After the Victory in Egypt.
The real trouble of the situation in Egypt began with the famous victory of Gen. Wolseley. That victory was the topic of Christendom the next morning. Europe and America and the British isles of the sea were alike discussing it. “It was a famous victory;”—and then what? It was a stroke of strategy which approves the military genius of the English general. Two steps from Alexandria to Cairo. The canal saved, the national movement overthrown, the Egyptian army scattered, and Arabi Pasha a prisoner or a fugitive. It is a striking dramatic spectacle. The French declare that Wolseley is a grand soldier; the Germans, that it is a splendid victory. Certainly it is a very complete victory;—and then what? Despite the positive and passionate assertions on all sides, the actual facts of the Egyptian situation are very obscure. The English view is represented on one side by Mr. Seymour Keaye and Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, whose wife, Lady Anne, is the granddaughter of Lord Byron, and who has a romantic enthusiasm for Arabians and a new Islam; and on the other, by Sir Edward Malet, the Consul-General, and Sir Auckland Colvin, of the “Control;” and each party states its side with positive assurance. The friends of Arabi Pasha assert that for several years a national feeling has been arising among educated Egyptians cherishing a vague anticipation of a new Islam—a Mohammedanism inspired by the modern spirit. The character and force of this feeling it is not easy precisely to estimate. But suddenly, within twenty years, a new element appeared in public affairs in the form of a national debt. This did not exist twenty years ago, but its present amount is nearly $450,000,000, the growth of the wild extravagance of the late Khedive. He borrowed of France and England, and permitted the two governments interested in the Suez Canal to send agents to Egypt to take charge of the finances of the country. He was required to pay the interest punctually, and to accomplish it he oppressed the Egyptians cruelly. The French and English agents—the “Control,” as it was called—filled the financial offices with their own countrymen, turning out the natives, and at the beginning of this year there were 1,325 European office-holders in Egypt, at a salary of more than $1,500,000. Here was fresh fuel for the flame of national feeling. A people ground by cruelly relentless taxation, and ruled by foreign tax-gatherers, is presumptively ripe for revolt. The active revolt was represented by a group of army officers and the army, which insisted that they represented the people. This has inevitably a very suspicious appearance. The army was increased, and the military budget doubled, and647 the chief of the disaffected colonels was made Minister of War by the alarmed government. All this is a familiar proceeding. It is but the ordinary course of military usurpation and of the rise of a military adventurer, who may, indeed, be quite as worthy of respect as the government that he threatens, but is not a patriot in the true sense. Mr. Blunt says that the army was the servant of the patriot people. Sir Edward Malet says that it was the master. Sir Edward quotes Sultan Pasha as his authority. Mr. Blunt retorts by quoting the same personage as his authority, and insisting that the Pasha probably told him the truth, and Sir Edward a lie. Sir Edward asserts that Arabi has received no considerable support, except from the most ignorant peasants, who had been made to believe that he would give them the soil and cancel their debts, that seven-eighths of the Deputies demanded his resignation and departure from the country, and that the Ulema during the mission of Derwish Pasha vigorously supported the Khedive. Mr. Blunt denies it all. Arabi’s movement has been sometimes represented as a kind of reproduction of the rising of the American colonies against England, and Arabi himself a kind of Washington, or Hofer, or William Tell, or Arnold von Winkelried, leading a devoted people in the defense of their liberties. But, so far as can yet be seen, the movement was wholly that of the army and of a few pashas, and there is yet no evidence whatever of popular support in the usual sense of those words. In the actual situation of the country, it is not possible to see that the success of Arabi would have revealed a self-governing nation, nor that it would have produced more than a change of task-masters. This for the present, however, is an idle speculation. Arabi is defeated. England is at Cairo. What will England do? Whatever she may do, she has no right to support the Sultan and his vassals in spoiling the Egyptians. Great as is the value of the Suez Canal to England, it is not worth saving at any such price. If England is to sustain the Khedive at Cairo, it must be only upon the condition of reforms which her assistance must accomplish. But between the rule of the Turk and that of the Englishman in Egypt, both being foreigners, there can be no hesitation. It is fortunate that the solution of the problem is the task of the ablest and most humane of living statesmen. The private English citizen who aroused the world to the Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria, at which Beaconsfield winked, is not likely, as Prime Minister of England, to abandon Egypt to the Turkish heel.—