AdventAI

THE DEFEAT OF JUSTICE.

From Review and Herald, Vol. 74, No. 48., November 30, 1897

In New York a man and a woman united in murdering the woman’s husband. The deed was so well planned and so carefully carried through that though they were both arrested and held for trial, it was quite well understood that there was not evidence enough to convict them unless one of them should confess.

The man was put on trial first. In the midst of the trial the woman confessed, but laid on the man the principal part of the guilt. This led the man to talk; and he acknowledged a part of the deed, but laid upon the woman the burden of guilt. But wherever lies the burden of guilt, the talk of the two has shown conclusively that they both took such a material part in the murder as to make them both completely guilty under the law.

The next day after the woman confessed, one of the jurors was taken with an illness so severe as to break the jury. That jury had to be discharged, another selected, and the trial to be begun again.

But now, though the court, the lawyers, and the whole community know perfectly that both the accused are fully guilty, the lawyers have deliberately set themselves to clear them. It is argued that neither the man’s statements nor even the woman’s confession can be made use of in the new trial; and that therefore, there being not enough evidence, without a confession, to convict them, if both can be persuaded to hold their tongues, the lawyers can wear out all legal processes, and so save them.

It is possible that this scheme cannot be successfully carried through. But that it should be deliberately planned and attempted by those who are a part of the sworn system of justice of the State, is a serious menace to legal government.

In California, more than two years ago, a murderer was found guilty, and was sentenced to death. Yet though courts, lawyers, and all, know him to be fully guilty, the lawyers have succeeded, by technicality after technicality, in defeating justice, and are still carrying it on.

In North Dakota a gang of murderers were under indictment. The first one tried was convicted by the aid of the confession of others. His case was appealed to the supreme court.p. 762 The court ordered a new trial, in a decision which, it is said, “would have resulted in the discharge of the whole band,” though they were confessedly guilty. In this instance the people, in desperation, turned out, and hanged the whole lot of them.

There is no question that lynching is bad. But when, from cause repeated all over the nation, it is understood that lawyers endeavor more to clear the known guilty than to discover guilt and do justice, and that courts are their too-willing tools in that business, what else can be reasonably expected?

One of the lawyers in the New York case mentioned above plainly says that “notwithstanding the guilt of his client, it is the lawyer’s duty to free him if he can.” The Chicago Times-Herald says that it does not believe that this canon will “meet with the approval of the American bar.” Whether it will or not, everybody knows that such is almost the invariable practise of lawyers and courts all over this nation. And it is this, more than all other things, that is the cause of lynching.

“And judgment is turned away backward, and justice standeth afar off: for truth is fallen in the street, and equity cannot enter.” There are no lynchings in England, nor any suggestion of any such thing.