The present tumult in the Balkan peninsula dates from the eighteenth day of September, when the people of Philippopolis, the capital of Eastern Roumelia, rose in revolt from Turkish rule, deposed their governor, Gabriel Chrestovitch, and proclaimed union with Bulgaria, declaring allegiance to Prince Alexander. Then they blew up the bridges and cut the wires leading south into Turkey, and fortified the roads on which the Porte’s troops might approach.
This move took all Europe by surprise. The first suspicion of on-lookers was that it had been secretly backed by Russia, the patron of Bulgarians, who gratefully acknowledge her aid in their past struggles for freedom. But the Czar’s prompt withdrawal of the many Russian officers serving with the Roumelian militia indicated that he also was surprised and vexed. It was even whispered that this premature revolt interfered with a great Pan-Slavic move planned for next year, in which Prince Alexander would have been deposed for some more pliant tool of Russia. Be this as it may, the Roumelian revolt sprang from the people, and was due to the grievous burden of supporting both Turkish and local institutions, and paying annual tribute to the Porte—evils they hoped to lessen or avoid by national union with their Bulgarian brethren, one with them in race and religion, though separated in part by the heavy wall of the Balkans and by Turkish restrictions upon freedom of trade.
But the revolution was a plain infraction of the Treaty of Berlin. The war of 1877 had ended in the advance of the Russians almost to the gates of Constantinople, where the frightened Turks hastily agreed to the Treaty of San Stefano, by which, under Ignatieff’s diplomacy, a great Bulgaria was formed, including what was afterward Eastern Roumelia, and parts even of Macedonia. The other powers, fearing the control which Russia, by a great dependent Bulgaria, would gain in the Balkan peninsula, protested against this treaty, Lord Beaconsfield heading the opposition to it, and in a general Congress which met at Berlin in July, 1878, made a new disposition. Bulgaria was limited to the region between the Balkans and Roumania, as an “automatic and tributary principality,” under the suzerainty of the Sultan, but with a prince of its own choosing, to be confirmed by the Porte with the consent of the powers. The ruler chosen was Prince Alexander of Battenberg. South of Bulgaria, on the other flank of the Balkans, a province was formed, and called Eastern Roumelia, as an integral part of Turkey, yet “subject to conditions of administrative autonomy.” That is, it had a Christian governor-general, appointed by the Porte with the consent of the treaty powers, and its own gendarmerie and militia—this accounting for the easy and bloodless success of the late revolt at Philippopolis.
Thus the Roumelian revolt at once challenged the signatory powers to vindicate their own dignity, and warned Turkey to hurry forward troops into the disaffected region, as she had a right to do under the treaty, “if the internal or external security of the province should be menaced.” But Turkey hesitated, as if paralyzed by the boldness of the movement, or in doubt as to what scheme of Russia and Austria might underlie it, and the golden moment for action was lost. She remembered her bitter experience with Bulgarian insurrections ten years before, and waited for the support of the powers, who, after all, only appointed a conference of ambassadors at Constantinople, which till now has done nothing decisive. Meanwhile Prince Alexander aided irresolution by ardently renewing his allegiance to the Sultan, pledging him the support of “the two Bulgarias” in keeping Macedonia quiet, and perhaps promising that the tribute should still go on. Still, he took the precaution to mobilize all his troops, and “the two Bulgarias” speedily became like a vast camp, trade being almost at a stand-still till union should be assured.
Now war clouds from a new source rose in the sky. Servia and Greece called for the restoration of the status quo ante in Roumelia and the vindication of the Berlin Treaty, declaring that Turkey must fight Bulgaria or fight them. The selfishness of this position was supreme; for the cause of Roumelia being that of greater release of a Christian community from the Turkish yoke, and union on the footing of nationality, was the cause in which they had once struggled, and for which they had implored aid. Its selfishness became more evident when both Servia and Greece expressed a willingness to accept Bulgarian union if territorial compensation were made to them. Turkey, however, in this instance, wanted just what they professed to want—the sundering of the Bulgarian union; hence why should they come to her for indemnity, and why fight her?
The illogical position of Servia and Greece did not check their preparations. Both countries rose in arms, and swept their monarchs before them to a war policy. King George of Greece found his subjects clamoring for a slice of Macedonia. King Milan of Servia found that he must fight or risk dethronement, and had needed no such spur to fight. He was hailed as “ruler of Macedonia,” while cries arose from his troops to be led into “Old Servia,” of which Prizrend was the ancient capital. But Austria has been the patron of King Milan, and Prizrend is on her coveted path to Salonica, to be taken whenever Russia goes to Constantinople. The Servian battalions therefore turned eastward to indemnify themselves out of Bulgaria; for it happens that this country possesses in the city and suburbs of Widdin a corner which Servia considers rightfully hers as a part of old Servia, though the Congress of Berlin withheld it. Prince Alexander, an experienced soldier, summoned every available man to oppose this menace of King Milan.
With Turkey, Greece, Servia, and Bulgaria on the brink of hostilities, the issues of peace and war, as these words are penned, hang equipoised in the scales.—Harper’s Weekly.