DECISION OF THE KING CASE.
By L. A. S.
Most, if not all, of our readers are doubtless by this time aware that the long-pending decision on the case of Bro. R. M. King has been given, and that by it the latter is remanded to the imprisonment from which he was temporarily released by writ of habeas corpus. The decision was rendered by Hon. E. S. Hammond, Judge for the United States District Court, sitting at Memphis, Tenn. The full text of the decision was given to the Memphis Appeal-Avalanche, a copy of which we have had opportunity to peruse. The leading facts in connection with the appeal decision, briefly stated, are as follows:— The appeal from the decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court to the District Court of the United States was based on sec. 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which says:— “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.” It was argued by Hon. Don M. Dickinson and Col. T. E. Richardson, counsel for Bro. King, that the latter had been deprived of his property “without due process of law,” since there was no law, either common or statute, in the State of Tennessee, which made plowing on Sunday a public nuisance, as the indictment against the prisoner had charged; that therefore the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution had been violated, and Bro. King should be set at liberty. Counsel for the State argued that Christianity was, and had been, a part of the common law of the State, that repeated acts of labor on Sunday did constitute a public nuisance, and became indictable as such, and that the prosecution of Bro. King was therefore legal, and the plea of want of “due process of law” could not be urged in his case. Judge Hammond, in his decision, stated that if it were true that no law of the State existed under which Sunday labor became an indictable offense, then the conviction of Bro. King, however strictly in accordance with legal forms, would have been “without due process of law,” and therefore in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment above cited; but that Christianity was a part of the common law of the State, not in the sense that the decalogue and the laws of the Church could be cited in court against an offender, but in the sense that the principles of Christianity had been interwoven into the common law by the Christian people of the land, and that the matter of Sunday observance was one of the things in which the adherents of Sunday had thus gained the support of the law; that it did not belong to the court of which he was judge to say whether the State law had been rightly interpreted and applied in any given case, or to pass judgment upon the character of the law; and that Bro. King’s offense being thus indictable at common law, and his trial, conviction, and sentence having been legal in form, there had been “due process of law” in his case, and consequently no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. We had expected that the decision would touch upon the justice of the application of the law which had been made in the trial by the State of Tennessee, and perhaps upon the constitutionality of Sunday laws; but in this we were disappointed. We are not prepared to say that Judge Hammond’s decision was not a just one. If, as he has said, a law exists in the State of Tennessee under which Sunday labor can become a nuisance, and the application of the law as made by the State is a matter outside the jurisdiction of the United States District Court, it is not easy to see how the decision could have been different. As to what the proper jurisdiction of this court is, Judge Hammond is, of course, vastly better informed than ourselves. The latter did not, however, confine himself to a statement of those points which in his judgment had a legal bearing upon the case, but extended the text of his decision so as to notice other points which the defendant’s counsel thought were involved, and upon which they had argued at some length. From this part of his decision we make several quotations, from which it may be seen that Judge Hammond’s opinion of the utility of Sunday laws, and the basis upon which they rest, differs materially from that commonly held by the advocates of Sunday legislation. As indicating his opinion of the rightfulness of the prosecution of Bro. King, and the effect of the Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom, he says:— “It will emphasize our judicial allegiance to the principle already adverted to of the conclusiveness, as a matter of evidence, of the verdict against him if we say that but for that allegiance we should have no difficulty in thinking that King had been wrongfully convicted. Not because he has any guaranty under the Federal or State constitutions against a law denouncing him and punishing him for a nuisance in working on Sunday, for he has not. It was a belief of Mr. Madison and other founders of our Government, that they had practically established absolute religious freedom, and exemption from persecution for opinion’s sake in matters of religion; but while they made immense strides in that direction, and subsequent progress505 in freedom of thought has advanced the liberalism of the conception these founders had, as a matter of fact they left to the States the most absolute power on the subject, and any of them might, if they chose, establish a creed and a church and maintain it.” Of the freedom guaranteed by the State Constitution of Tennessee in religion, he says:— “The most they did, as they confessed, was to set a good example by the Federal Constitution, and happily that example has been substantially followed in this matter, and by no State more thoroughly than Tennessee, where sectarian freedom of religious belief is guaranteed by the constitution; not in the sense argued here, that King, as a Seventh-day Adventist, or some other as a Jew, or yet another as a Seventh-day Baptist, might set at defiance the prejudices, if you please, of other sects having control of legislation in the matter of Sunday observances, but only in the sense that he should not himself be disturbed in the practices of his creed, which is quite a different thing from saying that in the course of his daily labor, disconnected with his religion, just as much as other people’s labor is disconnected with their religion, labor not being an acknowledged principle or tenet of religion by him, nor generally or anywhere, he might disregard laws made in aid, if you choose to say so, of the religion of other sects. . . . If a non-conformist of any kind should enter the church of another sect, and those assembled there were required, every one of them, to comply with a certain ceremony, he could not discourteously refuse because his mode was different or because he did not believe in the divine sanction of that ceremony, and rely upon this constitutional guaranty to protect his refusal. We do not say Sunday observance can be compelled upon this principle, as a religious act, but only illustrate that the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom does not afford the measure of duty under such circumstances, nor does it any more, it seems to us, protect the citizen in refusing to conform to Sunday ordinances.” The following indicates his view of the relation of the precepts of the decalogue to the civil law:— “The fourth commandment is neither a part of the common law nor the statute, and disobedience to it is not punishable by law; and certainly the substitution of the first day of the week for the seventh as a part of the commandment has not been accomplished by municipal process, and the substitution is not binding as such. The danger that lurks in this application of the aphorism has been noted by every intelligent writer under my observation, and all agree that this commandment, either in its original form, as practiced by petitioner, or in its substituted application to the first day of the week, is not more a part of our common law than the doctrine of the trinity or the apostles’ creed. Nevertheless, by a sort of factitious advantage, the observers of Sunday have secured the aid of the civil law, and adhere to that advantage with great tenacity in spite of the clamor for religious freedom and the progress that has been made in the absolute separation of Church and State. . . . The efforts to extirpate the advantage above mentioned, by judicial decision in favor of a civil right to disregard the change, seem to me quite useless. The proper appeal is to the legislature.” Even though it were a plain case of invasion of religious freedom, it will not do, says the judge, to ignore existing customs and laws:— “The courts cannot, in cases like this, ignore the existing customs and laws of the masses, nor their prejudices and passions even, to lift the individual out of the restraints surrounding him because of those customs and laws, before the time has come when public opinion shall free all men in the manner desired. Therefore it is that the petitioner cannot shelter himself just yet behind the doctrine of religious freedom, in defying the existence of a law and its application to him which is distasteful to his own religious feeling or fanaticism that the seventh day of the week, instead of the first, should be set apart by the public for the day of public rest and religious practices.” The judge is not, however, deceived by the hypocritical claim of those who are clamoring for the enforcement of a “civil sabbath:”— “His [the Sabbatarian’s] demand for religious freedom is as disingenuous here as is the argument of his adversary sects that it is the economic value of the day of rest, and not its religious character, which they would preserve by civil law.” Violation of law is to be punished, no matter what the motive which actuates the complainant in the prosecution:— “Malice, religious or otherwise, may dictate a prosecution, but if the law has been violated this fact never shields the law-breaker.” And man’s law is to be obeyed just as much as God’s law, even though it enjoins that which God has never sanctioned:— “Neither do the courts require that there shall be some moral obloquy to support a given law before enforcing it, and it is not necessary to maintain that to violate the Sunday-observance custom shall be of itself immoral, to make it criminal in the eyes of the law. It may be harmless in itself, because, as petitioner believes, God has not set apart that day for rest and holiness, to work on Sunday; and yet, if man has set it apart in due form by his law, for rest, it must be obeyed as man’s law if not as God’s law; and it is just as evil to violate such a law, in the eyes of the world, as one sanctioned by God—I mean just as criminal in law. The crime is in doing the thing forbidden by law, harmless though it be in itself.” This will be sufficient to give our readers a general idea of the facts under which the case stands in its present aspect. With the opinions of Judge Hammond above quoted, in the main, we certainly do not agree; but as concerns his interpretation of legal restrictions and technicalities under which he was bound to act as judge of the United States District Court in the present case, we defer, for obvious reasons, any expression of opinion. Bro. King is remanded to jail, and an appeal will probably be taken to the Supreme Court of the United States. Elsewhere in this paper are presented facts bearing upon the duty of the friends of religious liberty in reference to the situation which is now before us.