AdventAI

THE PERSECUTIONS IN MARYLAND.

From Review and Herald, Vol. 75, No. 47., November 22, 1898

American Sentinel.

The cases of Brethren John Curlett and John H. Rhodes, of Ford’s Store, Md., charged with violating the Sunday law of that State, were tried in the circuit court at Centerville, November 9, 10, the result being a sentence of thirty days in jail against each of the defendants. A remarkable and very significant phase of legal opposition to observers of the seventh-day Sabbath developed at this trial.

The circumstances leading up to this result are as follows: Ford’s Store is a small town situated on Chesapeake Bay, the residents being almost exclusively oystermen. These oystermen generally own a plot of a few acres of ground, on which they raise corn and garden products. By the law of the State, oyster-fishing is forbidden on Sunday; and in this respect the Sunday law is generally observed. During the oyster season, which begins early in the fall, the men are busy at their trade from early morning till night every day on which it can be legally followed; and Sunday, being their one day of leisure, becomes the natural time for attending to incidental work that may be necessary about their premises, mending their apparatus for fishing, etc.

The men who are now in jail at Centerville were arrested for working on Sunday at cutting corn. This corn is cut for fodder, and must be cut at a certain time, or it becomes useless. Consequently it falls, when the time for cutting it arrives, within the class of goods known as “perishable,” which goods are allowed by the Sunday law to be handled on Sunday in any way necessary to prevent pecuniary loss. The men were at work on Mr. Curlett’s premises, their position being such as to make it necessary to spy them out, in order to know that any work was being done.

The man who caused their arrest, Mr. Linwood Lane, had on the same Sunday been sailing for pleasure on the bay, and was returning when he spied the men at work. Taking his horse and carriage, he then drove first to one church and then to another to find the sheriff, and finally to his house, where he found him; then, with the sheriff, he drove to the field where the men were working.

It was necessary for the prosecution, at the trial, in order to sustain its case, to prove that the work done was not work of necessity, this work being permissible under the law. As cutting corn for stock on Sunday is usually allowed to be a work of necessity; as it could not be charged that the work had disturbed or interfered with any person, since no one claimed to have been disturbed, or even to object to the work, in itself; and as the constitution of the State allowed them freely to follow the religious practises dictated by conscience, provided only that such practises were not immoral nor in violation of the rights of others, it did not seem that any case could possibly be made out against our brethren.

But this view did not count upon the position that was to be taken in these cases by the prosecuting attorney,—a position that had never before been taken in any similar case in this country. Boldly stepping out from under the cover of such reasons, or excuses, as are usually alleged for the Sunday laws upon civil grounds, the State’s attorney declared, and reiterated and emphasized the statement, that the offense for which the men were being tried was that of having violated the sanctity of the Christian sabbath, which had become established by custom and by the law. It was not the work that these men had done on Sunday, or that others in the community usually did on that day, he said, that constituted the offense. That was not what they were being tried for; but, he said, when men belong to a religious sect which holds to the disregard of Sunday as a principle of religious belief, and violate the Sunday law on that ground, it is necessary to interfere to prevent the spread of such moral contamination! The State wants good citizens, he said, and these men are not good citizens.

Mark what is contained in this position that has now been taken in the courts against observers of the seventh day. All civil grounds that have been alleged in support of Sunday observance were ignored, and the offense was charged flatly upon the ground of religion. It was not the Sunday work that the men had done that was objectionable. Others did work on that day; in fact, the great majority were wholly careless of the law as regards such work as the defendants were charged with doing. But these men belonged to a religious body that did not believe in the sanctity claimed for Sunday, while others who worked on Sunday did believe in it, or at least professed to. Or if they did not profess to believe in Sunday as the sabbath, they did not express any opinion to the contrary. They simply did not care whether Sunday was, or was not, the “Christian sabbath,” or whether any day was the Christian sabbath. Therefore they were to be exempt from prosecution, while the others were to be arrested and punished.

The one class were conscientious in the matter, and the other class were not; and the conscientious people were the ones to be punished, and they were to be punished because they were conscientious; while the others were to be exempt because they were not conscientious about the Sabbath one way or another. People who disregarded the law entirely, by violating it merely for their own pleasure, and had no conscience about Sabbath observance, were good citizens, such as the State wanted, especially when they took pains to see that conscientious Sabbath-keepers were prosecuted for doing only what was allowed by the law on Sunday as a work of necessity or mercy!

But the point above all others to be noted in the case is that the men were prosecuted because they belonged to a religious denomination—“small and obscure,” the prosecuting attorney put it—that objects to Sunday observance on religious grounds: that no pretense was made by the prosecution that the case rested upon civil grounds; but, on the contrary, it was boldly avowed to rest upon the purely religious offense of a violation of “thep. 754 sanctity of the Christian sabbath:” and, still further than all this, that all law, even the Sunday law itself, was entirely ignored, and proceedings were taken, without law, against these observers of the seventh day, because they had violated a mere religious sentiment. And to-day these two men are in the Centerville jail without having been convicted of any legal offense, even under the Sunday law of the State; but for the offense of belonging to a people who observe the seventh-day of the week as the Sabbath!”

Of course in putting the case upon this ground, the prosecuting attorney of Maryland was really trying the denomination to which the defendants belonged,—a fact of which he was reminded by the counsel for the defense. But apparently it mattered not to the prosecution whether it was conducting a trial of two individuals for a civil offense, or of a denomination for a religious offense, so long as it secured a conviction of the prisoners, and thus vindicated the “sanctity of the Christian sabbath.”

This is the first time in the history of the prosecutions of seventh-day observers under the Sunday laws, that it has been openly avowed that the prosecution was for a religious offense. Now this stand has been boldly taken by the Sunday element in this State; and this new and bold stand taken in behalf of the sanctity of Sunday in this latter part of 1898 coincides very well with the new activity that has taken hold of the religious organizations which are sowing the land with their “reform” leaflets and literature in behalf of the same thing, and organizing for an active campaign in politics. From this the reader can make his own deductions with reference to what developments are soon to be expected.

It should be said, in explanation of the situation at Centerville, that in Maryland a jury is judge both of the fact and the law; hence in a case of prosecution for Sunday-breaking it only needs that the prosecuting attorney shall work upon the religious prejudices of the jury to secure a perversion of law which would hardly be possible were the jury instructed in the law by the judge, as is usual in jury trials.