ABELARD

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S. D. A. Publishing Association · Battle Creek, Mich. · Aug 29, 1895

FromThe Youth’s Instructor, Vol. 43, No. 35.

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ABELARD

(Continued.)
The question which divided the two schools of medieval philosophy was that concerning the nature of universals. The discussion of this question influenced very deeply the life and the history of the middle ages. It is therefore worth while to see what this question really was.
A general term is one which applies to all individuals possessing a certain group of qualities denoted by that term. It applies to all individual objects possessing the group of qualities comprehended in the term “horse.” There are an almost endless number of these qualities, and the possession of all of them is necessary. Some qualities are common to the horse and the ox, some to the horse and the lion, some to the horse and the zebra. Some animals have more qualities in common with the horse than have others; the ox has more than the lion, the zebra more than the ox. But when the group of qualities is complete, we have the animal called “horse,” and every animal possessing all these qualities is a horse. This kind of term is also called a universal term, or universal. We may notice further that there are terms which include qualities not possessed completely by any known individual thing, but by a group of individual things having a certain relation in common. Thus the term “church,” in the sense of a religious body, cannot be applied to any individual person, but only to a group of persons, things, and ideas, having a certain relation existing between them. Now the school of philosophy represented by Roscellinus claimed that universals were nothing but names, nothing but sounds uttered by the voice. It is very convenient to classify objects and give them a name, but there was nothing behind the name which would make a name even, if we did not discover it. So also there were no abstract realities. The “church,” for instance, had no real existence, since it was neither the pope, nor the priests, nor the people, nor the territory, nor the houses and utensils of worship, nor all of these together.
The realist school, to which William of Champeaux belonged, took the opposite extreme. There was a real, though invisible, essence represented by the name “horse.” This essence was in every horse. All the properties which he manifested to the senses were mere “accidents.” The thing which made him a horse was the essence of the horse which was in him. So also the church was a real entity, or existence. Every member of the church was pervaded by its essence. If all men apostatized from the Catholic faith, from the pope down, the “church” would remain as truly an entity as ever it was.
This doctrine Abelard attacked with all the resources of logic and all the weapons of ridicule. If the same essence of humanity was in Plato at Rome and in Aristotle at Athens, then Plato must be Aristotle, and Aristotle, Plato. For there were not two similar essences, since this would be two individuals, and no universal. There was but one universal, and therefore there was but one essence. If this essence was in Aristotle at Athens, and was Aristotle, his individuality being external and “accidental,” and was also Plato, and in Plato, then must Aristotle be in Plato and Plato in Aristotle. Hence one man was at Rome, and also at Athens. Yet Abelard, while opposing realism, did not go to the extreme of nominalism. He held very nearly the modern doctrine, that the universal exists in the mind only, but corresponds to real relations in the outside world, and is not a mere convenience, a mere word. The church is a real condition of relation, though not a real independent being.
The reader may wonder why men could rise and fall on the tide of ideas like these, and how a creature possessed of common sense could hold either to the extreme of nominalism or of realism. He must remember that there were important interests bound up with each of these ideas. It has been said that if it were to any one’s manifest advantage that the three angles of a triangle should not be equal to two right angles, schools of mathematicians and philosophers would arise to overthrow that fundamental proposition of geometry. Thus, if universals had no existence, then the whole doctrine of the trinity was a fiction of the mind, and there were three Gods, not one. So inevitable is this that Roscellinus is called a tri-theist—a believer in three Gods. But if realism were the true philosophic doctrine, one God in three persons became a matter of easy comprehension. There were persons of faith in the church who regarded the subject of the trinity as a reverend and inscrutable mystery, to be believed in rather than pried into, and indeed it would seem that such matters are not for the mind of man to attack; but the scholastic philosophy knew no inscrutable mysteries. Again: if realism were the true doctrine, the papacy had existed beyond doubt ever since the time of the apostle Peter, and the Roman empire had existed since the days of Augustus; all facts to the contrary were mere “accidents.” The papacy was as surely in possession of universal dominion over the church when the highest interests of its representative were in the rabble politics of Rome as when Gregory VII was summoning kings to his feet; and the empire was as real during the long periods when the purple was without a wearer as when it was worn by Constantine or Charlemagne. Furthermore, if the real essence, which gives identity to an object, is invisible, intangible, and those qualities by which it is known to our senses are “accidents” merely, the doctrine of transubstantiation met with no further difficulty. The visible bread and wine might become the true flesh and blood of Christ, without any change in their appearance. The “essence” might be changed, while the “accidents” remained. No other considerations than these were needed to decide on which side of the controversy the influence of the church should be found. Realism became orthodoxy, nominalism became heresy. C. B. MORRILL.