AdventAI

SCRIPTURE QUESTIONS.

By G. W. Morse

From Review and Herald, Vol. 65, No. 12., March 20, 1888

ANSWERS BY G. W. MORSE.

SPECIAL NOTICE.—Please observe carefully the following directions for the guidance of those who send questions to this department. 1. Always accompany the questions with your name and post-office address. 2. Always enclose a stamp for reply, for it is necessary to answer a large majority of the queries by mail instead of in the REVIEW. 3. If the questions are sent, with a letter pertaining to other business at this office, write the matter intended for this department on a separate sheet of paper, and in so doing, do not neglect directions 1 and 2. By observing these simple directions, parties will be much more certain of receiving satisfactory information than if they neglect them. Those who have not sufficient interest to regard these directions, are hardly entitled to the work of this department and they must not think strange if they never hear from their questions.

752.—THE SABBATH A TYPE.—“JOSHUA,” OR “JESUS.”

  1. Please give proof that the Sabbath is a type of the saints’ rest.
  2. What bearing does Hebrews 4 have on the subject?
  3. Why does the marginal reading of Heb. 4:8 say “Joshua” instead of “Jesus”?
Mrs. W. E. A.

1. We do not understand that when God instituted the Sabbath he designed it to be a type of the saints’ rest, nor do we understand that it has since become such a type. That it is not a type is proved by considering Isa. 66:22. Here we find it prophesied that the Sabbath will be observed in the new earth, after the saints have entered upon their eternal “rest.” Types cease when the antitype is reached, but as the Sabbath is never to cease, it cannot be a type.

2. Paul is not arguing the Sabbath question in Hebrews 4, nor do any of his remarks in this chapter have any reference to the Sabbath as a type.

3. In order to inform the reader that Joshua is referred to as the one who led the children of Israel into the land of Canaan, and not Jesus Christ, as might be inferred if one did not know to the contrary. “Jesus” is the Greek form of the word “Joshua.”

753.—WAS THE FALL OF MAN FOREKNOWN?

Judging from 1 Pet. 1:20, may we not conclude that God foreknew that man would fall, and if so, could our first parents have done otherwise than they did? A. S. T.

Doubtless the query of our correspondent arises from his interpretation of the statement concerning Christ’s foreordination, as found in the text referred to. The position has been taken in a previous number that the foreordination of Christ as brought to view in this passage, has reference to the purpose of God that he should be the possessor of a kingdom. The question of God’s foreknowledge of man’s fall, and the relation of such foreknowledge to man’s free moral agency, is not affected by the construction given above regarding Christ’s foreordination. Upon this subject the following from McClintock and Strong’s Cyclopædia will be found conclusive and comprehensive:—

The great fallacy in the argument that the certain prescience of a moral action destroys its contingent nature, lies in supposing that contingency and certainty are the opposites of each other. . . . If, however, the term “contingent” in this controversy has any definite meaning at all, as applied to the moral actions of man, it must mean their freedom, and stands opposed, not to certainty, but to necessity. A free action is a voluntary one; and an action which results from the choice of the agent is distinguished from a necessary one in this, that it might not have been, or have been otherwise, according to the self-determining power of the agent. It is with reference to this specific quality of a free action that the term “contingency” is used; it might have been otherwise—in other words, it was not necessitated. . . . Simple knowledge is in no sense a cause of action, nor can it be conceived to be causal, unconnected with exerted power; for mere knowledge, therefore, an action remains free or necessitated, as the case may be. A necessitated action is not made a voluntary one by its being foreknown; a free action is not made a necessary one. Free actions foreknown will not, therefore, cease to be contingent. . . . The certainty of a necessary action foreknown, does not result from a knowledge of the action, but from the operation of the necessitating cause, and, in like manner, the certainty of a free action does not result from the knowledge of it, which is no cause at all, but from the voluntary cause—that is the determination of the will. It alters not the case in the least to say that the voluntary action might have been otherwise. Had it been otherwise, the knowledge of it would have been otherwise; but as the will which gives birth to the action is not dependent upon the previous knowledge of God, but the knowledge of the action upon foresight of the choice of the will, neither the will nor the act is controlled by the knowledge, and the action, though foreseen, is still free or contingent. The foreknowledge of God has then no influence upon either the freedom or the certainty of actions, for this plain reason, that it is knowledge, and not influence; and actions may be certainly foreknown without their being rendered necessary by that foreknowledge.

The conclusion reached is that the statements regarding God’s foreknowledge furnish no evidence on which to base the claim that the fall of Adam and Eve was predestinated. Their fall was a result of their own free and voluntary act of disobedience.