EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT

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Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association · Battle Creek, Mich. · Aug 28, 1894

FromReview and Herald, Vol. 71, No. 35.

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EUROPEAN DISARMAMENT.

It sometimes happens to individuals, that, having adopted an unwise course, they are compelled to follow it until they can hardly tell which course is the most destructive, to keep on as they are going or to stop altogether. This is as true of nations as it is of individuals, and the nations of Europe, in regard to the question of disarmament, stand in this position. They have gone on arming until they can go no farther; they are almost crushed by taxation to support their immense armies, and now they do not know what to do.
The Roman empire, in the days of its greatest prosperity, maintained on land and sea an army of 450,000. (See “Gibbons’s Decline and Fall,” Vol. I., p. 21.) The author above quoted declares on the same page as quoted and in a note at the bottom of the page, that this army had been equalled by the army of Louis XIV., but that France was still suffering from the strain of that extraordinary effort. Since that time, beginning with the French Revolution and ending with the battle of Waterloo, the armies of all the European nations were greatly augmented, and during this period, the army of France under Napoleon was increased until at the time of the invasion of Russia the French army had reached the then enormous figure of more than a million of men. This great army was almost entirely wasted in the disastrous Moscow campaign. After the battle of Waterloo the nations of Europe, exhausted from their protracted struggles, did not attempt to raise such enormous numbers of troops as they had maintained before. Even Louis Napoleon with his desire to imitate his uncle, Napoleon I., did not think of such armies as have lately sprung into existence in Europe.
The war declared against Germany by Napoleon III. was the indirect cause of the present enormous armies of Europe.
The defeat of France by Germany would not necessarily make these two nations such bitter enemies that they would immediately begin preparations for another terrible struggle. Had Germany been a generous victor, she might have won the friendship of France, who at that time was inclined to throw the blame for the quickly incited war upon Louis Napoleon, where it no doubt properly belonged. But Germany was not content with defeating France, or even with taking from her a full money indemnity for the expenses of the war. She went farther, and seized a large portion of French territory. This was a greater affront than the high-spirited people of France would endure. Time has fully demonstrated that this seizure of Alsace-Lorraine was the greatest blunder in statesmanship that Bismarck ever made. A generous foe may easily become a friend; but when a nation is not only defeated but despoiled, and its national pride subjected to an extreme and unnecessary humiliation, a desire for revenge is engendered, which makes a stable peace very doubtful.
As soon as peace was established, the increased armament of France suggested her determination for another and more satisfactory settlement of the question. Alarmed at the wonderful recuperative energy manifested by France, and her growing military power, Germany also increased her army, and finally she secured for allies both Austria and Italy. This latter action was no doubt intended as a defense against an assault from France, which country was regarded as the menace of the peace of Europe; but an alliance of such great proportions was considered a greater menace, both by France and Russia. The Franco-Russian alliance is therefore entirely due to the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy. And now we have five nations of Europe arrayed in hostile attitudes, each one having a larger army than Napoleon I. ever commanded, and equipped with such weapons of destruction as he never dreamed of; and France, defeated and despoiled in 1871, carries her burden the easiest of them all. France and Russia together can now place in the field a million more men and seventeen hundred more cannon than the Triple Alliance.
All these immense armies are prepared and sustained for war. To talk as many European statesmen do about these great armies being kept in the interests of peace, is the veriest nonsense. Siberian blood-hounds are not kept for household pets, nor are armies maintained for peaceful purposes. The talk of disarmament and the actual preparation for war go on together, and some day Europe will witness such scenes of carnage as have not been seen since the days of the first Napoleon. Disarmament will not come until some bloody results of all these years of preparation have been attained, and the map of Europe be arranged as the fortunes of war shall determine.
M. E. K.