AdventAI

POSSIBLE RESULTS OF THE PRESENT WAR.

By J. Coeurdelis

From Review and Herald, Vol. 75, No. 28., July 12, 1898

J. COEURDELIS.

(Ottawa, Canada.)

It is, of course, quite impossible to portray, at this period, an elaborate forecast of the results of the present conflict between Spain and the United States; but from the present trend of affairs, it seems justifiable to say that bewildering complications may be confidently looked for before its finishing stroke shall be given. The interference of America in behalf of Cuba may generate events that will shape the policy of the world at large, and be counted among the most notable happenings of historical record.

The present conflict is not the breaking out of a sudden impulse, but the culmination of long years of irritation. Standing in the very gateway of America’s southern waters, and being a genuine treasury of wealth in natural resources, Cuba has been growing in national importance for more than a century. Since the discovery of Cuba, its political affairs have been under the continuous control of Spain, whose rule has been that of proprietor rather than that of governor. As time has developed the intellect of the race thus held in virtual slavery, the people have struggled to free themselves from the domination of their unmerciful master.

This condition of affairs being all the time well-known to the United States, and the imperious rule of Spain being obnoxious to a people free from such vassalage as that to which the Cubans were subjected, it seemed most natural for the feeling to obtain that the free people would, in time, assist the degraded race to rise above its thralldom, either through annexation or independence. For nearly half a century, however, prior to 1868, the American government discouraged this sentiment; but during the seven years following, in which Spain was in the throes of revolution, Cuba was terribly misgoverned, and the sympathies of America were drawn out toward that suffering people. However, no interference was offered by the United States until November, 1873, when the steamer “Virginius,” registered in New York as an American ship, was captured at sea by a Spanish war vessel, towed into a Cuban port, and retained there until fifty of her officers and crew were shot by the Spaniards. Only the leniency of President Grant then averted war between the two countries.

Since that time, the “intervention” sentiment has constantly grown in the United States, and the Cubans on American soil have accumulated a revolution fund amounting to $11,000,000. The Cubans might have gone on indefinitely, in their present war for independence, without interference from the United States, had not Spain adopted her annihilation tactics, under the most brutal system of atrocities ever known in the annals of modern warfare. Strong sympathy for a maltreated race was represented to be the ruling motive for tardy interference, although the hint of broken trade relations was added, in a message to Congress, as a secondary incentive for attempting to bring about the independence of the Cubans.

But as it is impossible humanly to foresee the future, events occurred to shut the American naval fleet in the Pacific out of all neutral ports. It was therefore thought necessary to have coaling-stations in Eastern waters under the absolute control of the United States; and as the Philippine Islands seemed a good point, the plan was quickly hatched to go there, destroy the Spanish fleet stationed at Manila for the purpose of holding the natives under Spanish rule, and take those islands under the protection of the United States.

Having partly accomplished this design, the question arose as to what should be finally done with the islands. Should they be permanently retained by the conquering nation, returned to Spain for an indemnity, or turned over to some European power for a consideration? Immediately the sentiment spread through American circles that these conquests should be retained as strategic points for future security. The next step was to advocate securing another such point at the entrance of the Gulf of Mexico; and it was suggested as good policy to secure Porto Rico, and thus drive Spain entirely out of Western waters, as well as to curtail her rule in the East.

Success thus far in the war has seemed to cause the American heart of sympathy gradually to retire before the growing ambition for conquest. But in yielding to this ambition, the United States will so change her attitude before the other nations as to enter upon a course that she will not be able to alter when desirable, except under the deepest humiliation. The West Indies, standing in the highway of international commerce, must connect the nation controlling any one of them with international politics. It is the same with the Philippines and the Hawaiian Islands. Let the United States assume control over any of these, and she connects herself with the complications of European politics, which will most likely prove a source of continual trouble, affecting the enterprise and prosperity of the nation.

Indeed, matters have already gone so far in this direction as to create distrust in the minds of many. As expressed by a writer in Blackwood’s Magazine: “Unless all the signs deceive, the American republic breaks from her old moorings and sails out to be a ‘world power.’ Whether the start has been well made—with sagacity, with dignity, with due circumspection, and preparedness against internal disturbances, for example—is for the Americans to consider.”

This is well said; for it is plain that for the United States to step into the circle where she becomes a “world power,” is to have every international question that affects the equilibrium of Europe seriously disturb the internal workings of her home government.