REPLY TO DR. KELLOGG'S REJOINDER.
BY REV. N. WARDNER, D. D.
Again, he says that the soul is “the sum total of the relation existing between the various parts of a human being.” But how can it be such, and still exist, while the “human being” does not exist? He says, “The soul is not the individual, but a representation of him.” It is the sum total of the relations existing between the various parts of a human being, yet is no part of that being, but simply a representation of him!
I quoted him as saying, “The Bible recognizes no human existence but a material existence; that the soul is not material,” and then said that, according to these statements, the soul is no part of human existence. But he says, “Such reasoning is inexcusable.” Then I ask, Are not such contradictions “inexcusable”? He tries to show my deduction to be a fallacy, by saying, “A house is recognized by science as only a material existence; the plan of a house is not material. Hence the plan of the house is no part of it.” Now compare. “The Bible recognizes no human existence but a material existence.” “The soul is not material.” “The soul is not the individual, but a representation of him,” and is not that equivalent to saying that it is no part of human existence? I appeal to the reader if my deduction was not legitimate, and that the bad logic is his! I said, If thought is inseparable from matter, it must be a property of matter. He replies, “We have never said that thought is inseparably connected with matter.” I did not pretend to quote his words, but the idea taught. On page 51 of his book, he says, “Mind is inseparably connected with matter.” Now the only difference between his statement and mine is between the words mind and thought. What does it indicate when a gentleman of the Doctor’s power and intelligence feels driven to make issues over such verbal hair-splitting?
He proceeds to say, “The next argument is based upon a statement supposed to be quoted from our work, viz., ‘Man is made wholly of matter.’ We never believed such a statement, and cannot find it in the work under consideration. The statement seriously misrepresents our position, as will be seen by reference to page 64 of our work, where, in referring to this very subject, we say, ‘Man is made up of two parts, matter and organization.’ Now we would humbly submit to the candid reader whether or not Eld. W.’s statement properly represents our views. If not, then all the arguments which he proceeds to build upon it are as erroneous as the quotation he makes.” This is equivalent to admitting that if the quotation is correct, my argument is sound. Now if the Doctor will turn to page 75 of his work, at the bottom, he will find the following two sentences, including the exact words that I quoted: “The Bible says nothing about man’s possessing a conscious entity which is added to his material organization, to make the complete man. On the contrary, it asserts that man is made wholly of dust, of matter.” I am sorry the Doctor has published a statement on the authority of the Bible which he never believed, and seriously misrepresents him, but do not see as I am to blame for it, or for quoting as his sentiment what I found stated as such, even if it does contradict something else that he said on page 64. The chief difficulty that I experience with his book is that I find it to contain so many contradictions.
In reply to my statement about the manifestation of electricity through a machine, he says: “The mind is inseparably connected with matter, is of exactly the same character as that which proves electricity to be inseparably connected, not with any particular machine, but with matter.” Here he sets up a man of straw, instead of my argument, evidently because he prefers to grapple with it. But I ask, Does he not also misrepresent his own teaching in this effort? He teaches that mind is the result of organized matter, and not matter in general; and that mind ceases to exist as soon as that matter is disorganized. It was this theory that I was criticising. I said, “The fact that spirit manifests itself through organized matter no more proves that it is produced by that matter, than the fact that electricity manifests itself through a machine proves that it is produced by that machine, and cannot exist independently of it.” He has not met this argument. His pretending to do so, while he replied to what he substituted in the place of it, is an acknowledgment of inability to refute it.
He claims that because when the skull is crushed upon the brain, mind ceases to manifest itself, this proves that the brain controls the mind, instead of being a medium of manifestation. But whatever controls thought, and hence conduct, is the seat of moral responsibility, which he thus affirms to be the brain; and its action is controlled, not by mind or spirit, but by the laws of matter. Mind and moral character are thus made to be mere products of matter. Here is fatalism, pure and simple. Crush an electric machine, and electricity ceases to manifest itself through it; but does that prove that electricity has ceased to exist? or that the machine produced it?
In regard to his statement that “the perfected character will be represented in a perfect body, which will no longer be a trammel to the soul in its aspirations after good, but will accord with it in perfect harmony,” he tries to escape from the dilemma in which he thus puts himself, by calling it a “rhetorical flourish” in which he stated what he did not believe! This is ingenious, at least, and to me looks rather thin. I should be glad to think that many other contradictory teachings in his book were simply the result of rhetorical flourishes. His language is plain and definite, that the soul will have aspirations after good above the promptings of the flesh (which accords with universal human experience), and therefore God will provide it with a body that will not be a trammel to it in such holy aspirations. Rhetoric or no rhetoric, I do not think he uttered a truer sentiment in his book. He corrects himself by saying he used the word “soul” where he should have said “mind.” This does not relieve him, for it did represent the mind as superior to the body, and in the same sense to be released from a trammel.
The Doctor seems astonished that I should believe that character may be developed by circumstances. If such is not the case, then of what use are Bibles, churches, schools, parental training, etc.? Whatever influences sway the mind and will, and excite good or evil thoughts and emotions, form character. But if man is a “mechanism,” as he claims, then his character must be just what his machine was designed to produce. No change of character could take place till a change had first taken place in the machine. All mechanical science teaches this. In view of his theory, it is natural that the Doctor should object to my belief that the mind and will are free in their action, though not independent of physical influences; but in this power and freedom of man to govern and control his mind and body is what makes him a moral and an accountable being.
In my last paragraph I asked, “Was Christ’s character and divinity simply the products of his physical organization and the influences around him? Did his divine Spirit, wisdom and power, cease to exist when his body died, or were they merely preserved in a record or photograph for three days and nights?” These were fair questions, and to the point. But instead of meeting them, he tries to escape by charging me with teaching that Christ’s character was a product of the circumstances under which he was placed, and also his divinity. I call upon him to prove this charge. I do not wonder that he wished to avoid answering my questions, for they involve what seems to me to be fatal to his theory. I wanted to know if the Doctor would apply the same rule, without modification, to Christ which he applied to the rest of mankind; and to show how unavoidable it was, according to his theory, I quoted Heb. 2:17, where it is declared that “in all respects he was made like unto his brethren.” But was it answering my questions to turn and charge me with teaching that Christ’s character and divinity was a product of the circumstances under which he was placed?
To my second question, “Did his (Christ’s) divinity, Spirit, wisdom, and power cease to exist when his body died, or were they merely preserved in a record or photograph?” he essays to reply by quoting Paul—“Christ died for the ungodly.” And then proceeds, “He does not say, Christ’s body died, as does Eld. W., neither do the Scriptures anywhere intimate that Christ himself did not die upon the cross as really as did the lamb, of which he was the great antitype.” The Doctor must know that he did not answer my question in this, nor even touch the point of difference between us. I asked if the divinity and power of Christ ceased to exist when he died, so that only a record or photograph of them existed, which the Doctor did not attempt to answer, and the reason is obvious. If he fails to meet these points, and reconcile them with his theory, it will be because he cannot. He goes on to say that he can much more easily reconcile the difficulties of his views than he can reconcile “with the teachings of Scripture and logical reasoning the doctrine of the trinity, to which my reviewer holds.” How does he know that his reviewer holds to that doctrine? Besides, he is not asked to reconcile the difficulties of other people’s positions, but those of his own. Was the above remark an appeal to the prejudices of his readers for the purpose of drawing their attention away from the fact that he did not meet the issue before him? It has that look.
The Doctor affirms positively and unqualifiedly that no intelligence, life, or force can exist separate from matter. This necessarily includes God as well as men and animals. He then tries to escape from the logical conclusion of his affirmation by hiding behind the inscrutable mystery of God’s existence. If the existence of God be so inscrutable, then how does he know that divine intelligence, life, and force could not exist separate from matter, since every particle that science can test is found to contain evidences of design and adaptation to an end? Will the Doctor claim that these particles of matter are the authors of this design and adaptation, or that they happen to be there by chance? Can there be thought without a thinker, or design without a designer? But since the Doctor’s theory will not allow of these qualities originating from any source aside from matter, how can he escape the atheistic deduction that there is no God above or outside of matter and its forces?
REPLY.
Eld. W. continues, quoting our remark that the soul is “the sum total of the relations existing between the various parts of a human being,” and then asks, “But how can it be such, and still exist, while the human being does not exist?” As we have repeatedly explained, the organization may exist so long as it has a representation. During life it has a representation in the body; between death and the resurrection, it has a representation in the record of an individual’s life preserved in Heaven. At the resurrection the organization again acquires a material representation, and the individual is reproduced. Is it not clear that in this manner the soul or organization may exist, even though the individual does not exist? Possibly Eld. W. may not have obtained a correct idea of our view on this point, though in other connections he has seemed to have clear views of it. It is possible that the mental bias arising from having for many years held and taught a very different view may be the cause of his apparent difficulty in comprehending our meaning. In order to avoid all such sources of error and confusion, let us take a simple illustration concerning which no such bias can exist. We can think of no better analogue than a game,—the national game of base ball, for example. In an actual game the players, the ball, bats, etc., constitute the material part, and the relations of all these different parts in playing, constitute the organization, the immaterial part. The players and all the implements of the game may change, but the organization remains the same, and thus preserves the identity of the game. This organization may be represented and preserved by a written description of the game, so that if a hundred years should pass without its being played, during which period the game would at no time actually exist, it could be very readily reproduced from the written representation, and it would still be the very same game. Here we have the organization of the game, which is its essential element, representing it, while the game itself does not exist. Will Eld. W. assert that the organization of a game, the plan of a house, the design of a marble statue, cannot exist after the objects mentioned have ceased to exist? If not, and he cannot with fairness do so, then he has no grounds upon which to base his objection against our view of the soul, since the case is precisely analogous. Eld. W. has read our work, evidently with care, and is undoubtedly aware that we hold that “man is made up of two parts, matter and organization.” p. 64. Furthermore, in a former article we called his attention to the fact that this was our position; yet he persists in misrepresenting us, presenting as our view that the soul is “the sum total of the relations existing between the various parts of a human being, yet is no part of that being.” Eld. W. expresses his astonishment at such a view by an exclamation point. Our astonishment at such ungenerous treatment of our view would not be adequately expressed by a dozen exclamation points. If the error had been made but once, it would be excusable on the ground of a misunderstanding; but when it is reiterated after a full explanation, without any apparent grounds for the repetition, we are utterly at a loss for any explanation consistent with a candid desire to learn what is truth.
We called attention to the fact that our reviewer had fallen into an error in his reasoning by drawing a conclusion from negative premises. This he perfectly well knows is illegitimate and illogical. If he does not acknowledge our position to be true, he has arrayed against him every authoritative writer on logical methods of reasoning from Aristotle down to the present date. We claim no superiority in learning above our reviewer. Indeed, we very readily grant his great advantage over us in scholarly attainments; but this only awakens in us the greater surprise that he should attempt to maintain a principle that any student of logic would instantly condemn as erroneous. Eld. W. says, “I appeal to the reader if my deduction was not legitimate, and that the bad logic is his!” The interrogation point at the close of the quotation is evidently appropriate, though not rhetorically or grammatically necessary, since the logic is so questionable. Eld. W. appeals to his readers; we will appeal to any three of the most learned persons of his own denomination whom he may choose to select. In doing so, we must be allowed, however, to call attention to the fact that he has adroitly attempted to cover up the logical blunder by adding a third premise, which is also negative, thus making himself still more culpable in the eyes of logical justice.
Eld. W., in referring to a quotation which we stated to be incorrect, says, “I did not pretend to quote his words,” yet the reader was certainly left to think that the quotation was intended to be verbally accurate, since it was placed in quotation marks. But suppose his conclusion to be correct, what follows? We would much rather hold the mind to be a property of tangible matter, the existence of which is supported by logical evidence, than that it is a property of an immaterial something, a “substance different from matter,” of the existence of which there is no better evidence than a desire or a guess. We have no disposition to split hairs; we did not recognize the statement made by Eld. W. as ours on account of the incorrectness of the quotation.
We stand corrected as to the verbal correctness of Eld. W.’s quotation respecting the constitution of man, and are glad to know that his argument was not madep. 131 without at least an apparent foundation. Nevertheless, our position remains just the same, and Eld. W. was undoubtedly aware of this fact at the time he made his criticism. It is very difficult to make a book so entirely free from errors or ambiguity as to make it impossible that it should be misunderstood; we could easily admit that Eld. W. might detect errors in our book, but had thus far labored under the delusion that he was criticising our position, not our book. If we understand him correctly, he built an argument upon the expression quoted, although he well knew, from other statements in the book, that it did not fairly represent our position. We think, however, that a fair consideration of the matter will dissuade any one from attaching any weight to the argument urged. The quotation with its context is as follows: “The Bible says nothing about man’s possessing a conscious entity which is added to his material organization to make the complete man. On the contrary, it asserts that man is made wholly of dust, or matter. ‘Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return.’” The point at issue in the connection from which the remark was quoted was whether man possesses in addition to his material organization an immaterial, conscious entity. We showed by positive evidence from the Scriptures that this could not be the case; though, as remarked in a previous article, the Bible does not explicitly describe the exact nature of the soul. So far as the Bible statement is concerned, the statement made is true; and yet, in a proper sense, as elsewhere explained, man may be said to be made up of two things, matter and organization. The fact that Eld. W. gives his whole attention to a point of very minor importance, without attempting to answer the main argument, based upon the Scripture assertion, “Dust thou art,” etc., leaves us to believe that he had no explanation to present in answer to our claim that the texts quoted leave no room for the belief in the theory that the real man, the personality, is “a substance different from matter,” an immaterial entity.
Eld. W. does not seem satisfied with our treatment of his argument (!) about the electrical machine, and to show that we have made no pretense in consequence of “inability to refute it” we will consider it again. In the first place, we are unable to discover any argument. An assertion is made, but no sort of logical evidence, nor indeed, evidence of any sort, is adduced in support of it. We are at a loss to know how it is possible to have an “argument” without evidence as a basis for reasoning. Under these circumstances there could not be any very great temptation to “set up a man of straw,” surely, if we had been disposed to do so. But let us consider this so-called “argument” upon which our reviewer seems to rely with so great assurance. He says, “The fact that spirit manifests itself through organized matter no more proves that it is produced by that matter than the fact that electricity manifests itself through a machine proves that it is produced by that machine.” We will ask the reader to notice two points: 1. The comparison is a lame one, because the relation of spirit with organized matter in general is compared with the relation of electricity with a particular machine, which is in the highest degree illogical. Particulars may be compared, and generals, but not a particular term with a general term. 2. We are both surprised and astonished at the intimation that an electrical machine does not produce electricity. A few years ago we purchased an electrical machine for experimental purposes, but upon subjecting it to a trial found that it would not work, in other words, did not produce electricity. We at once sent it back to the manufacturer, and purchased a similar machine of another maker, which was warranted to produce electricity, and did. If a machine of the first sort is the kind referred to by Eld. W., his illustration is lame, because no electricity was produced; if the second, then the argument is equally lame, because the machine did produce electricity. What is the value of an electrical machine if it will not produce electricity? If our reviewer will give us as good evidence that the mind is produced by an immaterial entity, a “substance different from matter” and independent of the body, as we can give that electricity may be produced by an electrical machine, we will adopt his view. Or if he will offer as good reasons for his view of the nature and origin of mind as we can offer for believing it to be dependent upon the brain, we will withdraw all opposition to his view. Let us for a moment compare the two views. We look upon man as a being made complete in himself, self-moving, self-governing, self-regulating, self-sustaining, self-repairing, and morally responsible because he has a moral sense and the power of self-control. The other view is that the being we see and converse with and admire, is not the real individual at all, but only the house in which he lives, while the real person is something that lives inside, that no body ever saw, heard, or in any way recognized, and indeed, is so infinitely attenuated that it is said to be altogether immaterial; that the tangible being is controlled by this intangible, hypothetical something, not being capable of doing or acting except as actuated by the immaterial entity within. The first view holds that the real man is the tangible man; the second, that the real man is a hypothetical entity. It is not a hypothesis that the tangible man exists, while the existence of an immaterial man is wholly hypothetical. The great objection to the tangible man is that it is not easy to explain how he can possess the power of self-control, how he can be self-regulating. Will Eld. W. or any supporter of his theory tell us how the hypothetical-entity theory helps matters any? Is it any easier to see how an immaterial “substance different from matter” (N. W.) can regulate itself than to understand how a tangible being provided with a most delicate and marvelously intricate structure can regulate itself? Suppose the body needs something to control it; does not the something which governs it also need a governor as well? If we must have an entity to manage a man, must we not have also an entity to control the entity, and a third entity to control the second, a fourth to manage the third, a fifth to regulate the fourth, and so on back through an endless line? If the entity can control itself, why may not the tangible man control himself as well? These are common-sense questions that the simplest mind can comprehend; why does not Eld. W. settle some of these pressing problems for us? He will answer, because he is criticising us, and not offering his own views. But what right has he to find fault with our position, unless he can present one more consistent and harmonious? The iconoclast has no just claim to the attention of intelligent minds.
Before leaving this point we wish to ask the reader’s attention to the fact that in Eld. W.’s quotation he omitted the words, “the evidence that,” at the beginning of the sentence. The omission makes the remainder of the sentence unintelligible.
After several remarks which afford room for criticism, but which we will not stop to notice for want of space, Eld. W. says, “Mind and moral character are thus made to be mere products of matter. Here is fatalism, pure and simple.” We repudiate the charge of fatalism; but let us see if our reviewer is not himself open to the same charge.
In his first article he quoted Dr. Allman in support of the view that there may exist “a substance different from matter,” of which the soul is supposed to be composed. Now as substance is only another term for matter, the theory amounts simply to this: The matter composing the body does not possess properties capable of making it intelligent and self-controlling, but is the vehicle of a different kind of matter (substance different from matter), which is supposed to control it. How does this view differ from ours, except that it puts the question of responsibility back a step upon another kind of matter? If a belief in the potency of one kind of matter is fatalism, then the belief in any other kind of matter is also fatalism.
Thus our reviewer is himself obnoxious to the charge made against us. Eld. W.’s position is a most embarrassing one, because he makes a belief in the material basis of mind fatalism, and yet commits himself to the same view, only seeking to hide the difficulty by resorting to the hypothesis of a different kind of matter. Now we submit, and it does not require a deep insight into philosophy to see, that the difficulty is just as easily explained by supposing the existence of different properties of matter as of different matter, and much more consistent with the acknowledged rules of philosophical investigation. If Eld. W.’s “substance different from matter” possesses power to control not only itself but the matter of the body, there can be no philosophical reason why the matter composing the body may not at least possess power to control itself. Indeed, when Eld. W. has admitted that the soul is composed of substance, he has placed himself upon our ground; for substance is matter, and hence the matter of the soul helps compose the body. Thus man is a material being, after all. Thus it appears that we have the advantage over Eld. W. of being able to maintain the existence of an immaterial soul, while he is obliged to abandon his favorite theory, and hide behind the hypothesis of a “substance different from matter,” thus making him open to the charge of materialism, which he seems to be fond of laying upon us.
Our reviewer still dwells upon our remark about the freedom of the soul—used in the sense of mind—in the perfected state, and seems to consider it a strong point, though we cannot see how it adds any to the strength of his position to insist upon it that our language meant something which we have expressly explained it does not mean. If, as before intimated, his whole aim is to find fault with our book, his course is at least consistent; if, however, it is to criticise our position, his remarks are but a waste of words. The mental function is affected by conditions as much as is respiration or digestion. A pair of lungs compressed by tight lacing may be said to be “untrammeled” by removal of the constriction. In the same way the mind will be “untrammeled” by the removal of disease from the brain and other parts of the body.
Says Eld. W., “In view of his theory, it is natural that the Doctor should object to my belief that the mind and will are free in their action.” We ask, When and where have we objected to such a theory as held by Eld. W., or any one else? We believe in freedom of the will as much as does Eld. W. The difference in our belief about the will is this: He holds that man possesses a “substance different from matter” in him, which is the seat of will. We hold that the same God that made man could as easily make him a self-controlling being as to make another self-controlling being and put it into him. That is, it would be just as easy for God to make man a unit as to make him dual; and as the existence of the “substance different from matter” is purely an hypothesis, it is certainly most rational to suppose that our explanation is the correct one. Here is a plain, logical argument which we would like to have our reviewer answer.
Eld. W. states that we have charged him with teaching that “Christ’s character was a product of the circumstances under which he was placed,” and calls upon us to prove the charge. This we will readily do from his own words. We quote from his second article as follows: “Character results from choice, will, habit, etc., all exercises of the mind, and when developed by one class of circumstances cannot possibly be the same as a character developed by different circumstances and influences.” Shortly after he says, in speaking of Christ, “In all respects he was ‘made like unto his brethren.’” What other conclusion can be drawn from the above premises than that which we stated? If any other, will Eld. W. please show us the train of logical reasoning by which it is reached. If he believes the text quoted to be strictly and literally true, then he can find no fault with our deduction. If he does not believe it to be true, then he has no grounds for an argument. This is certainly clear. We see no difficulty to reconcile. If Christ was “in all respects made like unto his brethren,” then certainly his death was like that of his brethren. If he was not made in all respects like his brethren, then to the same extent that he differed from them, his death may have differed from theirs. This difficulty is for Eld. W. to settle, not for us.
Our reviewer seems to be somewhat displeased at our reference to the doctrine of the trinity, a doctrine which is confessedly in the highest degree unphilosophical, unreasonable, and unreconcilable with common sense, which leads us to conclude that we were not incorrect in supposing him to be a believer in the doctrine. Our only reason for mentioning the doctrine of the trinity was to remind our reviewer that so long as he held a view so utterly at variance with logical reasoning, he ought to have at least a small amount of liberality for other views in which there may at first seem to exist slight difficulties.
Eld. W. concludes with a reiteration of arguments already answered, as the question of the origin of God, the argument from design, etc., and ends his paragraph by remarking, “But since the Doctor’s theory will not allow of these qualities originating from any source aside from matter, how can he escape the atheistic deduction that there is no God above or outside of matter and its forces?”
We see no difficulty to escape from; but, supposing that a real difficulty exists, then our reviewer is as deeply involved in it as are we, since his theory only puts the question back upon a “substance different from matter,” and is evidently open to the very same objection urged against our view.