AdventAI

BUDDHIST ETHICS.

From Review and Herald, Vol. 71, No. 17., April 24, 1894

[Just now, while the sound of the praise and flattery bestowed at the World's Fair on the representatives of the great heathen religions still rings in our ears, the following concerning Buddhism is both interesting and instructive.—J. O. Beard.]

Lying is forbidden in Buddhist ethics. The following explanation is added:—

“Four things are necessary to constitute a lie: 1. There must be the utterance of the things that is not; 2. There must be the knowledge that it is not; 3. There must be some endeavor to prevent the person addressed from learning the truth; 4. There must be the discovery by the person deceived that what has been told him is not true.”—Hardy's “Manual of Buddhism,” p. 486.

I have italicized the pregnant particular that closes the series of four things mentioned as necessary to constitute a lie. What do my readers say to it? I do not wonder that Mr. Hardy felt it necessary to support himself in his translation by giving in connection, for comparison by Singalese scholars, the original phrase that expressed so incredible a sentiment. Dr. Rhys Davids, in his compact and summary compend of Buddhism, having stated the bare precepts of morality inculcated by the system, remarks that the precepts are accompanied with such comments and explanations as moralists usually add to their injunctions! It would seem that his vigilance must have winked when he read the monstrous statement foregoing that I have italicized. And that statement has curiously escaped the attention of every admiring writer on comparative religion that I have found praising the exalted morality of Buddhism.

Look at the statement again, and yet again. Ponder it well, and see if the gist of the matter be not this: You must not lie; but if you lie well enough not to be found out, you have not lied! Who is there, pray, who lies expecting to be found out? A premium is here put, not upon telling the truth, but upon lying expertly. It is like the case of the Spartan boys brought up to steal, and to think stealing disgraceful only when found out. I ask now, What would be the natural, the legitimate, the inevitable tendency of such doctrine on the subject of lying? Would it not be to produce a race of liars? That, in fact, the Hindus are a race of liars, it is not mine to assert. I have no personal knowledge. That they have the reputation of being such is as well known as is anything else whatever respecting the Hindus. I beg to have it steadily borne in mind that I charge upon no particular man—certainly not upon Gautama Buddha—the origination of the foregoing monstrous doctrine about what is necessary to constitute a lie. The doctrine may not be the doctrine of Buddha, but it is the doctrine of Buddhism; and I insist that on Buddhism its own proper responsibility shall abide. That is an inseparable part of Buddhist morality. Let Buddhist morality swim, if it can, with such a millstone tied, in a knot that none will untie, about its neck. (Wilkinson's “Edwin Arnold as Poetizer and as Paganizer.”)—Toledo Blade.