BY PROF. P. T. MAGAN.
(Battle Creek College.)
Nations, like individuals, have their time of trial; and if this be wasted or misused, their future course is inevitably evil; and the efforts of some few good and wise citizens, like the occasional struggles of conscience in the mind of a single man when he has sinned beyond repentance, are powerless to avert their judgment.—Arnold.
The immediate cause of the French Revolution was the embarrassed condition of the national treasury.1 In the year 1788 the deficit was $31,323,920. The revenue for the year 1789 amounted to $91,637,957; the debt to $1,267,500,000; and its annual interest to $50,505,000. The annual expenses at this period amounted to $78,000,000, exclusive of the interest on the debt. The annual expenses therefore, added to the interest on the debt, would equal $127,505,000. Thus, figuring the annual income in round numbers at 470,000,000 francs, or $91,650,000, there would remain a deficit of $36,855,000.2 This was the state of affairs financially when the storm burst in 1789. There had been deficits for a number of years, and each one was larger than the one preceding. Of course this lack had to be supplied from some source, and the officers of the treasury had recourse to an expedient which Lowell rightly denominates “one of the most famous errors of the government of old France.”3 This was the practise of issuing what were called “anticipations.” The same writer defines and comments upon “anticipations” as follows:—
These were securities with a limited time to run, payable from a definite portion of the future revenue. They were a favorite form of investment with certain people, and a great convenience to the treasury, but they constantly tended to increase to an amount which was considered dangerous. Thus the revenue of each year was spent before it was collected; and loans were contracted, not for any urgent and exceptional necessity of the state, but for ordinary running expenses.4
For some little time of late there has been a deficit in the treasury of the United States. That department of the government is at present running behind between $70,000,000 and $80,000,000 a year. In order to make up this lack, bonds have been issued to the amount of $262,000,000. These bonds are practically the same as the French “anticipations.” They are “securities with a limited time to run, payable from . . . the future revenue.” Moreover, as was the case with the “anticipations,” they are “a favorite form of investment with certain people,” especially when such individuals can purchase them privately for a much lower figure than they are worth on the marts and markets of the world. Doubtless as it was with the anticipations, they are “a great convenience to the treasury;” but on the other hand, they “constantly” tend “to increase to an amount which” may be “considered dangerous.” Finally, as it was in France, these loans are “contracted, not for any urgent and exceptional necessity of the state, but for ordinary running expenses.” From all this it will appear that the condition of affairs in this branch of political economy is practically the same in the United States in 1897 as in France in 1789.
In the latter part of the year 1788 and the earlier months of 1789, the people of France began to wake up to the fact that these annual deficits of the treasury were unnecessary. Certain suspicions stole over their souls that the public moneys were in some way or other slipping into the pockets of private monopolists. The newspapers of the day were completely under the control of the monopolists, who governed the government, and manipulated things in their own interest. But the head of the ordinary Frenchman seemed all at once fairly to seethe to the bursting point with ideas on the condition of the country. As the columns of the press were closed against him, he had recourse to pamphlets and tracts. A perfect deluge of these burst over France in general and Paris in particular. “One collector is said to have got together twenty-five hundred different political pamphlets in the last months of 1788, and to have stopped in despair at the impossibility of completing his collection.”5 Says Young, “Every hour produces its pamphlet; thirteen came out to-day, sixteen yesterday, and ninety-two last week.”6 The pamphlets were from all quarters, and bore all sorts of titles: “The Forty Wishes of the Nation;” “Plan for Matrimonial Alliance between Monsieur Third Estate and Madam Nobility;” “Te Deum of the Third Estate as It Will be Sung at the First Mass of the States General, with the Confession of the Nobility;” “Creed of the Third Estate;” “Magnificat of the Third Estate;” and “Requiem of the Farmers General.” There was a perfect “rage for arguing on financial and government matters.” Everywhere—by the fireside, on the street corners, at the public resorts, and especially at the Palais-Royal in Paris, the vilest of all the resorts—men and women, lashed to an unseemly pitch of fury, poured forth their panaceas for the financial and governmental difficulties from which the nation was suffering. Some of these remedies might have been good, had it been possible to put them into operation; many more were utopian and useless; while the majority savored of anarchy of the rankest kind. And if possible to make matters worse, the nobility took up the word “anarchy” against the commons, and made of it their hue and cry. Says Taine: “The nobles, the more to alienate the commons, began by charging these with ‘revolt, treason, and treachery,’ and demanding the use of military force against them.”7
It will now be in order to turn from France, and focus the eye on the United States for a while, the year being 1896, just closed. During the early part of that year, a perfect furor of excitement swept over the land. This intense wave of popular feeling circled for the most part around the financial question as a storm center. It radiated, nevertheless, into the realm of trusts, monopolies, combines, and the like. At the opening of the year, probably not one man in a thousand could have explained the meaning of “16 to 1.” Now every schoolboy is familiar with it. Of a sudden, tens of thousands of people—“all sorts and conditions of men”—awakened, and awakened in a kind of frenzy, to the fact that things in national finance and governmental matters generally weren’t going just exactly right. By the firesides, on the street corners, at the resorts, everywhere, ideas, wise and unwise, were set forth on the money question. Pamphlets and tracts by the many million, discussing the question from every possible, as well as many impossible standpoints, fluttered into farmhouse, hamlet, and city. And again cries of “anarchy,” “riot,” and “treachery,” have been heard on every hand.
Judge ye: Is there any similarity between the days of 1789 and the days of 1897? The things which happened then were “the beginning of sorrows,”8 or of “travail,” as the Revised Version has it. And a fearful time of travail it was. But why sorrow and travail? How could they possibly be born of a simple question of political economy? Ah, the fearful saturnalia of blood, the awful carnival of woe, which lay concealed in the womb of time at the beginning of 1789, was generated by a seed which contained, not a mere abstract question of financial expediency, but which was filled in one lobe with the insatiable greed of those who had, and in the other with the unslacked desire of those who had not. In the womb of 1788 and 1789 they “struggled,” like those children of old, and in time they were brought forth, and the one in anger cried to the other, You have stolen my birthright! Yield, give up, disgorge!
Here are a few statements side by side. The one was written concerning 1789; the others, concerning these times:—
1788-89]
And then it became as fearfully apparent that the dangers springing from the financial difficulties were but as dust in the scales compared to those arising from the social and moral disintegration of the people, wrought by the ancient régime with the privilege corrosive. The economic effects of the iniquities and follies of the political and social system furnished only the occasion for the formal initiation of the Revolution. The real causes were their moral effects. Therefore these determined their character and course. Von Sybel is unquestionably right,—“The deepest wound of France was the hostile discord between the different classes of the people.”—Von Holst, Lowell Lectures on the French Revolution, Lecture 1, par. 7 from the end.
1896-97.
The conditions of to-day are but little different from those which produced the French Revolution. . . . Silver has been lost sight of. It is the proletariat against the plutocrat.—Hesing, in Chicago Times-Herald, June 30, 1896.
I know that in this country and city there is a widening chasm between the rich and the poor. . . . We are on the eve of a great catastrophe. . . . You must recognize and understand the aggravations of the poor. Thank God that the money question has been settled as it has. It has focused the main question, the widening abyss between . . . the rich and the poor. Shall we wait until it is too late? That is what the barons of France did.—E. Walpole Warren, in a sermon in St. Paul’s, New York. Quoted in N. Y. Sun, Dec. 14, 1896.
What do these things mean?—“A time of trouble, such as never was since there was a nation even to that same time: and at that time thy people shall be delivered, every one that shall be found written in the book. And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt. And they that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars forever and ever.”9