AFFAIRS IN THE EAST

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AFFAIRS IN THE EAST.

JAPAN has yielded to the powers of Europe, and will retire from the country where she has given the most signal evidence of her prowess in war. She has learned much of war, but does not feel equal to the task of fighting three of the great nations of Europe at the same time. Russia and Russian greed is the direct cause of this change of the program in the East. It has been sometimes said of very avaricious men that they want to own everything that joins them. This is the motto of Russia. In harmony with this plan, she has for years extended her dominions farther and farther in every direction possible. Under various pretexts she extended her conquests through Central Asia until she now looks England in the face through the mountain passes of Afghanistan. Not being prepared to carry her conquests any farther in that direction, she turned eastward, crossed the continent north of China, and established herself upon the China Sea. But her one port on those waters, Vladivostok, is locked with ice, and she has looked longingly and covetously at the warmer harbors of China and Corea. There was no pretext by which a claim might be made for these ports, and so Russia bided her time. But something happened. Japan and China went to war, and the very strongholds which Russia has coveted were seized by the young giant of the East; and when the terms of the treaty were announced, it was found that beside the indemnity that China must pay, these strongholds on her coast were to be given to Japan, at least for a season. Then Russia protested, threatened war, and, with the aid of Germany and France, has now succeeded in making Japan yield these ports back to China, where they will be easy for Russia to seize, or China may give Russia some good port or ports to pay her for her interference. Russia will be sure to demand something for her services, and China will, unless helped by other powers, have to give all that Russia desires.
The most remarkable thing about this whole transaction is the part that Germany and France took in it. Neither of these powers had any interests in the East that were the least endangered by the terms of the treaty between China and Japan. Russia gains all the substantial advantages; the other interfering powers gain nothing. Why, then, did they join Russia in her interference? Three words will tell the story,—hatred, hope, and fear. France and Germany both hate each other and England. The latter power is the great opponent which stands in the way of Russia in the East. France wants to please Russia, that she may have an ally should she be forced to fight the Triple Alliance. She would, also, like the help of Russia to compel England to evacuate Egypt. Germany wants to show herself friendly to Russia, so as to prevent an alliance between Russia and France. It is also probable that the emperor of Germany, seeing the rapid spread of socialism in his dominions, looks for an imperial alliance of the great emperors,—a kind of imperial conspiracy against the people,—which of course must include the czar and autocrat of all the Russias. But whatever the motive which actuated these powers, the deed is done, and Japan must accept half a loaf where she expected, and according to the usages of the world, had a right to receive, a whole loaf.
There may be another side to this affair in later times. Perhaps when Russia makes a move toward taking these ports, Japan may say, You would not let me have them temporarily, and now you cannot have them for good; and she may have England to sustain her. At such a time Germany and France would be out of the race; for they have not said that Russia should take these ports, but only that Japan must not hold them. Russia, by her course in this matter, has probably made Japan her implacable enemy; and she will be no mean foe to contend with.