THE HEARING BEFORE THE OHIO SENATE COMMITTEE

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Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association · Battle Creek, Mich. · Feb 16, 1892

FromReview and Herald, Vol. 69, No. 7.

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THE HEARING BEFORE THE OHIO SENATE COMMITTEE.

The following joint resolution was introduced in the General Assembly of Ohio, Thursday, Jan. 28. It passed the House by a vote of 68 to 20, and was referred in the Senate to the Committee on Federal Relations:—
“Be it resolved by the General Assembly of Ohio, that the commissioners having in charge the Columbian Exposition, be, and they are hereby, earnestly requested to exercise the authority vested in them in closing the gates of said Exposition on the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday, in accordance with the law of God, and the rights of man, and the precedents of our American history.”
I was sent to Columbus by the National Religious Liberty Association, to appear before the committee against the passage of the resolution. After the hearing was arranged, I requested that some one appear with me at the hearing, and Elder Corliss was immediately requested to go, and left on the next train for Columbus. The hearing was set for Feb. 4, at 1:30 P. M.
The committee is composed of five members, three Republicans and two Democrats. The following are some of the points made in the hearing:—
The position of the National Religious Liberty Association in opposing the resolution is, that religion, to remain pure and powerful, must not be allied with the State, and that the State, in order to secure equal and exact justice to all, must not meddle in the slightest degree in matters of religion. The resolution is undeniably religious in character. This appears both from its title, which states that its object is “to close the World’s Columbian Exposition on the Sabbath Day,” and the body of the bill, which asks that it be closed “on the first day of the week, commonly called Sunday, in accordance with the law of God.”
In the first place, Christianity does not need the resolution, it does not ask for it, and it cannot afford to accept it. Upon this point Judge Welch, Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court, delivered the following opinion in the case of the Board of Education of Cincinnati vs. Minor et al (23 Ohio State p. 247):—
“True Christianity asks no aid from the sword of civil authority. It began without the sword, and wherever it has taken the sword, it has perished by the sword. To depend on civil authority for its enforcement, is to acknowledge its own weakness, which it can never afford to do. It is able to fight its own battles. Its weapons are moral and spiritual, and not carnal. Armed with these, and these alone, it is not afraid nor ‘ashamed’ to be compared with other religions, and to withstand them single-handed. And the very reason why it is not so afraid or ‘ashamed’ is that it is not the ‘power of man,’ but the ‘power of God’ on which it depends. True Christianity never shields itself behind majorities. Nero and the other persecuting Roman emperors were amply supported by majorities, and yet the pure and peaceable religion of Christ in the end triumphed over them all; and it was only when it attempted, itself, to enforce religion by the arm of authority, that it began to wane. A form of religion that cannot live under equal and impartial laws ought to die, and sooner or later must die. . . .”
“When Christianity asks the aid of government beyond mere impartial protection, it denies itself. Its laws are divine and not human. Its essential interests lie beyond the reach and range of human governments. United with government, religion never rises above the merest superstition; united with religion, government never rises above the merest despotism, and all history shows us that the more widely and completely they are separated, the better it is for both.”
Not only does Christianity not ask the aid of government to protect its doctrines and religious practices, but it is not within the jurisdiction nor the power of civil government to do it. No doubt the organization which is responsible for the introduction of this measure, believes that since God ordained that civil governments should exist, it follows that they should protect religious doctrines and practices. True, governments are ordained of God, and ordained of God to protect; but they are ordained to protect men, and not religious dogma.
On this point of jurisdiction the House of Representatives in its report on Sunday mails, submitted March 4 and 5, 1830, says:—
“In our individual character we all entertain opinions, and pursue a corresponding practice upon the subject of religion. However diversified these may be, we all harmonize as citizens, while each is willing that the other shall enjoy the same liberty which he claims for himself. But in our representative character, our individual character is lost. The individual acts for himself; the representative, for his constituents. He is chosen to represent their political, and not their religious views, to guard the rights of man, not to restrict the rights of conscience.”
Again: the Ohio Supreme Court, in the case of Bloom vs. Richards (2 Ohio State p. 391), unanimously rendered an opinion in which occurs the following:—
“We sometimes hear it said that all religions are tolerated in Ohio; but the expression is not strictly accurate. Much less accurate is it to say that one religion is a part of our law, and all others only tolerated. It is not mere toleration that every individual has here in his belief or disbelief. He reposes not upon the leniency of the government, or the liberality of any class or sect of men, but upon his natural, indefeasible rights of conscience, which, in the language of the Constitution, are beyond the control or interference of any human authority. We have no union of Church and State, nor has our government ever been vested with authority to enforce any religious observance, simply because it is religious.”
In this same opinion, which has never been set aside by any subsequent decision, the following statement appears:—
“But the General Assembly of Ohio is not, as we have shown, a guardian of the sanctity of any day. If it may protect the first day of the week from desecration because it is the Christian Sabbath, it may in like manner protect the sixth day because it is the holy day of the Mohammedan, and the seventh day because it is the Sabbath of the Jew and Seventh-day Baptist. Nay, more, it may protect the various festival days, which, by some of the churches are considered scarcely less sacred than the Sabbath day.”
Again: in the case of McGatrick vs. Wason (4 Ohio State p. 571), an opinion was rendered by the Ohio Supreme Court, also unanimous, in which the following appears:—
“No power whatever is possessed by the legislature over things spiritual, but only over things temporal; no power whatever to enforce the performance of religious duties.”
Not only does this resolution propose to enforce a Christian practice, but it assumes to interpret the law of God, and thereby attempts to settle a theological controversy of long standing upon which Christians who observe Sunday religiously are themselves at disagreement. (At this point quotations were introduced from denominational works, showing that Sunday observance was grounded by some on the power of the church to appoint holy days, by others on the example of the apostles, and by still others, on its general observance as a Christian custom, and that all of these denied that it received its force from the law of God.) Is it the province and duty of a purely civil legislative body to presume to settle theological disputes for the people of Ohio, by declaring that Sunday observance is “in accordance with the law of God?” Upon this point the United States Senate report on Sunday closing of the post-offices, communicated to that body Jan. 19, 1829, and approved, contains the following:—
“They (the petitioners) appear in many instances to lay it down as an axiom that the practice is a violation of the law of God. Should Congress in legislative capacity adopt the sentiment, it would establish the principle that the Legislature is a proper tribunal to determine what are the laws of God. It would involve a legislative decision on a religious controversy, and on a point in which good citizens may honestly differ in opinion, without disturbing the peace of society or endangering its liberties. If this principle is once introduced, it will be impossible to define its bounds.”—“American State Papers,” Class VII, Page 227.
The danger of establishing such a precedent, its logical but disastrous consequences, if followed, are well set forth in the report of the national House of Representatives, as follows:—
“If a solemn act of legislation shall, in one point, define the law of God, or point out to the citizen one religious duty, it may, with equal propriety, proceed to define every part of divine revelation, and enforce every religious obligation, even to the forms and ceremonies of worship, the endowment of the church, and the support of the clergy.” A. F. BALLENGER.