BY ELDER WOLCOTT H. LITTLEJOHN.
(Battle Creek, Mich.)
(Concluded.)
With the close of the last article the conclusion had been reached that hades was a pure myth of Pharisaic origin. Do you ask how it is, then, that Christ can be justified in mentioning it in the parable? The answer is not difficult to make. In the first place, as already remarked, it was perfectly legitimate, by common consent in the enforcement of doctrines, to construct and use a parable, the details of which were not true in fact. The only thing required in such cases was that the leading idea inculcated by the parable should be sound. As a rule, parables have but one such idea. Hence it is a canon of interpretation that they should “not be made to walk on all fours;” i. e., that when interpreting them, no one should insist upon finding an application for every part of a parable, or expect to find every part either reasonable or true. As an illustration has already been given of the correctness of this view, in the case of the apologue employed by Jotham in addressing the men of Shechem, it is not requisite that other proofs should be offered at this time. Suffice it to say that the objective point that Christ had in view in the parable was that of impressing his hearers with the thought that riches were not a guaranty of the divine favor, and that as this doctrine was sound, it was admissible to enforce it by such a parable as he used; that is, one all the details of which he did not himself indorse.
In the second place, it is very easy to justify the conduct of the Master from another standpoint. In logic a line of argument is recognized that is styled the argumentum ad hominem. Archbishop Whately defines it as follows:—
The argumentum ad hominem is addressed to the peculiar circumstances, character, avowed opinions, or past conduct of the individual, and therefore has a reference to him only, and does not bear directly and absolutely on the real question, as the argumentum ad rem does. It appears, then (to speak rather more technically), that in the argumentum ad hominem the conclusion which actually is established, is not the absolute and general one in question, but relative and particular, viz., not that “such and such is the fact,” but that this man is bound to admit it, in conformity to his principles of reasoning, or in consistency with his own conduct, situation, etc. Such a conclusion it is often both allowable and necessary to establish, in order to silence those whose weakness and prejudices would not allow them to assign to it its due weight. It is thus that our Lord on many occasions silences the cavils of the Jews.—“Elements of Logic,” pp. 170, 171.
Thus it appears that the argumentum ad hominem, as its name implies, is an “argument to the man;” that is, the conclusion is one which the individual to whom such an argument is addressed must accept, because regularly drawn from premises which he admits to be sound. The person making the argument need not indorse the premises which he employs, but he must believe in the conclusion reached, having arrived at it from other premises which he himself could approve. For example: Were a gentleman from South Carolina and one from Massachusetts discussing the propriety of legalizing dueling, the former affirming, and the latter denying, it would not be an unheard of thing if the gentleman advocating the code of honor should declare his conviction that in some way God, or the fates, presides over such contests, so ordering that the result would prove the justice of the cause of the triumphing party. To meet this position upon strictly philosophical grounds would require time, and perhaps skill in debate. To avoid unnecessary delay, therefore, the Massachusetts man would look about him for some familiar illustration which would answer his purpose. He bethinks him of the great rebellion. To his mind it was conceived in sin and brought forth in iniquity. Not so, however, to that of his friend. He has been in the habit of regarding it as a noble struggle for separate national existence. The Massachusetts gentleman, knowing this to be the case, says to him, So and so, your theory that the ends of justice are served by resort to violence when individuals have personal altercations, is not sound, as I think I can satisfy you in a moment’s time. Going to war is simply dueling on a large scale. You were a soldier in the army of the Southern Confederacy; the war for their independence was a failure; and, therefore, if you are right in your theory of dueling, you ought to accept the results of that war as conclusive proof that the South was wrong, and the North right. Would not such reasoning be final? You answer in the affirmative, and admit that the overthrow of the duelist was most complete.
But suppose that the Carolinian should still persist in his theory, offering as an objection to the logic of the New Englander, that his illustration was not good, since he did not individually believe in the rectitude of the Southern cause? To this the Massachusetts man would reply, “I was trying to convince you, sir, and not myself, that the decisions of war are not always equitable, and therefore I selected an illustration to which you could not take exceptions. My personal opinions had been framed long before, upon historic facts and observations which were satisfactory to myself; now, therefore, before you can evade the deduction which I have made from the premises laid down, you must concede that those premises are incorrect.”
It may be true that the hypothetical illustration used above would have been more satisfactory had the premises employed been strictly correct; but as the decision reached could, under other circumstances, be vindicated in the use of data to which there could have been no exceptions, the means employed were fully justifiable. The brevity of the time required in the employment of such a stratagem in making an individual acknowledge an important fact, and renounce a dangerous error, was a consideration of sufficient weight to call for a resort to the method pursued. With our Lord, the one object had in view was the confounding of the Pharisees. In the use of no other plan of attack than that adopted by him, could such complete and brilliant success have resulted. Had he employed any other style of logic than that of a parable in the form of an argumentum ad hominem, triumph would have been more tardy and less perfect. Had he, for example, scrupulously adhered to exact verity in all the accessories to the parable which he employed, regardless of the opinions of the men he was addressing, discussion might have arisen as to the propriety of using such accessories. Under cover of that discussion, the Pharisees would have found an opportunity to throw dust into the eyes of the people by skillfully drawing attention from the main point of the parable to these imperfections inhering in its structure. To avoid this, therefore, he carefullyp. 276 limited himself to the use of just such characters, and the mention of just such places, as every man before him would readily admit might have an existence, although in fact they did not exist at all.
It was not the first time that he had employed the argumentum ad hominem to the confusion of those proud self-sufficient teachers of the law, with whom consistency was more highly prized than truth. How successfully, for example, did he use it when they sought to condemn him for healing on the Sabbath day. Why, said he, “Doth not each of you on the Sabbath loose his ox or his ass from the stall, and lead him away to watering? And ought not this woman, being a daughter of Abraham, whom Satan hath bound, lo, these eighteen years, be loosed from this bond on the Sabbath day? Luke 13:15, 16. Again on a subsequent occasion: ‘Which of you shall have an ass or an ox fallen into a pit, and will not straightway pull him out on the Sabbath day? And they could not answer him again to these things.’ Luke 14:5, 6. In these cases it will be perceived that Christ does not stop to elaborate an argument to prove that the ox or the ass could properly be watered, or taken from the pit, on holy time. He takes the short cut to the objective point in view, by appealing to those practices which they admit to be correct, and then draws the conclusion therefrom that they, judged by their own opinions and usages, fully justified all that he had done. The examples cited are exactly parallel to the parable of the rich man and Lazarus in which he reasoned that they, by admitting that it was possible for the former to go to hell, and the latter to Abraham’s bosom had completely stultified themselves by holding one set of doctrines utterly irreconcilable with another in which they also believed.
If, however, one would find another instance of the use by the Saviour of the argumentum ad hominem under circumstances more nearly like those attending the giving of the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, he can do so by reading Matt. 12:27, 28. In that passage an account is given of an interview between the Lord and certain individuals in regard to the casting out of devils by him, wherein they charged that he had accomplished it through the agency of Beelzebub. Replying to them, he said: “If I by Beelzebub cast out devils, by whom do your children cast them out? therefore they shall be your judges. But if I cast out devils by the Spirit of God, then the kingdom of God is come unto you.”
Here, again, was a successful effort to put his adversaries on the defensive. He does not try to prove by independent argument that the power by which he worked was from heaven, but he appeals directly, and in brief, to that which their own children were doing according to their belief. Now, he says in substance, if they do the same work which I am doing, the presumption is that they do it in the use of the same instrumentalities. If, therefore, I am the tool of the Devil, they must be the same. This logic was, of course, unanswerable. But the feature of it to which we wish to call attention especially, is the fact that—for his then present purpose—he seemed to accept, or at least to employ without disputing the same, their profession that members of their party were really successful in exorcising evil spirits. But right here it is submitted that it must be matter of extreme doubt whether the children, or partisans, of the wicked, bigoted, and backslidden Pharisees who confronted our Lord at the time in question, were actually able to expel demons under any circumstances. If this doubt be justified, then we are furnished with a case precisely in point with the one found in the 16th chapter of Luke. The strongest objection that could be made to the exegesis of the parable of the rich man and Lazarus presented in this article, would be that the hypothesis that Christ did, for the time being, accept the Pharisaic notion of hades, is unreasonable. In the case before us the same thing occurs in effect. There he is confronted by the Pharisees who claimed to be able to cast out devils. This they could not do in fact, but Christ resorting for the moment to the argumentum ad hominem, concedes their claim and then argues that if he casts out devils by the power of Beelzebub, their partisans must do so likewise. Was he justified in so doing? Otherwise expressed, did he do wrong in admitting for the sake of the argument, that the partisans of the Pharisees could cast out devils? If not, then it would not have been wrong for him for a similar purpose to acknowledge for the time being the validity of the notions of the same sect on the subject of hades.
The wisdom of such a course was vindicated by the result. How complete was his victory, and how triumphant his demonstration. Out of their own mouths, and in the use of their own tenets, his enemies were convinced, or silenced. With one strategic movement he brought to his feet, in the presence of the admiring multitude, the pride and wisdom of those crafty men whom he had completely entangled in a net which they themselves had woven. The pages of history will be searched in vain for another instance where, in so few words, and with so little effort, the wisdom of this world was ever so completely emptied of all its proud pretensions.
But enough. It is now time that this article should be brought to a close. It has been the earnest effort of the writer, in presenting the exegesis which it contains, to free himself from the spirit of partisanship. He has allowed only such considerations to be presented as were thought to be really pertinent to the issue, and of a nature to commend themselves to candid examination from individuals on either side of the prolonged controversy concerning the state of the dead. For this reason, also, he has endeavored to say what he had to say in this communication without making his own private opinions concerning the future life at all prominent. In fact, it is thought that both the believer and the disbeliever in the natural immortality of man, might unite in approving the exposition herein given of the parable of the rich man and Lazarus. To be sure, the former could not thereafter claim to draw from it any support for his own peculiar tenet; but he might insist that outside of the parable, he could find in the Scriptures something which would justify his theory of the future life. Be that as it may, however, it has seemed to us that the system of interpretation herein offered is both natural and truthful, and therefore should be accepted by all. Let this be done, and the difficulties that spring from the construction generally placed upon that portion of the sacred word which we have had under consideration, will be dissipated. Thenceforth it will inculcate the simple and beautiful truth that the poorest and weakest of men, destitute though he may be of food and raiment, covered with sores and dependent upon charity for his daily bread, may, nevertheless, be highly esteemed in heaven; while at the same time those who are arrayed in fine apparel and fare sumptuously every day, may, after all, be subject of the divine wrath.