LICENSE AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
By T.
The question of the ability of municipal or local governments to levy tax or impose a license upon the sale of articles manufactured in another State, has been before the courts of this country for some time. It has been no small annoyance to those engaged in canvassing to meet in various cities a law which required them to take out a license before engaging in house-to-house work. Canvassing for respectable books is one of the most useful employments, but as it is liable to interfere with the sale of cheaper literature and trash on the counters and shelves of the bookstore, great efforts have been made to suppress and obstruct the work of the canvasser. The case of J. W. Brennan against the city of Titusville, Penn., has been prominently before the country. Brennan was a canvasser for a Chicago manufacturer of picture-frames, and, being fined twenty-five dollars for carrying on this business in Titusville without a license, carried his case from court to court, until he reached the highest tribunal of the land, the United States Supreme Court. Judge Brewer made a statement of the case, and rendered a decision, a digest of which we find in New Ideas, and we give the following extracts as being of interest to our readers:— Justice Brewer, in delivering the opinion of the court, declares the question to be whether a manufacturer of goods which are unquestionably legitimate subjects of commerce, who carries on his business of manufacturing in one State, can send an agent into another State to solicit orders for the products of his manufactory without paying a tax for the privilege of thus trying to sell his goods. It is true, Justice Brewer goes on to say, that in the present case the tax is imposed only for selling to persons other than manufacturers and licensed merchants; but if the State can tax for the privilege of selling to one class, it can for selling to another or to all. In either case it is a restriction on the right to sell, and a burden upon lawful commerce between the citizens of two States. It is as much a burden upon commerce to tax for the privilege of selling to a minister as to a merchant. True, the tax is imposed for selling in a particular manner, but a regulation as to the manner of sale, whether by sample, or from house to house, or otherwise, is as surely a regulation of commerce. There is no charge that the pictures or frames were obscene or detrimental to the health, morals, or safety of the community. It must also be borne in mind that the ordinance is not one designed to protect from imposition and wrong, either minors, drunkards, or persons under any other affliction or disability. There is no discrimination except between manufacturers and licensed merchants on the one hand, and the rest of the community on the other; and unless it be a matter of just police regulation to tax for the privilege of selling to manufacturers and merchants, it cannot be to tax for the privilege of selling to the rest of the community. It is also as much within the scope of the police power to restrain from going to a store or manufactory as from going to a dwelling-house for the purpose of making a sale. If, under the excuse of an exercise of the police power, this ordinance can be sustained, and sales in the manner therein named be restricted, by an equally legitimate exercise of that power, almost any sale can be prevented. But, again, this license does not purport to be exacted in the exercise of the police, but rather of the taxing power; for the statute under which the ordinance in question was passed was enacted in 1874, and one clause grants authority “to levy and collect license taxes on hawkers, peddlers, merchants of all kinds, and regulate the same by ordinance.” The ordinance itself is entitled one “to provide for the levy and collection for general revenue purposes of annual license taxes in the city of Titusville.” Even if the ordinance had not been directed to raise revenue, but the license tax declared to be imposed as a police regulation, that would not conclude the question; for whatever may be the reason given to justify, or the power invoked to sustain, the act of the State, if that act is one which trenches directly upon that which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national government, it cannot be sustained. Justice Brewer concludes as follows: “No State can levy a tax on interstate commerce in any form, whether by way of duties laid on the transportation of the subjects of that commerce, or on the receipts derived from that transportation, or on the occupation or business of carrying on that commerce. For these reasons the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.” “The effect of this decision,” said a prominent lawyer, “is practically to render null and void any law of the city of Pittsburg or of the State of Pennsylvania, or any other State for that matter, which imposes a tax upon peddlers, book-agents, canvassers, hawkers, drummers, and the like, who solicit orders for products or make sale of goods from house to house, when such goods or products are manufactured or produced outside the State, and the agent is acting for such manufacturer or producer.”