POLYGAMY AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

7%

Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association · Battle Creek, Mich. · Sep 30, 1890

FromReview and Herald, Vol. 67, No. 38.

Read the full edition

POLYGAMY AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.

BY A. F. BALLENGER.
(Chicago, Ill.)
If Satan has not instituted Mormonism, with its practice of polygamy, for the especial purpose of furnishing, in these last days, an apparent precedent for enforcing laws against Sunday work by seventh-day observers, those who have administered the law in such cases have attempted to find in the enforcement of laws against polygamy, a precedent for enforcing Sunday laws against seventh-day observers. Inasmuch as prosecuting attorneys in their arguments, judges in their charges, and Sunday-law advocates in their addresses have thus unjustly classed Sunday work with the practice of polygamy, the question becomes an important one. While Seventh-day Adventists are willing to bear the disgrace which too often comes from a belief in, and practice of, the truth, they are unwilling to have their practice of working on Sunday placed in the same category with the practice of polygamy. The object of this article is to show, first, why the government may not rightfully enact a law against Sunday work; and, secondly, why it may in justice prohibit polygamy. It will not be necessary to argue at length on the first point, as the readers of the REVIEW are familiar with it.
Sabbath observance is purely religious. It has to do only with man's relation to God. The keeping of a Sabbath is dependent on divine revelation, which cannot constitute the authority upon which civil government bases its action. Aside from regular nightly rest, it cannot be proved that one day in every six or eight, or a certain portion of each day, would not meet the demand of man's nature for rest. In fact, it cannot be proved that man's physical nature demands any rest aside from the regular daily and nightly rest secured each day. Man's nature demands rest, but how much and when it shall be taken is dependent upon the nature of the work and the constitution of the individual. It is claimed by the Sunday-law advocates, that the Sabbath commandment is twofold, having a religious and a civil side, the latter forming a basis for Sunday laws. Without stopping to show that the fourth commandment has nothing whatever to do with Sunday, we will come directly to the issue, and deny that the Sabbath was instituted for any purpose which would form a basis for civil legislation.
The Sabbath was instituted primarily for worship, and not for physical rest. True, man may or may not derive physical rest from worship, but that this was not contemplated in the giving of the Sabbath, is shown from the fact that the Sabbath was instituted before man fell and became subject to physical weariness, while he had access to the tree of life, which perpetuated youthful vigor, and that it will be kept in the redeemed state when man is immortal, and when he will be a stranger to physical weariness. We cannot measure the Sabbath by the little time covered by man's fallen state. Physical weariness was the direct result of the fall: “Because thou hast hearkened unto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree, . . . cursed is the ground for thy sake; . . . thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; . . . in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground,” etc. In no case is man's need of physical rest given as a reason for observing the Sabbath. The only work forbidden in the commandment is “thy work;” works of worship, charity, and necessity, if not commanded, are at least allowed. “It is lawful to do well on the Sabbath days,” says Christ. The service of the tabernacle, which was commanded of God, required more labor on the Sabbath day than on other days. The Saviour did more works of mercy on the Sabbath, which had a tendency to cause weariness, than on other days, because he was brought in connection with the people on that day, to an extent not realized on other days. We would not be understood as arguing that man may not rest in connection with his worship. He should rest from all his work. But we maintain that man's need of rest was not the object of the institution of the Sabbath. Man was commanded to rest from his labors, that he might keep the Sabbath holy by devoting it to the worship of God. He was not commanded to cease from his work, that he might rest. The resting from labor was a means to an object, and not one of the objects.
Having shown that the keeping of the seventh day is a purely religious duty, which, according to the Scriptures, man owes to God only, and that there is nothing in its nature which forms a basis for civil legislation, we next examine the question of the right of the State to prohibit the practice of polygamy.
The first question to be settled is, as to whether marriage is a civil or a religious relation. For if marriage is a religious relation, it cannot be regulated by a civil State. But marriage is, primarily, a civil relation, and since the few who will question this proposition are found among believers in religion, we will address this portion of the argument to them.
Mutual aid and companionship are among the primary objects for which marriage was instituted. Gen. 2:18. Hence marriage is clearly a social relation. Another primary object of the marriage relation is the propagation of the race. Gen. 1:28. But reproduction is wholly natural. Ps. 51:5; John 3:6. This argues the natural character of the marriage relation. It is dependent on natural conditions for its existence, and must end with mortality (Matt. 22:30; Rom. 7:2); hence temporal and natural, not spiritual.
That marriage was instituted by the Creator, does not prove that it is a spiritual relation. God has instituted government, and commands men to be subject to “the powers that be.” But our relation to governments ordained of God is, primarily, civil. If marriage is a religious ordinance, only those are married who are religious or spiritual. But this principle would nullify all marriages between parties who reject all religion, but who are faithful and happy in obedience to their marriage vows. Further: if marriage is a religious relation, it must be a relation of the true religion, thus confining legitimate marriage to possessors of the true religion, not merely to professors of it. In other words, if marriage were a religious or spiritual relation, it would follow that all marital obligations between infidels, hypocrites, and all but the few who profess and possess the true religion, would be null and void. This is the position of the Church of Rome. “Marriage,” says the Romish Church, “is purely religious. But we alone are the possessors and guardians of the true religion. Hence, all marriages not sanctioned by the church are void.” This is the logical and inevitable conclusion to which they arrive, upon the assumption that marriage is a religious institution or sacrament. This conclusion, with all its disastrous consequences, is embodied in a formal decree by the Catholic Church. (See a record of the decrees of the Council of Trent, November, 1563.)
While maintaining that marriage is primarily a civil relation, we would not be understood as excluding from it the benign influences of pure and undefiled religion. The blessings of religion ought to be taken, not only into the marriage relation, but into every relation of life, social and civil.
Having shown that marriage is a social or civil relation, and therefore within the purview of civil legislation, provided the rights of society demand it, we will next inquire, Do the rights of society demand the regulation of the marriage relation? We maintain that they do, and for the following reasons, among others: The State must regulate marriage, for the purpose of ascertaining the paternity of children. This the State must do, in order that it may impose upon the proper parties the parental care of the child, that the tax-payer who is not responsible for its existence, may not be charged with its support. Hence it is proper and just for the State to require, as it does, that those entering upon the marriage relation shall furnish competent evidence of having entered upon that relation, and that they accept its duties and responsibilities.
Having shown that the government may in right, and must in justice to the tax-payer, regulate the institution of marriage, we next inquire, May it regulate that relation to the extent of prohibiting plural marriages?
(Concluded next week.)