AdventAI

RUSSIAN WAR PREPARATIONS.

From Review and Herald, Vol. 69, No. 23., June 7, 1892

The continuous movement of Russian troops toward the western frontier, and the calling out of the successive categories of reserves, is again attracting the attention of Europe. The reserves, it is stated, are being forwarded to various points of concentration, whence they can in the easiest manner re-in-force the regulars in the Polish garrisons on the Austrian and German frontiers, the quarter in which, when war once begins, attack will first be made. A few years ago, when the swing of the Russian army toward the west excited hostile comment in Europe, Prince Bismarck pronounced it to be “nothing new,” at most the preparations of Russia to make the weight of her diplomacy heavier in any European crisis, and not necessarily denoting any hostile intent. But since then the trend of Russian military movement has been steadily toward the west; army corps of the Caucasus, replaced by new levies, have been transferred to the Austro-German frontier, and the whole Russian boundary, from the Black Sea to the Baltic, turned into a military camp. Troops ostensibly engaged in mere military maneuvers in the southwest, have not been recalled, the strategic railways leading to the west have been increased as rapidly as the treasury could supply the money, and the bulk of the Russian army permanently concentrated on the frontiers of Germany, Rumania, and Austria. The places of the corps thus moved are filled by reserves, so that Russia still has troops for service on the eastern, or Asiatic, side; the construction of the Black Sea fleet goes steadily on, and a plan has recently been approved by which all private railways and steamers will be placed in government control whenever a mobilization of troops is ordered.

All this may not, as Prince Bismarck said, necessarily mean war, but it is nevertheless preparation for war, and has so strengthened the position of the czar as markedly to increase its possibilities. It is true that the nations have apparently agreed to postpone hostilities in their unreadiness and the uncertainty as to where they will end, but it is equally true that the great causes of difference which threaten peace have not been touched, much less removed, and that a peace which requires nations in arms to defend, is the most unreal of conditions. Thus far peace has been maintained, though at tremendous cost to the nations, but the Triple Alliance, while an alliance for peace, has objects which can only be gained by war, and Russia will not abandon her traditional policy, and will endeavor to regain her lost ground.

Russia is a military empire, and the czar cannot disregard the opinion of the military class, nor having thrown a great army toward the west, withdraw it again without a better reason than fear of his neighbors. Moreover, Russia’s movements are not dictated by that sober calculation which marks those of other nations, but by the ceaseless trend toward aggression of the military governing class, which overrules sovereigns and statesmen alike. All Russia’s interests, according to this class, are on the side of war; they know that if war begins, France will attack and largely employ Germany, and they believe that ultimately the contest will be mainly a duel with Austria. In this view, Russia may not be convinced of the futility of attacking the central powers, and it is this possibility, with the certainty that, in the event of war, the forces of France will be turned against the League, that occasions uneasiness in Berlin and Vienna. The uneasiness may not be justified, for apart from the diminished power of resistance on the part of the Central Alliance threatened by the failure of Italy, there is no new reason why the czar should yield to the pressure for war; though the continuous westward swing of his regiments may increase the desire of those standing on the defensive to precipitate the crisis, and have done with it once for all.—N. Y. Observer.