VINET ON LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE.
By John Veilleumier
ALEXANDER VINET (born near Lausanne, Switzerland, 1797; died 1847) was successively professor of French literature in Basel, and of practical theology in Lausanne. While in Basel, he began to advocate religious liberty, which was being denied the dissenters in his own canton. One of his articles in a Lausanne paper was seized upon by the authorities, and subjected to a regular trial, on account of what was called his revolutionary doctrines. Vinet came to Lausanne to make his own defense. He read a masterly paper justifying his doctrine, and then analyzed and exposed the positions taken by the report of the State Council which condemned him. One sentence of Vinet’s article which had been taken as a provocation to rebellion was this: “An immoral law, an irreligious law, a law which compels one to do things condemned by the conscience or the law of God,—when we cannot have it repealed, we are at liberty to trample it under our feet.” From that time, Vinet was actively engaged in digging out and disseminating through the press the principles of religious liberty. He wrote two lengthy essays and a large number of articles on the subject, and is considered one of the foremost champions of liberty of conscience in Europe in the beginning of this century. I give below a synopsis of his views on this question:— Liberty of conscience grows out of the moral nature of man. What is, indeed, the conscience?—It is the seat and sanction of moral duty. Therefore, to oppress the conscience in any way, is to attack the moral nature of man, that which constitutes the principal distinction between him and the brute. For the Christian, conscience is the voice of God speaking within him. Thus to demand of the disciple of Christ to surrender his conscience, or to refuse him the right of following implicitly its dictates, would be asking him to surrender his allegiance to God. But the religious sentiment, of which the conscience is the seat, manifests itself in external acts. “Worship, ceremonies, preaching, are as essential to religious conviction as is the word to the thought, respiration to the organs of the lungs, and pulsation to arterial blood.” Religion, indeed, is not conceivable without worship, and no nation has yet disproved this. It is plain that liberty of conscience and liberty of worship are one and the same thing. What are the limits of this liberty? “My freedom is legitimate as long as it does not interfere with the freedom of another; beyond this point it ceases to be legitimate.” “My right is in each sphere exactly what others claim for themselves; and their right is, similarly, all that I claim for myself. . . . Each man may exercise his right without interfering in any way with his neighbor’s exercise of the same right. This is the test of true rights, and distinguishes them from false and abusive rights, the exercise of which cannot be reciprocal. For instance, if I require my neighbor to profess my opinion, to adopt my manner of living, to embrace my worship, I leave him thereby no means of reciprocity.” It is evident that this liberty which is claimed for those who have religious convictions to manifest, exists equally for those who have none, or who may wish, in the name of conscience, to make a profession of infidelity. Liberty of choosing one’s religion, indeed, implies that of choosing none and of professing this absence of choice. One of the clearest consequences of these principles is the utter separation between the civil and the religious society. “What is it to proclaim liberty of conscience, but to declare that religious conviction is a sphere into which civil power has no right to penetrate; or, in other words, but to separate civil from spiritual affairs? . . . there is, therefore, in each member of society, two distinct beings—one whose physical nature and temporal relations place him within the jurisdiction of civil society, and another which, as relates to his faith and his hopes, belongs only to himself and to God. The State may demand some things of the first, but nothing of the second. And even should the State think it proper to favor some particular church, it cannot claim from me,— “1. Either that I should attend the services of that church; “2. Or that, by any act, I should recognize, even by implication, the authority of said church; “3. Or that my adhesion to the doctrines or rites of that church should, in any case, become a test of the exercise of my civil or political rights.” JOHN VEILLEUMIER.