AdventAI

THE REVOLUTION IN CHILI.

From Review and Herald, Vol. 68, No. 29., July 21, 1891

THERE is as yet no public opinion in this country upon the revolution in Chili, because the facts are so imperfectly known. In general it is understood that Balmaceda has made himself military dictator, and holds the larger number of provinces by means of the army, and that the revolutionary leaders control the navy and certain ports. The latter suffer from the want of arms, and the surrender of the “Itata” with the munitions of war is a costly proof of their desire not to alienate the sympathy of this country. Balmaceda commands the ear of other governments through his accredited agents, and his efforts are now directed to produce the impression that the revolution is stayed, although the insurgents have not formally surrendered. The action of other countries must depend upon their knowledge of the actual situation, and it is an exigency in which the United States require a minister of public experience, knowledge, sagacity, and ability. That Mr. Egan is possessed of these qualifications, or of any qualifications for dealing with a most important public crisis other than those which every American citizen may possess, the country is not informed.

Seignior Pedro Montt has been sent to this country as the agent of the Congressional party. But it is given out from Washington that he will not be received, in accordance with a settled policy to adhere to an established government so long as it can maintain itself in power. But that is a fact of which every government is the judge. Seignior Montt denies the reports of Balmaceda’s agents that the revolution makes no progress, that provisions are scarce, and that the insurgent army is discontented. The occupation of the Lobos Islands by the “Esmeralda,” an insurgent vessel of war, shows the progressive activity of the revolution. The army, composed of volunteers, is not discontented, nor is its payment in arrears. Two agents of the revolution have stated to Mr. Reid in Paris, that Bolivia and the Argentine Republic had acknowledged the belligerency of the insurgents, and this recognition of neighbors who are in a position to observe the course of events they held to be worthy of the attention of the United States. These agents also requested Mr. Reid to state to the authorities at Washington that the insurgents held that they were entitled to the arms upon the “Itata” because she had not taken them on board at any United States port, and Mr. Reid consented to transmit their representations to Washington, with the distinct understanding that such transmission did not imply any “recognition” whatever of the insurgents.

There are undoubtedly commercial considerations involved in the situation. The statement is made that Balmaceda was interested in nitrate schemes, and desired the election as his successor of a President whom he could control. But, unable to make sure of that result, he assumed the direction of affairs under the usual declaration of regard for law, order, and the public welfare. The executive officer of a republic who does this with the aid of the army, places himself at once on the defensive. He must be suspected from that moment. Balmaceda’s term has expired; and any election held under his authority, and with the support of the army, cannot be regarded as a lawful expression of the public will. The general assumption is sound that when an executive chief, after the expiration of his term, retains his office by the aid of the army under the plea of public order, his acts cannot be held to have the national legal sanction. This is the position of Balmaceda, and his assumption, so far, is denied and resisted by a force competent to prevent his successful assertion of his alleged authority.—Harper’s Weekly.