The recent doings of royal personages in Europe have been funny in the extreme. Their “business,” to use a stage word, greatly resembles that of their burlesque counterparts in comic opera. The German emperor went a long way to see his brother emperor of Austria, and when they met, they rushed at each other and mutually embraced and kissed. He then visited his august grandmother of England, and when he had duly kissed her he made her the colonel of a Berlin cavalry regiment. He extended his hospitality to the czar, and on receiving him fell upon his neck, and the two potentates kissed each other over the peace of Europe. What makes these loving demonstrations more ludicrous is, that the German emperor’s “asides,” heard perfectly by the European audience, express everything but confidence and affection. Now the peripatetic emperor is on his way to visit the sultan, and the czar, not to be outplayed, is also going to see the sultan. Is it a farce or a comedy? Or is it the prologue to a dire and desolating tragedy? And is the title of this play with a dubious plot, “How They Maintain the Peace of Europe”?—Washington Post.
After more than a thousand years of vain knocking at the outer gates with imperious demand that they open, the czar of Russia has been invited to a peaceful entry of Constantinople. This is one of the most flattering reliefs from the exertion of war that the Eastern world has offered to the science of civilization. Of what it is portentous it may be presumptuous to inquire, but it hardly can be supposed that this visit, likely to occur in the spring of next year, will tend to advance the practical interests of Russia along the line of aggressive diplomacy it is believed Peter the great marked out in his will. In some few instances in the world’s history the friendly visits of potentates to countries upon which they bend an envious eye have been followed in time by conquest and possession, but it is rather a rule that this sort of courtesy precludes a violent seizure in future without some more relative excuse than Russia just now has for laying armed hold upon Stamboul. That the invitation to his majesty the czar was the result of an indirect request, actuated by jealousy of the more enterprising movements of the emperor of Germany, can make no difference of general interest in the agreeable tete-a-tete proposed between czar and sultan, save to enhance it. This interest especially relates to the fact that the czar of Russia is the only power in Europe that was not free to don his crown and run down without extra formality to make an afternoon call upon his Oriental excellency, the sultan. The attitude of Russia toward Constantinople since the year 865 has been that of menace, a spirit of audacious demand, that has neither been conducive to tranquil dreams in the sultan’s palace, nor prophetic of anything even remotely resembling a fraternal conference between the self-styled head of the Greek Church and the present occupant of the old Byzantine stronghold. Four times before the modern Turco-Russian wars—namely, in 865, 904, 941, 1043—the Russians made unsuccessful assaults upon Constantinople with a view to becoming its holder as the key of the East, the Greeks proving even better defenders of the envied position than did the Mohammedans. But repeated rebuffs have not served to cool the acquisitive ardor of the Northern power, and the judgment of the Great Peter is now as much the basis of Russian policy, no doubt, as it was in the year when that remarkable document was drawn. That will enjoined Russia to labor for European supremacy, advising to that end as near approach as possible to Constantinople and toward the Indies, and wars with Turkey. As much as possible these specific directions have been followed, and now, for the first time, a czar is actually about to set foot within the superb old city that has battled with half the forces, barbarian and civilized, of the world. This peaceful entry may be the precursor of good to both sides in the settlement by diplomacy of some questions which may not be arbitrated by war, inasmuch as other European powers will see to it that Russia shall not swoop down upon Turkey. Meeting both the formidable emperors who are at once his danger and his safety, the sultan will doubtless be able to secure his future peace by making, in return for assurances of protection, such concessions as will do him no harm and yet greatly benefit those two powers. The Turk has nothing to lose in the case, and has a fair prospect of moral and diplomatic gain. In any event it will be a pretty little tea-party.—Chicago Inter-Ocean.
Diplomacy in the settlement of European questions long ago came to a full stop, except so far as it relates to minor questions. European rulers meet, and there is the kiss of peace. If it meant more than a temporary condition, what could hinder the reduction of every army and navy to a peace footing? If diplomacy can go no further, what is the next step? It is suggested by the Kaiser, who declared for peace for the next twelve months, and immediately made a call upon Germany for a larger war expenditure than had ever been made.—San Francisco Bulletin.