AdventAI

FIRST AND GREAT COMMANDMENT

By R. M. Kilgore

From Review and Herald, Vol. 61, No. 28., July 8, 1884

THE LAW AND ITS PENALTY.—NO. 1.

BY ELD. R. M. KILGORE.

Antinomians triumph over the fact that the decalogue has no penalty attached to it. This affords them sufficient grounds, they think, for a denial that it is, of itself, a perfect law; because, say they, a law without a penalty is a nullity, inasmuch as it makes no provision for the punishment of those who transgress it, and is therefore powerless to enforce obedience to its requirements.

From our present standpoint, looking at facts as they now exist, the above would appear to be the correct principle upon which all law is founded. But let us view the matter from another standpoint, and take our position at the beginning, when the law was first promulgated; we will then see that other and equally important questions are involved, even those which affect the character and wisdom of its Author.

The decalogue is but the outgrowth of, and hangs upon, the law, composed of but two great commandments as enunciated in the Pentateuch, and repeated by Christ. Deut. 6: 5; Lev. 19: 18; Matt. 22: 36–40.

FIRST AND GREAT COMMANDMENT.

Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind.

SECOND.

Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.

This, then, is the law in its original form. It embraces in its demands every duty that could possibly be required of all the intelligences of God’s creation, when as yet they were in their innocency, and each and every one were living in perfect compliance with those just and reasonable requirements; when not a ripple had appeared to disturb the peaceful stream which then flowed from the throne of the Lawgiver to every part of his dominion, and returned to him in undisturbed rivulets from each of his sinless and happy subjects. His intelligences are placed upon probation. Their acts must determine what their future shall be. Should they prove themselves loyal, a penalty is not needed; otherwise it can be announced. But sin was not an intuition, nor an inherent part of their organization. The principle of evil was unknown, unthought of; love, purity, and innocency were universally dominant. Now1, contemplate for a moment the statute as having a form somewhat like the following:—

FIRST COMMANDMENT.

Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind,

SECOND COMMANDMENT.

Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.

PENALTY.

In the day that thou dost not do this, THOU SHALT SURELY DIE.

At such a time as this a penalty would have been a great misfortune. It could not have been appended to the law without conflicting with the attributes of its Author. Its simple announcement associated with the promulgation of the law would have been an insinuation that evil was possible, and a hint to the innocents that they could do wrong. This would be a reflection upon the wisdom of the Sovereign which we cannot accept. It would impeach the character of the Father, since he would have been the first to intimate to his children that they could commit an act worthy of punishment. He would have incited the mind, and therefore become the author of the thought, and the sower of the seed of evil. This is repulsive. It is not to be tolerated.

To illustrate: an earthly father and mother living on a lonely island with their little son and daughter, who see only the godly example of their parents, would not be heard saying to their little ones, “You must keep away from the bad boys. You must not say any bad words. If you do we shall punish you.” No; they would have no occasion for such admonitions and threats. The innocent ones are ignorant of wrong-doing, and of the existence of evil-doers. The parents would be culpable of planting in the minds of those lovable babes the seeds from which would spring a bountiful crop of surmisings and conjectures as to what it was to do wrong, and, without doubt, an abundant harvest of experiments in order to discover the lately revealed principle. This would finally result in the destruction of their innocency, and the defilement of their purity. Instead of peace and love, these would be fruits borne from a tree of their own planting, to mar the tranquility of the household. Oh! what a mistake! It was a want of wisdom that led to such a fearful result. But we cannot account for the origin of sin on such a ground as this. Wisdom was the habitation of God’s throne.

In the development of evil, we may look at it through any train of events whatever, and tracing it to its incipient point, it will not be seen that a word had escaped the lips of the Father which would convey to the minds of these happy intelligences whose chief delight was a perfect compliance with the supreme law, even an intimation that the pure and holy love which must have filled their hearts might wax cold. He will lay no foundation for sin. It can have, therefore, no reasonable ground for its existence. Its origin must arise from a source entirely independent of a penalty suggesting it.

If sin shall get a foothold in God’s fair domain, it must have for its starting point other ground, and for its author another intelligence whose foresight could not have discovered the ultimate results of such a course upon which he was then entering. With him its inception must be primary. He shall have no excuse to render why he should take such a step. No palliating circumstances can be permitted to surround him upon which to base a single argument in justification of his act. He must act without reason. Sin could not have had an existence if there had been a good and sufficient reason for its conception and birth; for whenever a good and sufficient reason can be given for ap. 435 wrong act, it ceases to be sin. But there could have been offered an excuse, had offenders been threatened with punishment. Those angels, after taking the fatal step, and having gone too far to be reclaimed, could have presented at least one reason why their minds were turned into that channel of thought. Justifying themselves so far, they would doubtless have made an effort to vindicate their course by censuring the one who gave rise to the first inquiries as to what evil was, and why it should merit punishment.

Such would have been the inevitable result had the primeval code been accompanied with the dread penalty. But no such consequences can follow, no censures can be made, nor insinuations arise in any part of the universe because the Father of all did not state that capital punishment would be the result of disobedience. It was time enough to make the penalty known when occasion demanded it. A penalty was not a necessity, and would have been an absurdity, till after the law was transgressed. When one or more of his creatures have become established in acts of disobedience, then a penalty is an absolute necessity, and justice demands that transgressors should be held guilty and recompensed accordingly. In another paper we shall view the subject in the light of these circumstances.