The new treaty of arbitration between Great Britain and the United States is just now the most important topic of discussion in both the interested countries. This treaty has been signed by Julian Pauncefote, the British ambassador to this country, and Mr. Olney, the United States Secretary of State; but it is necessary that it be ratified by the Senate before it can become operative, and that body is not so enthusiastic over the treaty as some people would be glad to see it. This treaty has grown out of the contention that arose between this country and Great Britain in regard to certain claims of the latter in Venezuela. The United States, in harmony with its traditional policy known as the Monroe doctrine, in order to protect the weak republics of the western hemisphere against the aggressions of greater powers across the water, proposed an arbitration in regard to these English claims.
The majority of the people of Great Britain, who regard the possibility of a war with their cousins in the “States” with a well becoming horror, hail the treaty with great joy. England, at peace with America, from which she may draw sustenance for her people, and secure from attack in her “tight little island,” can stand in arms against the world; while with American ports closed to her, war with any of the great powers would be quite another thing. So a sense of self-interest in the British breast, joined to the more kindly feelings of fraternal relations toward her eldest daughter, the other great English-speaking nation, causes a strong desire in England for the prompt ratification of the treaty.
Immediately upon the publication of this treaty, the religious press of this country set up a great cry that it be at once ratified. It was hailed as the greatest and most significant step of the century, and as sure evidence of that time when the nations shall learn war no more. The Christian ministry have very generally taken up the same cry, and have urged with great zeal that it would be a national crime for the Senate to reject it. But in spite of all this, the Senate manifests no haste to ratify the treaty. There are some reasons for this delay. On the part of the people of this country, the treaty was negotiated by parties—President Cleveland and Mr. Olney, who represent little but themselves. Their party has repudiated them and their policy generally. Of course it cannot be expected that the party which did not entrust these men in power will take a very lively interest in their proceedings; and if any glory and honor are to be gained by such a treaty, why not wait a few days, and let the incoming administration have the benefit of it?
But, after all, the greatest objection in the way of the ratification of the treaty by the Senate is the fear that in some way Great Britain will secure the greatest advantages. It is pointed out that the long delays which, in case of disputes, the treaty provides for, will allow Great Britain a great advantage, since our nation, where everything must be fully discussed, is proverbially slow in getting ready for war. Then in case Spain should propose to cede Cuba to Great Britain, which would cause a contention in regard to territorial acquisition, the question would have to be left to arbitrators,—a condition of things very galling to American pride, and to American policy, which would not care to see any of the great powers of Europe entrenched any nearer our shores than they now are. From all these considerations, and many others that might be mentioned, it is doubtful if the treaty is ratified without considerable modification. This nation is not likely to go to war with England very soon, even if the treaty is rejected.
M. E. K.