A BLOW AT THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

13%

Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association · Battle Creek, Mich. · Jan 3, 1893

FromReview and Herald, Vol. 70, No. 1.

Read the full edition

A BLOW AT THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

Under the Constitution of the United States, as lately construed by the Supreme Court, Congress possesses the same despotic power over the intellectual contents of all communications, written or printed, open or under seal, which pass through the mail, that was exercised at the end of the Middle Ages in Europe.
In the judgment lately rendered in the freedom-of-the-press cases (In re Rapier, In re Dupré, 143 U. S., 110–135), the first in which the rights of the press under the Federal Constitution were ever presented for adjudication, it was held that the limitation in the First Amendment, which expressly provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press,” does not restrain the autocratic power of that body to look into the contents of all documents passing through the mail, and to exclude all, when the ideas which they seek to disseminate are “condemned by its judgment.” The Federal government has the right “to refuse the facilities for the distribution of matter deemed injurious by Congress to the public morals;” it may decline “to become an agent in the circulation of printed matter which it regards as injurious to the people.” Congress may refuse “to assist in the dissemination of matters condemned by its judgment, through the governmental agencies which it controls.”
It is thus clearly and curtly declared that Congress may exclude from the mail every document, public or private, political, religious, or social, whenever the ideas or principles which it seeks to disseminate are “condemned by its judgment,” “as injurious to the people.” The only restriction that rests upon this new-born despotism is that Congress cannot “prevent the transportation in other ways, as merchandise, of matter which it excludes from the mails.” The court holds that the Constitution guarantees to the people no right whatever to disseminate their ideas through the only agency which Congress controls. It is one of the most remarkable episodes in our judicial history.
In the Constitutional Convention of 1787 no special limitation for guarding freedom of speech and of the press was inserted in the Constitution, simply because it was by the majority deemed unnecessary. But as soon as it was settled that amendments embodying a Bill of Rights were to be added, five States proposed, in as many different forms, the suggestion out of which grew the clause of the First Amendment, which expressly forbids Congress, by name, from making any law “abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.” Thus was this vital provision set in the forefront of our National Bill of Rights.
The meaning of this provision was then known to all men, even to the judges. It was understood as denying to Congress that kind of political censorship which had passed away from the crown and the Parliament of England a century before; as denying to the judges that kind of judicial censorship which Mansfield had vainly struggled to uphold; and as a guarantee to every American citizen, so far as the Federal government was concerned, of the right to speak or write what he pleased, subject only to the censorial power which resides in juries alone.
At a later day when Congress prohibited the circulation through the mail of immoral literature, the same constitutional guarantee was kept steadily in view. It is unquestioned that under the authority granted Congress to “establish post-offices and post-roads,” plenary power was given to regulate the entire postal system of the country, subject only to the limitation that it shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, the simple meaning of which is that no one shall be punished on account of the contents of any document sent through the mail until a jury has first determined under “the law of the land,” that the same is either immoral or illegal. Recognizing this limitation, Congress, in the perfectly constitutional statute forbidding circulation through the mail of immoral and obscene literature, expressly provided that in all such cases the fact of immorality or obscenity must be passed upon by juries alone. In the leading case of United States vs. Bennett, 16 Blatch., 343, the judge charged the jury: “The only question, therefore, which you are called upon to decide is whether or not the book is obscene, lewd, or lascivious, or of an indecent character.” When the Act was passed, it never occurred to Congress that it might, by flatly ignoring the First Amendment, re-create the medieval censorship and establish an Index Expurgatorius for all publications which its arbitrary judgment might deem obscene or immoral.
If the decision lately made by the Supreme Court—to the effect that all communications may be arbitrarily excluded from the mail when the ideas they embrace are “deemed injurious by Congress to the public morals”—be a sound one, then at its next session Congress may amend the Act against immoral literature by incorporating into it a black list of all the books and papers which have passed under the ban of its censorial judgment, and this may include the New Testament alongside of the works of Voltaire.—Hannis Taylor.