AdventAI

THE DELAY OF JUSTICE.

From Review and Herald, Vol. 65, No. 34., August 21, 1888

[THERE has just been furnished the public, in the execution of Maxwell, the St. Louis murderer, another instance of the long and evil delay of justice which the present methods of dealing with crime make possible in the cases of even the blackest criminals. As to the evil effects which such a spectacle can hardly fail to produce, the New York Observer furnishes the following comments:—]

“Here was a man who had committed a peculiarly atrocious crime, a cold-blooded and deliberate murder. He had put to death for a paltry sum of money a man who had befriended him when in trouble, who had ministered to his necessities, and who had reposed in him the utmost trust and confidence. It was a deed utterly without provocation, and with no extenuating circumstances. And yet in the face of this, the murderer was enabled, by the employment of shrewd and skillful lawyers, to avert the punishment due for his crime for more than three years. Nothing that money or influence could do to delay the course of justice in his case was left undone. Appeals were taken from court to court on technical points, and an attempt was made to bring the case into the United States Supreme Court. Even the British Government, to whom the condemned man owed allegiance, was moved to interfere in his behalf, though without avail. At last, after every resource known to the law had been exhausted in the effort to escape justice, the man was brought to the gallows.”

“The moral effect of such a case as this upon the public mind could hardly be less than disastrous. The natural course of reasoning with many would be, that if such a man, convicted of such a crime, could by any means delay the course of justice for a term of years, there can be little hope of reaching ordinary criminals by legal process. There was surely something wrong in a condition of affairs that made it possible to interpose a period of three years between the apprehension of a criminal, and his punishment. . . .”

“It is folly to talk about capital punishment’s not being effective as a deterrent from crime, as long as those who commit capital offenses are treated in the way that Maxwell and Lyons and others of their kind have been treated. When it comes to be understood that the penalty for willful murder is really death, and nothing less than that, and that the punishment is speedy as it is certain; when it comes to be understood that the commission of a fearful crime is not the surest and quickest road to public sympathy and newspaper fame, then there will be some ground for considering the question of the deterrent effect of penalties for crime. . . . When every man who meditates murder, who proposes to himself to take the life of a fellow-being, can be made to see the gallows looming up surely and darkly before him, with the way between his crime and its punishment brief and direct, with no thousand side-passages of legal technicalities to afford chances of escape, no flowers strewing the path, no sentimental women shedding tears of sympathy, and no newspapers singing his praises,—when he sees all this, he may be inclined to the belief that the lot of a murderer is not, after all, a pleasant one; and he may for that reason withhold his hand from the contemplated deed.”