha the forerunner of the Mehdi or Messianic teacher, whose coming at this time their traditions teach them to expect. In the opinion of multitudes this Messiah has already come in the person of Mahomet Achmet, the Soudan prophet, mention of whom has already been made in these columns. This magnetic leader, having made himself absolute master of the Soudan, is pushing his way to the north with a vast following. Not since the days of Ethiopian prowess has there been such a barbaric incursion. Late advices announce his arrival in Upper Egypt, and less than one thousand miles from Cairo. As it is now high Nile at that point, it is estimated that three weeks will be sufficient to bring his advance within the influence of the war spirit of the Arabian Mohammedans. If, as reported, Arabi Pasha is himself a disciple of the Mehdi, and proclaims an Arabian caliphate, the consequences cannot fail to be momentous. There are twelve millions of the Arabian Moslems, the most fanatical of all the four great divisions of Islam. Desperate and brilliant fighters, if once united to sweep the infidel from sacred soil, cement the faith and re-establish the caliphate in its ancient splendor, there is no single power that could prevail against them. Even should he refrain from proclaiming the caliphate, and content himself with joining forces with the prophet and calling the faithful to a religious war against the infidel, it cannot be doubted that the position of England in India and Egypt, and that of France in Algeria and Tunis, would be rendered extremely hazardous, and the influence of the Sultan in Islam practically destroyed. While it is scarcely probable that Arabi Pasha has either the disposition or the ability to organize such a movement, yet there is much in the present suppressed excitement of the Moslem populations which tends to promote infectious fanaticism. The possibility of a Mussulman revival under Arabian auspices is an element in the situation which it is not well to ignore.

There are, too, some later points of interest which serve to greatly complicate the situation. One is the establishment of a provisional government at Cairo, composed of leading Christians and Mussulmans, in opposition to that of the Khedive. This gives the revolt something of a national character, and shifts further responsibility from Arabi to the Notables. It may mean either a more determined resistance, or a loophole of escape if worst comes to worst. Another complication grows out of the defeat of the French ministry, on Saturday, on the vote for a war credit. The Gambetta party has all along insisted that France should play as conspicuous a part in the restoration of order in Egypt as England. This insistence has been made the stronger by the war feeling in England, which promised to break away from Gladstone's control and wage a war of conquest, and by the declarations of the English press that if England were left alone in the struggle, she would do as she liked with Egypt afterward. When, therefore, the French ministry asked a vote of credit merely to protect the Suez canal, leaving to England the task of suppressing the revolt, they were overwhelmingly defeated. But the defeat, so far from showing that France is against war, shows that she wants to take a more conspicuous part in it; and that, while she is now practically out of the lists, she will want to get in again on a larger basis than ever.

Another factor is the antagonism of Russia to English intervention, shown in her withdrawal from the conference; meaning thereby that future negotiations on the subject will be conducted from St. Petersburg. Still another danger lies in the action of De Lesseps, who, as president of the Suez canal company, is intriguing with Arabi, the Cairo Notables, and the Porte, in favor of the surrender of the former on condition that England withdraw her troops from Egypt and let Turkey settle the difficulty. His scheme is, of course, strongly backed by Turkey, and will undoubtedly find favor with a large element among the canal stockholders, and may in the end be indorsed by some of the powers. As England and France will not consent to any arrangement that may again give Turkey a hold in Egypt, he is necessarily hostile to both powers, and on this account may find the readier favor for his scheme with Russia, Italy, and Germany.

But the gravest complications to be apprehended lie in the uncertain policy of the Porte. That policy has been simply one of drift ever since the beginning of the trouble. The task that England has assumed belongs primarily to the Sultan. England has all along endeavored to conform to his wishes, but has been kept constantly in the dark. It is barely possible that even at this late hour the Porte may send troops, in which event, with Turkish intervention strongly backed as it is by the other powers, the most serious complications may be expected. All this shows that, while England has gone too far to recede, affairs are yet largely in the hands of the diplomats, and that the proportions of the struggle are yet undefined.

The military situation becomes plain only with the aid of a good map. It is made clearer, however, when it is remembered that at the present time the English are practically in a state of siege in Alexandria. The Egyptian line extends from Mareotis, nearly ten miles to the southwest, to Aboukir on the coast fifteen miles northeast of Alexandria. The main infantry force, however, is concentrated at Rosetta near the mouth of the west branch of the Nile, thirty miles east of Aboukir, and at Damietta, at the mouth of the east branch of the Nile, one hundred miles east of Rosetta. Between Lake Mareotis, a salt marsh south of Alexandria, and Lake Aboukir, a shallow lake north of the city, runs the Mahmoudieh canal and the railroad to Cairo. The canal extends east from Alexandria to the Rosetta branch of the Nile, and it is by cutting it and turning its waters into the Mareotis marsh that Arabi threatens to deprive Alexandria of fresh water. Ramleh, now occupied by the English, is seven miles distant from Alexandria on the railroad and canal, and is important only as commanding the water supply. A little farther east, and also on the canal, is Kafridwar, where Arabi's forces are solidly entrenched, and which will probably be the first point of attack by the English troops.

The railroad from Alexandria to Cairo, after passing between Lakes Mareotis and Aboukir, trends southeast to Kafr Zegat, near which it crosses the west branch of the Nile at a point about seventy miles from Alexandria. At Tanta, ten miles east, it turns south, crossing the east branch of the Nile at Benha, about one hundred miles from Alexandria, and then runs due south to Cairo, a distance of forty miles. From Benha a branch extends through Zagazig to Ismailia on the Suez canal, and from Cairo a road runs east to Suez at the southern end of the canal. There is a large fresh-water canal extending from the Nile near Cairo to Zagazig, with a branch from thence to Ismailia. All these interior points are garrisoned by Egyptians, while at a point twenty-five miles north of Cairo there are said to be extensive fortifications. Arabi, then, holds Cairo, controls both branches of the Nile, occupies Zagazig and so commands the fresh-water supply of the Suez canal, has an extended line in front of Alexandria, and threatens Port Said, the northern terminus of the Suez canal, with his troops at Damietta, thirty miles to the west. His plan is to hold the Nile delta until its overflow in August, when the campaign will present unusual difficulties to the English, both in the way of commissariat and disease. In that event English operations are likely to be confined for a time to keeping the Suez canal open, and to an advance from Suez with the Indian troops. Much depends, however, upon the rapidity with which English troops are concentrated in Egypt, and the strength developed by Arabi Pasha.—Interior.