AdventAI

THE EASTERN QUESTION AS VIEWED IN PERSIA.

By S. G. W. Benjamin

From Review and Herald, Vol. 62, No. 50., December 22, 1885

The complication in European Turkey has, for the moment, tended to withdraw attention from a scarcely less important phase of the Eastern Question. The political situation on the frontier of Persia is one which very recently attracted wide attention. It is of great significance, and, although temporarily in abeyance, must ere long once more disturb the diplomatic circles of the world. Every interval of delusive calm in that quarter only tends to make the conflict more certain, and the final crash more terrible. For it is during these periods of seeming repose that intrigue is most active and the preparations for war are most thoroughly conducted.

As Persia lies contiguous to the line now followed by the march of Russia toward India, if not actually included in that fatal space, and as, in any case, there is every evidence that Russia proposes to absorb Persia at the earliest moment that it can be done without interference from England or Germany, Teheran, the capital of Persia, must naturally be a center of the intrigues which are now aiding to bring the Eastern problem to a solution.

It may be premised that Persia is not the effete country, nor her sovereign the imbecile tyrant they are represented to be by some industrious fabricators of untrue statements who have interested motives in maligning, for the purpose of suggesting a reason for subsequently ruining that empire. For an old country, she exhibits a singular degree of vitality; but her progressive efforts are greatly hampered by several serious obstacles. The first, and probably greatest obstacle, is the State religion. With Mohammedanism, as such, we have nothing to do here. But, while it was undoubtedly the instrument which gave to Persia renewed power and splendor at various periods, this very influence now prevents the adaptation of the country to modern conditions, and thus leaves her in the rear when desirous of pressing to the van. But, as the vitality of Persia is still active, this sinister influence would gradually be dissipated, if time were allowed for changes which must, from the nature of the case, be slow.

But the geographical position of Persia is such that it is a question whether she will be able top. 790 survive long enough as an independent power to gather strength to resist the menacing attitude of her northern neighbor. Given time, and Persia will once more arise from her depression, as she has often done in the ages past. Unlike Turkey, Persia has native resources of intellectual and administrative ability that give her permanent powers of recuperation within herself. She is far more than simply a military nation. But the everlasting rivalry between England and Russia in the East, and the manifest intention of Russia to absorb Persia, present a chronic menace toward all the efforts of Persia to liberate herself from the manacles of conservatism and reaction. Russia is naturally opposed to any movements which may tend to add to the difficulties she may have to encounter when she proposes seriously to enter on the task of swallowing her intended victim. For this reason Russian diplomacy acts with sleepless vigilance in Persia. Now with arrogance and threats, anon with blandishments, and always with money, she works openly and secretly to accomplish her ends. It is easy to see what success must attend the peculiar and tortuous methods of Russian diplomacy, in form European, but in spirit Asiatic, and backed by a territorial bulk which looms above the Caspian like the Afrite in the Arabian tale, a vast cloud of blackness, big with terror and doom. Europe is blinded by the fictions and appalled by the vague size of Russia. What, then, must be the effect on a country like Persia, isolated in position, her arms weak and her ministers venal? Muscovite influence in that quarter has also been greatly aided by the vacillation of England, especially apparent in the dealings of the Gladstonian ministry with the Afghan question. This for two reasons: one, because like all Orientals, the Persians turn from the setting to the rising sun; and, secondly, because it is naturally perilous for a country so situated as Persia to offend the power which is in the ascendant by siding with her apparently declining, or at least hesitating, rival. Russia knows what she wants to do, and is bound to do it. England knows not what she wants, and dares arrive at no decision. Therefore, English prestige has vastly declined in Central Asia, and her actual power is now, therefore, underestimated by Asiatics.

If one were to ask which side the Persians favor, I should emphatically reply that, while willing to fill their pockets with foreign gold, they cordially hate both English and Russians, and would give glory to God if both of these uneasy powers could be abolished from the earth. Secretly, most Persians doubtless incline toward England, because her designs toward Persia are those of strict neutrality, while those of Russia are exactly the reverse. But the proximity of the latter power suggests great caution in showing any antipathy toward her.

The hand of Russia is evident, so constantly and in so many ways, in interfering with the independent action of Persia, that it is difficult to enumerate them all. A few cases will suffice. The foreign trade of Persia is considerable; but the routes it follows are few and defective. The one by the Caspian is inoperative, except for direct trade with Russia, the transit of goods across that country being practically closed. The route by Trebizond and Tabreez lies partly through Turkey; and, although free transit is nominally allowed, numerous obstacles occur to hamper the movement of trade, aside from the character of the severe mountain passes to be traversed in winter. The route via Bagdad and Kermanshab labors under similar disadvantages. There remains the route via Bushire, the only route which begins and ends in Persia. But that port is but a mere open road-sted, while the road leads through frightful mountain passes, dangerous to both travelers and freight. One of the happiest events which could happen to Persia would, therefore, seem to be the opening of a more approachable port within her own borders, free for the passage of her goods both in war and peace. Such a port exists at Mohammerah, in the Shat-el-Arab, or junction of the Euphrates and Tigris. It is on Persian territory, is commodious and safe, has depth of water for the largest ships close to the shore; and goods can be transferred thence on lighters up the Karoon to Shuster, two hundred miles nearer the heart of the country. From Shuster the road to Ispahán and Teheran would be through one of the richest but least cultivated parts of Persia. Such a road would not only be an extraordinary aid toward the development of Persian industry and commerce, but it would also open up the now languishing southwestern districts of Persia, and, besides developing the production of cotton and cereals, would lead to the exportation of the vast amount of bituminous coal which now lies there, awaiting the advent of enterprise and capital. The Shah has considered the scheme with high favor, and promised to give the money required to construct it, which he is abundantly able to do. The Minister of Foreign Affairs heartily approves the plan; capable European engineers have surveyed the route, and repeatedly received orders to be in readiness to break ground. Several foreign ministers, representing great powers, have used every influence to start an enterprise that would be a benefit not only to Persia, but to the commerce of every nation except Russia. And yet the work lingers, hindered by some mysterious machinery behind the scenes. The reason the road to Mohammerah is not built, is because it would add too greatly to the resources, the progress, and the prosperity of Persia, and would increase her facilities for receiving foreign aid in case of war with Russia; therefore Russia opposes it with open threats and secret intrigues. It is the purpose of Russia to throttle Persia by placing her iron grip on the throat of that unfortunate country, and preventing her from breathing the invigorating air of modern progress until, in a dead syncope, the old empire falls helpless into the arms of her grasping and insidious foe.

Russia again shows her hand in Persia by a specious process of which, perhaps, she invented the name. It is called rectification of the frontier. I refer to her steady attempts to grow into the territory of her neighbors by slow attrition. Anxious to rectify the frontier, in order, as she alleged, to put an end to incursions and border difficulties—for so powerful a State, Russia is singularly apprehensive of her weaker neighbors—in 1883 she claimed, seized, and held the very important frontier range, called the Daman-i-kuh, in Northeastern Persia, one of the most valuable bulwarks left to this poor country. The Shah made his great expedition to Meshed in that year, ostensibly on a pilgrimage to the shrine of Imâm Rezâb; his real purpose was to examine the question of the frontier, and, if possible, to avert the attack on so important a portion of his dominions. The matter created a great deal of bad blood at Teheran, and would have proved a casus belli if Persia had been equal to the contest. In addition to this, Russia at that time worried Persia into an offensive and defensive treaty, by which the latter agreed to side with Russia in case of war with England. This compact was intended to be secret; but the business leaked out, and was at once promptly disavowed by Russia, and declared to be impossible by England. But I have sound reasons for stating that such a treaty was drawn up. Whether it was ever signed by Persia is more doubtful.

A year later, Russia suggested the absorption of the eastern and richest portion of the large province of Khorassán, including the holy city of Meshed. This, also, was for the purpose of “rectifying her frontier.” But when the proposal was made, the Sadr Agem, or Prime Minister of Persia, a grand old man of ancient type, replied, with indignation and scorn: “You have taken our cradle, and now you ask us to give you our life!” He referred to the fact that the district of which Persia was robbed the previous year was the birthplace of the present Khajâr dynasty, while to take Meshed is practically to attack the seat of the Sheah faith, on which rest the laws and autonomy of Persia; she will fight to the death before she yields Meshed. Russia knew that; and, not being yet ready to fight, withdrew her demand, but with very ill grace. We do not need to go into the questions involved in the seizure of Sarracks from Persia preliminary to Russia’s advance on Herât. She wanted it, and she took it. That is all that needs to be said about that transaction.

Recent events have forcibly demonstrated that Persia cannot be eliminated from any discussion of the intrigues and differences between England and Russia on her eastern frontier. Although little consulted by either, she is one of the parties most interested in the Eastern Question, aside from the fact that her very existence depends on the ultimate result. This is shown by such examples as the case of Eyoob Khan, of Afghanistan, who is interned in Persia, and strictly maintained a prisoner at Teheran, under British pressure, the expenses of his captivity being paid by England, as it is darkly hinted. A direct intrigue was carried on with him by the Russian legation at Teheran in the winter of 1884–’85; he was secretly furnished with funds, and everything was prepared for his escape, with the intention of arousing the Afghans against England. The proverbial treachery of Orientals disclosed the intrigue, and the captive prince was removed from his residence to close confinement in the palace of the Shah. Of these facts I can speak with certainty.

Of the ultimate intentions of Russia in Persia and Afghanistan, there is no longer room to doubt; although I am inclined to think her recent operations in those parts against England were rather in the nature of a feint, at a time when the latter was embarrassed with a weak ministry, and handicapped with the war in the Soudan, in the hope that, by distracting the attention of her rival, Russia might essay a coup de main on Constantinople; although never slackening from a well-defined and determined plan to push her conquests southward until she reaches the Indian Ocean. So carefully were her movements planned that the news of her successive advances to Penjdeh and Pool-i-malan was secretly known at Teheran weeks before they were reported at London, to be contradicted, and finally reaffirmed. The determination and the diplomacy of Russia were well stated by a Russian official when he emphatically said, last spring: “Believe nothing you hear apropos of the imbroglio on the eastern frontier. Even if you hear any one swear that we do not want Herât, do not believe him; not even if I swear, not even if the Czar himself should swear; don’t believe it. We want Herât, and we shall have it.”

Looked at impartially, Russia has quite the same right to advance on India as England had to take it in the first place. Regarding the matter from the higher ground of abstract justice, both England and Russia are interlopers in Asia. But history shows that the only justice that has thus far prevailed in the march of empire and political progress has been the law of the stronger. The portion of the civilized world whose title is other than the tenure of the sword, is quite insignificant. It is not Russia’s right to seize all she can hold that is the question, but her dark and devious ways, her treachery, dissimulation, and deceit.

As regards India, it may also with fairness be asked, since that country seems bound to be, for ages to come, under the sway of some European power, wherein she will be benefited by a change of rulers just now when she is beginning to feel the better results of the beneficent sway of England. It is nonsense to believe that any Asiatic people could be improved by exchanging the rod of England for that of Russia. Undoubtedly, English rule has its faults and crimes. Has that of Russia less?

It is impossible to foresee at present the ultimate result in India and Afghanistan. Much, of course, depends upon what ministry holds the power in England; but more, also, upon what faith she places upon her Oriental subjects and allies. Northern India is swarming with the emissaries of Russia fomenting trouble; not Europeans, but paid Asiatics. The East Indians are ready for any change, and, like most subject races, detest their rulers. The hope of England, in resisting a rising in India when Russian armies face her at the northern passes, consists in skillfully pitting the Mohammedans against the Hindoos, and in retaining possession of the canal of Suez. As for the Afghans, they are a treacherous lot. To depend on their fidelity is insanity. Their present Emeer, Abdul-Rahmann, is outwardly a creature of England. But he lived several years on Russian territory, where he was well treated, and secretly favors Russia, so far as a fanatical Asiatic Mohammedan can favor any Christian power. Russian emissaries live unmolested at his capital, Cabul. This is a fact. In the meantime Russia is massing vast stores at Krasnovodsk, on the eastern shore of the Caspian. If necessary, she could transport 50,000 men to that port from Baku in a week. The Caspian Sea swarms with her steamers, and she is rapidly pushing her railway toward India. But there is little danger of open hostilities in that region for the present. So long as Russia can acquire important points by stealth, so long as she can beguile her adversaries by protestations of innocence, her conquests will be pursued without blood; and there seems to be no limit to the gullibility of her rivals.p. 791 The annals of diplomatic fraud may be searched in vain for anything more insolently cool than the means by which Russia induced a great power like England to send the frontier commission under Gen. Sir Peter Lumsden to gather wool on the bleak waste-lands of Afghanistan.

So far as concerns Persia, the danger of absorption by Russia is less real than apparent; and the danger is less now than ten years ago, although it may seem paradoxical to hazard this assertion. Her natural defenses are great; there is good fighting stuff in her troops. In the last war with Russia, when her army was in the dangerous transition state from Asiatic to European tactics, she was only beaten when so able a general as Paskiewitch was sent to take command of the invading forces. And again, Persia is a very different country from the feeble khanates of Khiva and Bokhara, with no history and little organization. The Persians have for 2,500 years shown extraordinary administrative qualities; they are quick, intellectual, and talented in many directions, and have exceptional national vitality. Such a people are not easily destroyed. And, in addition to this, they have now a new ally, and one who holds the balance of power in the councils of Europe and Asia—Germany. By successive stages, in a quiet and unobtrusive manner, legations of the two countries have, within a year, been established at Teheran and Berlin. The significance of this event is such that it is singular it has not attracted more attention. Perhaps it has, in secret. Prince Bismarck wastes no powder. He never establishes close diplomatic relations except with a distinct purpose in view. That a first-class legation has been established at Teheran, means that Germany proposes to have something to say in that quarter, as well as at Constantinople, where she has assumed a predominating influence since the last Russo-Turkish war. In the event of a war between Germany and Russia—which will be one of the probable results of the death of the Emperor William—it will be convenient to be able to annoy Russia on her eastern flank. At any rate, with England, Germany, and Russia watching each other at Teheran, Persia gains a new lease of life, none of these powers being prepared to see her devoured by the others. One result of this exchange of diplomatic courtesies is now evident in the request of Persia that Germany should exert herself with England and Russia to have Persian territory declared neutral and free from invasion in case of war between England and Russia. Once let this principle be established, and, with a patriotic and progressive monarch like Nusr-ed-Deen Shah, this glorious old monarchy would bring to a successful issue the career of progress upon which she has entered.—Hon. S. G. W. Benjamin, late U. S. Minister to Persia, in Independent.