p. 306 | RESURRECTION by N. Wardner

Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association · Battle Creek, Mich. · Thursday, May 13, 1880

FromAdvent Review and Sabbath Herald, Vol. 55, No. 20

RESURRECTION

By N. Wardner

The Fifth and Sixth of the Series of Discourses on Life, Soul, Death, and the Resurrection.

BY REV. N. WARDNER, D. D.

"Verily, verily, I say unto you, The hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God; and they that hear shall live. Marvel not at this; for the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation." John 5:25, 28, 29.

DR. KELLOGG, in his book, p. 120, says, "If the soul is conscious without the body, and receiving in Heaven or hell its reward or punishment, its return to the body is wholly unnecessary." How does the Doctor know this? May not God see good reasons for it, though the Doctor says not? Who claims that the soul is receiving its full reward or punishment, between death and the resurrection? That immediate suffering or happiness follows death, was clearly taught by Christ and the apostles; just as immediate and increased suffering is experienced by a criminal when his doom is decided, before the real penalty is executed. The saints are happier than while in the flesh, because they are no longer tempted, persecuted, nor tortured with doubts and anxious fears. Their eternal condition is made certain to them, and they "rest" in that assurance. God evidently designed that the human spirit should find its highest happiness in union with a body adapted to its highest aspirations and development, and not in an unclothed condition.

Paul taught that if absent from the body, he would be present with the Lord, and that while in the body, he was absent from the Lord. 2 Cor. 5. How can one be absent from the body, if he cannot exist without it? Paul here contrasts the joy a Christian may experience while in the body, with what he may experience out of it, with Christ. Now, if he thought death was "non-existence," and "the penalty of sin," then he decided that the penalty for sin was to be preferred to living for Christ; that it was a real gain. If God annihilates men at death, for sin, this signifying his will that they should not exist, why force them into existence again, that he might annihilate them a second time, for sin? The first annihilation would put the sinner and sin out of existence as effectually as the second. Paul said (Gal. 2:18), "If I build again the things which I once destroyed, I make myself a transgressor." If God inspired this statement, it is equivalent to a positive declaration that he will never act in that way himself.

The Doctor says, p. 127, "It is evident that the identical atoms need not, necessarily, compose the resurrection body." If so, then the identity of the person can only consist in his spiritual nature. There would be no more identity of body than there would be between a basswood buggy and a hickory one, made after the same pattern. Is it possible to make a hickory buggy out of basswood?

On page 215 he says, "There is plenty of opportunity for the omission of defects, without, in any degree, affecting the identity of the individual." If the mind and character is the product caused by the material organization, how can the organization be in any sense changed in material or structure, without producing a corresponding change in the character of the individual? A different cause cannot produce the same effect. If the organization may be changed a little without affecting the character, it may be changed a little more, or much, without such effect, or become altogether another organization and still produce the same characteristics. If individual identity and character depend upon identity of organization, then "the omission of defects," and change of material, in the organization, can no more fail to affect the identity of person and character, than substituting a stone house in place of a wood house, that had been consumed, with defects left out, could fail to affect the identity of the two houses. And if one could succeed the other and be identical, could they not exist side by side and be identical? If thought, feeling, memory, etc., are simply effects produced by a material body, how can the same thoughts, feelings, and memory be produced by a body composed of different materials, and so changed in structure as to leave out of all defects, any more than the identical flame produced, hundreds of years ago, may be reproduced by the burning of different materials under entirely different circumstances? To punish one person for sins committed by another, because of physical likeness, would seem like monstrous injustice. And to compel such new being to recognize himself to be the other person, composed of different materials, and with changed organization, where character was formed under very different conditions, seems as unreasonable as to compel an American to recognize himself to be a Hottentot. If soul, body, and spirit are all annihilated at death, why did Christ when dying, say, "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit," and say nothing about his body, if he knew his body to be the essential part of his existence? In harmony with Christ's statement, Paul says (2 Cor. 5:6-8), "Therefore, we are always confident, knowing that while we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord. We are confident, I say, and willing, rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord." Now, if Paul believed that he could not be with the Lord, nor even exist without his body, this language seems very deceptive.

To the Philippians he says (Phil. 1:21-24), "For to me to live is Christ, and to die is gain. . . . For I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart and be with Christ, which is far better; nevertheless, to abide in the flesh is more needful for you." Here he represents himself as struggling with two conflicting desires,—one to remain in the body, and the other, to depart from it, that he might be with Christ; signifying that he should be with Christ if he left the body. Did he mean that to exist away from the body, or be present with the Lord without the body, was impossible? If so, what is the use of language? If death means "non-existence," or unconsciousness, then abiding in the flesh was being present with the Lord, much more than to depart from it; for to depart was to go out of existence; but while to abide in the flesh he had Christ formed within him, the hope of glory, the joy of life.

From the above it is evident that the resurrection promised by Christ is not the production of a new spirit by a new body, but the clothing of it with a new body, adapted to its future state and powers of expansion. It may be the same body spiritualized, or one of entirely different material. The identity of the person is in the spirit, and not in the material or shape of the body. A person who becomes deformed does not change his identity for this reason.

In the case of our Saviour, the same body was raised that was nailed to the cross, revived by a reunion with his spirit, and shows what he meant by "the resurrection." In John 2:18-21, we read, "Then answered the Jews and said, What sign showest thou unto us, seeing that thou doest these things? Jesus answered and said unto them, Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up. Then said the Jews, Forty and six years was this temple in building, and wilt thou rear it up in three days? But he spake of the temple of his body. When, therefore, he was risen from the dead, his disciples remembered that he had said this unto them; and they believed the Scriptures and the word which Jesus had said." Here Christ speaks of his body as a temple—a dwelling place of God; but was it God? He represented that the Jews would destroy that temple, and in three days he would raise it up again; signifying that though his body would be destroyed, he himself would still exist, and have power to raise it to life again; and upon the fulfillment of this declaration was suspended the crowning evidence of his Messiahship and divinity. It was, therefore, necessary that it should be such a resurrection as could be demonstrated to the world. If his body were not raised, it was still in the tomb, under an armed guard, set and watched by his deadly enemies, and they could easily have refuted the testimony of his disciples, could they have produced that body. The fact that the Sanhedrin bribed the guard to expose themselves to a death penalty by reporting their own unfaithfulness, clearly shows that they knew his resurrection to be a fact that could not be disproved except by false testimony.

Matt. 27:62-66, shows that they understood Christ to base the crowning evidence of his Messiahship upon his rising from the dead the third day; and so "the next day that followed the day of the preparation, the chief priests and Pharisees came together unto Pilate, saying, Sir, we remember that that deceiver said, while he was yet alive, After three days I will rise again. Command, therefore, that the sepulcher be made sure, until the third day, lest his disciples come, by night, and steal him away, and say unto the people, He is risen from the dead; and so the last error shall be worse than the first. Pilate said unto them, Ye have a watch; go your way, make it as sure as ye can. So they went and made the sepulcher sure, sealing the stone, and setting a watch." Such extreme solicitude by the authorities to prevent what they feared might prove true, gives assurance that they would not have left it doubtful whether that guard did their duty or not; and they would have clamored for their blood, if they believed they had connived with the disciples, or had carelessly gone to sleep, and thus, by criminal negligence, had given them opportunity to steal away the body. Nor could the disciples have so concealed it but that the authorities could have found it; for they were Galileans, far from home, and had no hiding-place but their hired upper room, and were watched by enemies on every hand. That Christ arose, as he said he should, was positively confirmed by more than five hundred witnesses. Nearly all the persecutions suffered by the disciples, in New Testament times, were for testifying to the resurrection of Christ, by which he proved himself to be the Messiah; and many of those who participated in his crucifixion were so overwhelmed by these proofs, and the witness which God gave to it by miracles wrought in Christ's name, that they also became converts and sharers in this suffering. Paul, who excelled all others in his zeal to disprove it, afterward preached that the belief of it was necessary to salvation. "If thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thine heart that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved." Rom. 10:9.

The general subject of the resurrection he treats of at large in 1 Cor. 15. It appears from his language that two heresies had crept into that church, which were undermining their faith as Christians. One was, evidently, what he referred to in 2 Tim. 2:18, where he speaks of Hymenaeus and Philetus, "who concerning the truth, have erred, saying that the resurrection is past already, and overthrow the faith of some." The other was, probably, that of the Sadducees, who taught that the soul and spirit were produced by the body, and therefore were annihilated at death, and hence there could be no resurrection, because it left nobody in existence to be raised. In the first twelve verses, Paul calls attention to the doctrine he had preached to them, and was accepted by them as the ground of their faith; viz., that Christ was put to death, and arose the third day, according to the Scriptures, of which there were more than five hundred witnesses, most of whom were still living. In verses twelve to eighteen, he arrays these facts and their skepticism face to face, and then states that "if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is

Christ not risen. And if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is vain." Their faith was suspended upon a risen Saviour. "Yea, and we are found false witnesses of God; because we have testified of God that he raised up Christ, whom he raised not up, if so be that the dead rise not." Thus he shows that the whole question of the resurrection of the dead rests upon the fact that Christ has risen. Then, in verses 19-22, he refers to the sufferings and persecutions to which the disciples were subjected, on account of their testimony concerning Christ and the resurrection, and winds up by saying, "If in this life only, we have hope in Christ, we are of all men the most miserable;" having but little peace nor safety in this world, nor treasure in the world to come.

Up to this point, his object seems to be to establish the fact that there is to be a general resurrection of all the dead, based upon the testimony of Christ (John 5:28), and proven by his own resurrection, as the first-fruits, and that he has power to raise all men. Having established this point, he then applies the doctrine to the saints, and what its effect will be upon them as respects the future, in order to comfort and strengthen them to endure patiently the persecutions which were upon them. In verses 35-38, he answers a cavil. The question was, How could the dead rise after their bodies had gone back to dust, or become parts of other human bodies, and yet be the same person? He replies, "Thou fool! that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body which shall be, but bare (simply) grain, it may chance to be of wheat, or of some other grain: but God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed its own body." This is but a repetition of what Christ said (John 12:24), "Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit."

These passages show that man's physical organization does not constitute his essential existence, but that it consists in that life principle which takes on the new body. What Paul says in verses 39, 40, about different kinds of flesh, shows that the resurrected body may be of very different texture or quality from the present one, and will be spiritual, adapted to the new condition and sphere of the spirit. Also, that it is not necessary for all men to die in order that this change may take place, but that those living at the time of the resurrection will experience a change in the nature of their bodies as radical as in those who are raised. Now, if spirit and character are the products of material bodies, how can bodies so suddenly changed and radically different still produce the same spirits and characters, so as to preserve the same moral and intellectual identity? Can a sweet, pure fountain send forth the same quality of water that a bitter, corrupt fountain does? and vice versa? If not, then how can a pure, spiritual body produce the same character as a gross, diseased body? The Scriptures teach that the characters by which men will be recognized after the resurrection, and for which they will be judged and rewarded and punished, will be the characters which they form here in their present corrupt bodies.

REPLY.

Says Eld. W., "That immediate suffering or happiness follows death, was clearly taught by Christ and the apostles; just as immediate and increased suffering is experienced by a criminal when his doom is decided, before the real penalty is executed. The saints are happier than while in the flesh," etc. "Their eternal condition is made certain to them." So far as assertion can go, the above statement supports Eld. W.'s view, but no further, since no valid evidence is offered that the view in question "was clearly taught by Christ and the apostles." To our mind, both Christ and the apostles taught a very different doctrine. Eld. Wardner's theory that "immediate suffering or happiness follows death" in consequence of the "eternal condition being made certain," necessarily supposes that the Judgment takes place at death. That this position is quite untenable we think every reader will be willing to admit after looking at the evidence. One of the clearest doctrines in the Bible is that of a definite Judgment time or day. "Because he hath appointed a day, in the which he will judge the world." Acts 17:31. A description of the Judgment scene is given in Daniel 7:10, as follows: "A fiery stream issued and came forth from before him: thousand thousands ministered unto him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him: the Judgment was set, and the books were opened." A like scene is referred to in Rev. 20:12: "And I saw the dead, small and great, stand before God; and the books were opened: and another book was opened, which is the book of life; and the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the books, according to their works."

The above texts establish beyond the possibility of question that there is a definite time when all the dead shall be judged together. The time of this Judgment is clearly and definitely pointed out in 2 Tim. 4:1, thus: "I charge thee therefore before God, and the Lord Jesus Christ, who shall judge the quick [living] and the dead at his appearing." Christ's appearing is everywhere in the Bible represented as a definite event. We are aware that there are those who hold that Christ appears at death; but this does not help the difficulty, since he is said to judge the livi- ing as well as the dead at the time referred to in the text.

But even if this unanswerable objection did not exist or could be removed, this fanciful theory of a spiritual second coming of Christ would be of no service to Eld. W., since he believes in a literal resurrection, which the Bible represents as taking place in connection with the literal and personal second appearing of Christ at the last day.

Again, it is clear that the Judgment does not take place at death, not only from the foregoing texts, but from Heb. 9:27. "It is appointed unto men once to die, but after this the Judgment." Eld. W. would have the text read at instead of after; but Paul evidently held a different view of this question, as elsewhere shown in his language to Timothy, already quoted.

It thus appears that the Judgment does not occur at death; and if this is the case, it is evident that there can be no classification of the dead into righteous and wicked, since this would necessitate a Judgment at the death of each individual in order that it might be determined whether reward or punishment was deserved. How beautifully this view agrees with the words of Solomon, "The living know that they shall die: but the dead know not anything, neither have they any more a reward." Here we have a distinct and unambiguous statement that the dead have no reward. Eld. W. says the dead do have both rewards and punishments, though not in their fullness. Solomon declares that the dead "know not anything" and have no reward; which authority shall be taken? certainly both cannot be correct. If Solomon's theory respecting the state of the dead be correct, that of our reviewer must be erroneous. Eld. W. says that the righteous dead are "happier than while in the flesh." Solomon says of the dead that even their love is perished. Eccl. 9:6. Eld. W. holds that as soon as a man dies he knows more than he did during life. Solomon explicitly declares that "there is no work, nor device, nor knowledge, nor wisdom, in the grave [intermediate state, according to Eld. W.]." The psalmist says of man, "His breath goeth forth, he returneth to his earth; in that very day his thoughts perish." How much does this look like increased happiness or knowledge? How much happiness can a man have whose very thoughts are perished? The only way in which a man's thoughts can perish is by the destruction of his "rational or moral nature," the thinking part, or, according to Eld. W., the immortal, immaterial soul. Eld. W. has said that the Bible nowhere represents the thinking part of man as perishing at death; but if this text does not teach it, we are incapable of understanding language.

Eld. W. comes very near to our position when he admits that the "highest happiness" cannot, in accordance with the design of the Creator, be attained without the body. We only go a little further and claim that the body is essential to any degree of happiness, since it is not the vehicle or instrument of a rational, thinking entity, but is itself a rational, thinking entity. The distinction made between body and mind is wholly an artificial one, at least unless it is understood that the mind sustains a purely functional relation to the body. The eminent Canon Barry has well said that "the progress of modern physiological science has rendered obsolete the old idea that the various organs of the body stand to the true personal being in a purely instrumental relation."

That the doctrine of a conscious intermediate state cannot be maintained is well shown by the fact that the eminent author quoted, who was for years Principal of King's College, London, and is now Canon at Worcester, England, asserts that the doctrine of Christianity is "that the 'intermediate state' is a state of suspense and imperfection." A person in a "state of suspense and imperfection" would certainly not be "happier than while in the flesh." Canon Barry ranks high as an orthodox ecclesiastical authority, and we certainly have a right to quote him. He has evidently made himself familiar with the evidences afforded by "modern physiological science," and has found himself compelled to abandon the old view which he refers to as described in "Butler's Analogy," to which Eld. W. seems well to adhere. That the eminent theologian does not believe in any sort of consciousness during the "intermediate state" between death and the resurrection, is sufficiently evident from the following language which we quote from the same essay as the preceding: "In respect of the 'intermediate state,' it only extends (I grant immeasurably) the experience of those suspensions of the will and the full consciousness of personality which we have in life, in sleep, swoon, stupor, dependent on normal and abnormal conditions of the bodily organization." In other words, according to Canon Barry, a person in the "intermediate state" is in a condition of unconsciousness "immeasurably" more complete and profound than that of sleep, swoon, or stupor, whether

from natural or artificial causes, as from narcotic poisoning, from the pressure of the skull upon the brain as the result of accident, etc. "How much does this look like" being "happier than while in the flesh." Who would not infinitely prefer life in the flesh, with all its temptations, persecutions, and torture, with "doubts and anxious fears," to a condition of immeasurable stupidity? Yet this is the position which our reviewer must adopt if he gives fair attention to the truths of physiological science and yet clings to his present views of the nature of the soul or spirit and of the "intermediate state."

In referring to 2 Cor. 5, Eld. W. says, "Paul here contrasts the joy a Christian may experience while in the body with what he may experience out of it." That is, according to Canon Barry, one of the most able and learned defenders of the popular view held by Eld. W., Paul "contrasts the joy which a Christian may experience while in the body" with what he may experience while in the intermediate state, in which, according to the Scriptures, his "thoughts perish," and he would "know not anything," and according to Canon Barry, he would be in a state of stupor "immeasurably extended."

But let us examine the text before involving Paul in such a monstrous absurdity. According to Eld. W., Paul contrasts the joys of life in the body with those he would experience out of the body, or in an unclothed state, and desired the latter. This is certainly not a fair representation of Paul's feelings, and he apparently takes particular pains to prevent a misconception of his views by declaring the contrary. In verse 4 of the chapter referred to by Eld. W., he says, "For we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened; not for that we would be un-clothed, but clothed upon." How could language be made more explicit? Paul did not desire to be out of the body, or unclothed. He was not anxious to pass into a state of sleep or stupor, "immeasurably" or measurably "extended." He especially desired, verse 3, that he should "not be found naked" or unclothed. Paul believed, with Canon Barry, that the intermediate state is one of unconsciousness, for he said, 1 Cor. 15:51, "We shall not all sleep." How, then, can Eld. W. say that "Christ and the apostles taught that immediate suffering or happiness follows death"?

Neither did Paul desire to "suffer the penalty of sin." He expressly declared the opposite, in 2 Cor. 5:2: "We groan, earnestly desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from Heaven." That is, he was anxious to have "this mortal" "put on immortality." 1 Cor. 15:53, and 2 Cor. 5:4. The time at which this change is to take place he points out as being when "the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed." 1 Cor. 15:52.

In the little work reviewed by Eld. W., we raised the query why it should be necessary for the soul to return to the body if it was already being punished or rewarded. Eld. W. answers, "May not God see good reasons for it?" Eld. W. now asks, "If God annihilates men at death for sin, . . . . . why have them into existence again?" We quote in reply his own answer, "May not God see good reasons for it?" But we can see good reasons why wicked men should die a second death.

1. The first death is not absolute annihilation. As before stated, we are not responsible for any such view. Annihilation would be the absolute destruction of an individual with all that pertained to or represented him. This the first death does not do, since each individual's personality or identity is preserved in Heaven by means of the record of his life, as we have endeavored to explain at length in the work which gave rise to this discussion.

2. The first death is not for an individual's own sin, but a consequence of Adam's transgression. Humanity has had two probations. Represented by Adam, the race was on probation in Eden. In consequence of Adam's fall, the first probation ended, and the penalty, death, was inflicted. In order to save the race from destruction, annihilation, the plan of salvation was devised by which a second probation was given the race. By tasting death himself, Christ obtained the keys of the grave, and thus redeemed the race from the penalty of Adam's sin in Eden. By virtue of Christ's resurrection, all mankind are entitled to a resurrection, so that each person will have an opportunity to stand or fall on his own merits. Those who die the second time, who suffer the second death, die in consequence of their own sins while on the second probation, and will be annihilated by being destroyed, together with the memory of their evil deeds. Ps. 109:15. The object of the Judgment and of the punishment of sinners is not, according to our view, simply to make the transgressor suffer for his evil deeds, but to verify the word of God, "The soul that sinneth, it shall die"

(Eze. 18:20), and to make an example of the results of sin for the benefit of the whole universe.

The argument made from Gal. 2:18 is a very ingenious one, but, we fear, somewhat sophistical in character. Paul had been criticising Peter because he had compelled some Gentile brethren to follow the obsolete Jewish rites and ceremonies which he had himself discarded. He then adds, "If I build again the things which I destroyed, I make myself a transgressor." That is, if I require men to observe the ceremonial law which I have taught is no longer in force and have myself disregarded, I am a transgressor. Paul would be a transgressor, not simply because he rebuilt what he had destroyed,—for such an action might be the most righteous thing to do under some circumstances,—but because he had rebuilt that which he still believed to be worthy of destruction. Of course God could not do such an act. But the least vestige of argument disappears when we consider the fact that God does not destroy man at the first death. Man dies in consequence of the wearing out of the vital machinery, and often destroys himself by the most wanton abuse of his natural powers.

Eld. W. evidently does not understand our views respecting the nature of identity, and this may be the reason why he has so often misunderstood us on other points, as this is the central idea of our view of the soul and the resurrection. At any rate, our views on this point are quite different from what Eld. W. represents. He says, quoting us, "It is evident that the identical atoms need not, necessarily, compose the resurrected body," and adds, "If so, then the identity of the person can only consist in his spiritual nature." The conclusion is by no means a necessary one, and Eld. W. has not even laid for it a logical basis, since he has not proven that man has a spiritual nature independent of his material body. We have labored at some length to show from scientific evidence that personal identity may be maintained otherwise than by a separate conscious entity. We have endeavored to show, first, that the power to preserve personal identity or individuality is the essential property of the soul. In this view we are supported by Canon Barry, whose name has been before mentioned in this article, and Mr. Hutton, the editor of the London Spectator, and well known as one of the most subtle thinkers and eminent authors of the day, and a Broad-church theologian. Mr. Hutton, supported by Canon Barry, defines the soul as being that "which lies at the bottom of the sense of personal identity, the thread of continuity running through all our checkered life." This is our view exactly. Now we have shown in our work on the Soul and the Resurrection that the thing which lies at the bottom of personal identity is not an immaterial conscious entity, but the organization, or in other words, the sum of the relations of the material parts entering into the formation of the individual. Will Eld. W. tell us what lies at the bottom of the identity of an animal, a horse, for instance? What makes one horse differ from another? Is it the difference in the kind of atoms which enter into his structure, or is it the difference in the manner in which the atoms are put together; in other words, in the organization? or is it a "rational or moral nature"? We think Eld. W. and all other candid reasoners will readily agree with us that organization is the foundation of identity in horses and all other lower animals. In fact, the established principles of physiology shut us up to this conclusion. If organization is sufficient to form a basis for identity in lower animals, what reason can be given as evidence that organization is not equally competent in the case of man? We know that man possesses an organization, and we know that organization may form the foundation for individual identity, which Mr. Hutton and Canon Barry, two great theological lights, say is the soul; what need have we, then, of an immaterial entity to accomplish the same purpose? The only ground that can be offered for the existence of such an appendage to man, is the supposed necessity; but when this is removed, or shown not to exist, then those who hold to this view are left absolutely destitute of even a semblance of argument.

Eld. W. frequently cites inanimate and wholly unsuitable objects as illustrations in speaking of the nature of human identity. As we have shown in a former article, and at length in the work reviewed, man must be compared with an object of his own class, as a river, a rainbow, an animal, or some object which naturally undergoes changes in matter, and to some degree in organization. The positions taken by us respecting the nature of identity, Eld. W. has not attempted to controvert, and hence we have a right to believe that he admits them to be correct. If this be true, he cannot escape our conclusions, unless he can show defects in our methods of reasoning, which, again, he has not attempted. He has only criticised our conclu- sions, but has neither shown errors in our premises, nor defects in our logic. The argument about the hickory and the basswood buggy, as intimated, is wholly irrelevant. A buggy is not an object naturally subject to change, and consequently a change of matter changes its identity. Eld. Wardner holds that any change in the organization must make a corresponding change in character, and hence cause a loss of identity, so that there can be no opportunity for improvements in the resurrection body. If a slight change in character causes loss of identity, then human identity is a very changeable element, since, as Eld. W. must admit, human characters are continually changing. His view involves the same difficulty, if difficulty there be,—we do not see any,—since he holds, with us, that the soul is the means of identification, and also holds that the character is the product of the soul. Now, it is evident that the character can only change by corresponding changes in the soul. As Eld. W. says, "A different cause cannot produce the same effect," and vice versa, a different effect cannot come from the same cause. It clearly follows, then, from Eld. W.'s own reasoning, that the perfected soul in the future state will not be the soul which it purports to be, which existed in this present state, any more than, to use his own illustrations, a basswood buggy would be a hickory one, a wood house one of stone, or a flame that was extinguished hundreds of years ago the same as a flame which burns to-day.

We agree with Eld. W., that "to punish one person for sins committed by another because of physical likeness, would seem like monstrous injustice." We have never intimated belief in such a theory, and must complain of at least a slight degree of injustice in being so represented. What we have endeavored to maintain is that personal identity does not consist in identity of matter. This point we think we have established, as also that personal identity does consist in identity of organization, instead of identity of an immaterial entity or non-entity. If we have not proven our position on this point, which, as before remarked, is the central idea in our views on this subject, let it be shown by logical arguments.

Again Eld. W. says, following the same line of argument, "To compel such a new being to recognize himself to be the other person, composed of different materials, and with changed organization," etc., "seems as unreasonable as to compel an American to recognize himself to be a Hottentot." Eld. W. will admit that the body is changed, and he must admit that the soul is also changed, since the character, evidently, is more or less modified, at least in those who are saved. Hence, he is involved in the same difficulty, and we may say with equal justice, "to compel such a human being to recognize himself to be the other person, composed of different materials, and with changed soul, etc.," "seems as unreasonable as to compel an American to recognize himself to be a Hottentot." The illustration is a lame one, even if it were appropriate, for our reviewer has made his metamorphosis work the wrong way. The characters of the redeemed are not to be made worse, but better, by leaving out defects; and surely there would be no injustice in this, any more than there would be in making a sound man out of a cripple, or an enlightened, civilized American out of a benighted, degraded, half-starved Hottentot. We may be very obtuse, but it appears to us that under such circumstances there would be no occasion for charging God with injustice.

Says Eld. W., "If soul, body, and spirit are all annihilated at death," etc. This argument needs no attention, as we have never taken any such position. Indeed, as before remarked, our chief aim in writing the book under review was to show that man possesses a soul which does not perish at death, even though he may not possess a conscious immaterial entity.

The argument from 2 Cor. 5:6-8 we have fully answered in a previous article, and need not give further attention until it has been shown that our answer is not conclusive.

The argument from Phil. 1:21-24 is sufficiently answered by Paul himself, in 2 Cor. 5:4: "For we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened; not for that we would be unclothed." See also verses 2 and 3. Paul evidently looked forward to the time when "the dead shall be raised incorruptible," when "mortal shall put on immortality,"—this is not being unclothed,—and when the living are changed and "caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air." It was this time which Paul had reference to, for he said (1 Thess. 4:17), "And so shall we ever be with the Lord." It was at the resurrection, not at death, that Paul was to "be with Christ." This is further shown by the fact that Paul declares in 1 Cor. 15 that if there is no resurrection,

they which have "fallen asleep in Christ are perished." According to Eld. W.'s view, Paul was mistaken. Instead of saying, They which have fallen asleep are "perished," he should have said, They which have fallen asleep in Christ will remain forever with him in an unclothed state, "happier than while in the flesh," but not perfectly happy, since "God evidently designed that the human spirit should find its highest happiness in union with a body," etc. How does this agree with the declaration of the psalmist, "In thy presence is fulness of joy"? Is it possible that Paul could have held any such views as this? If he did, it is no wonder that he declared that he did not wish to be "unclothed," though Eld. W. continually argues in the face of Paul's direct statement that he was anxious to be "unclothed," or to be "out of the body."

Again, says Eld. W., "From the above it is evident that the resurrection promised by Christ is not the production of a new spirit by a new body," etc. It needs no argument to show this. We have never claimed the contrary, neither is it a legitimate deduction from our premises. We only differ with Eld. W. respecting the nature of the soul or spirit. We claim it to be the organization, which is, during death, represented in Heaven by the life-record of the individual, and preserves his identity during the intermediate state, and is at the resurrection again represented in matter, thus reinstating the individual.

Our reviewer says, "A person who becomes deformed does not change his identity for this reason." Certainly not, any more than does a person whose "rational or moral nature" becomes deformed, by sin, change or lose his identity in consequence.

Eld. W. builds an argument for the immortality of the soul upon the fact that Christ said, "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up." This argument has no force, unless it is contended that the real Christ did not die. If this be true, then the atonement was only a human sacrifice after all, and the death of Christ was no more efficacious than would have been the death of Adam, or any other representative member of the race. Again, in what did the sacrifice consist, if, as according to Eld. W.'s view, Christ did not really die, but simply rested three days in a condition in which he was "happier than while in the flesh"? This would be no sacrifice at all.

But let us look a little deeper into this question by reference to the original Greek. In Mark 10:45 we read that Christ came "to give his life [Greek ΈΈψή, psucha, soul] a ransom for many." "My soul [psuche] is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death." Matt. 26:38. "Thou wilt not leave my soul [psuche] in hell [the grave]." Acts 2:27. Eld. Wardner says that the word here translated life and soul means simply animal life; but this rendering would make nonsense of the Sacred Word, as will appear by supplying this definition for the words life and soul in the text. Christ came "to give his animal life a ransom for many." "My animal life is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death." "Thou wilt not leave my animal life in hell." Even Eld. W. will not claim that Christ's animal life could be sorrowful. We can see no way of escape from the conclusion that it was Christ's "rational or moral nature" that was "sorrowful unto death." Hence, according to the testimony of Christ it was possible that his soul or "rational or moral nature" should die; and that the very same did die is evidenced by the testimony of Isaiah, "He hath poured out his soul [psuche] unto death," and that of John, "He laid down his life [psuche] for us." That the words soul and life here may mean something more than the mere animal or physical life, considered distinct from the "rational or moral nature," is evident not only from the sense of the language, but also from the fact that it is thus defined by Greek scholars. Robinson gives as one of the definitions of psuche, "the soul of man." This definition is fully justified by the use of the word in various texts of Scripture. The following texts are given by the lexicographer among others as illustrative of this use of the word psuche: Matt. 10:28: "And fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul." Heb. 10:39: "But of them that believe to the saving of the soul." James 1:21: "Which is able to save your souls." Chap. 5:20: "He which converteth the sinner from the error of his way shall save a soul from death." 1 Pet. 2:11: "Abstain from fleshly lusts, which war against the soul." Will Eld. W. attempt to maintain that soul in all these instances means simply "animal life"? We think not. Have we not then shown by credible evidence that the language of Scripture does not forbid the view that Christ himself, even his divine nature, suffered the death of the soul? According to Heb. 13:20, it was "the God of peace that brought again from the dead our Lord Jesus," and not he that resurrected

himself. So also in Acts 2:24 we read, "Whom God hath raised up," and in verse 32, "This Jesus hath God raised up." Rom. 4:24, 25: "If we believe on Him that raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead, who was delivered for our offenses, and was raised again for our justification." Numerous other texts teach the very same doctrine. Christ "was raised." He did not raise himself except by his faith in God, his Father, that he would raise him from the dead. Paul says explicitly in Gal. 1:1, "By Jesus Christ, and God the Father, who raised him from the dead."