AdventAI

The accounts thus far received of the troubles in China are characterized by anything but clearness. Nevertheless it is tolerably evident that the Chinese government has at once to contend with fighting within and fear without. It must suppress rebellion, and at the same time it must placate foreign powers whose subjects or citizens have been murdered or molested by mobs. Just how great is the extent of the rebellion, it is impossible to make out; for the dispatches are so contradictory, that the conclusion of one day that the revolt is merely local, is shaken the next by reports that would indicate that the disaffection is not with the administration merely, but is a manifestation of the hostility of the Chinese masses to the Manchu dynasty that occupies the throne. The present imperial house dates only from 1644, and as the Chinese reckon age, is a parvenu line whose establishment has not been sanctified by time. The Manchus overthrew the native Ming dynasty and established themselves on England. The history of China was for centuries the story of a succession of invasions, the interruptions being intervals of centuries in which the conquerors organized their control and prepared to meet the next flood of the land grabbers.

To millions of Chinese the Manchus are what the Normans were to millions of Englishmen for three centuries after the Norman conquest. The Manchu dynasty has succeeded so far in holding its supremacy by conciliating where it could not crush. Government boards in China reflect this great division of the population. The majority in the great commissions are Manchus, who have extraordinary powers that make the participation of the Chinese members scarcely more than perfunctory. Yet the show of power compensates somewhat for the lack of substance, and has undoubtedly answered its purpose of keeping the irreconcilable from open manifestations of the hostility they feel. The classes are everywhere more easily conciliated than the masses, and it is from the latter that the dynasty has to apprehend trouble. The Manchus’ stronger nature and higher organizations are in the last resort the dependence of the throne. Besides this peculiar danger, the government has still another to watch and ward against. The Mohammedan population of the empire is but 30,000,000 out of 400,000,000, but Mohammedanism in its militant missionary aspect sometimes makes up for disparity of numbers, and it has often troubled the Buddhist majority. The foreign difficulties of China are, so far as the dynasty is concerned, less serious than domestic dissensions. The government can placate foreigners by cutting off a few thousand heads, or by paying a few millions, or at the worst, suffering some bombardments.

The only power that can do more than pound the outer edge of China, is Russia, which always nurses its grievances until they have ripened to the profit-yielding stage, and which has an interest in Chinese affairs very different from that of France or America. For years past Russia and China have been face to face in Asia, and as England is always uneasy about India, England’s policy may yet make her the “great friend of China,” a mediator between her and the other great powers, if not an open ally, not because she loves the Chinese, but because she dreads the Russians whom the Chinese hate.—Boston Transcript (Ind.) Dec. 4.